MODELOS TEÓRICOS DE AUTO-CONCEPTO

Besides individual strategies, the industry also employed collective strategies to counter the growing international competition in the cotton industry during the inter-war and post-war period. Since international competition was an industry-wide problem, firms pursued several collectivist strategies to counter this threat, an aspect overlooked by Lazonick in the supply- side thesis (Dupree 1990: 106).

During the interwar years, the industry crafted a new relationship with the Government by engaging in a frequent dialogue to influence the regulations in overseas markets (Dupree 1990). The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, with its long history as a major representative body within the industry, played a prominent role in these proceedings. The industry and trade unions viewed the loss in the export market as an ‘exogenous issue’ about which they could do little without the Government’s assistance (Bowden and Higgins 1998: 323). However, success in the collective efforts of the industry to negotiate trade regulations in Japan and India were ‘often long in coming and complicated to achieve’ (Rose 2000: 248). With little maneuverability in labour wages, owing to fear of trade union’s action, with fluctuating raw material prices and falling price of goods, there was not much the industry could do to control the costs. The industry thus turned its attention to avoiding the ‘ruinous price competition’ through some form of price agreement and short-time working, which would help in curtailing the out-put and stabilize the prices (Bowden and Higgins 1998: 324-332). However, as firms used different kinds of raw cotton (i.e. Egyptian for finer qualities, American for coarse and medium qualities) and were thus not affected equally, any lasting agreement on price was difficult to maintain and, by 1933, all efforts towards achieving this were discarded (p. 339). The industry also made an attempt to increase its productivity through ‘more loom per weaver scheme’ (Bowden and Higgins 1999). The aim of this scheme was to increase the number of looms tended by workers. Traditionally, a weaver looked after four looms. The experiment would have increased that to eight looms per weaver. However, it would also have also resulted in alternation of the wage structure, which was set on industry bases. Therefore, in order for the scheme to be successful, it was important to receive an industry wide support. However, this could not be achieved because of two major reasons. First, firms specialized in

different areas. The experiment was mainly aimed at the bulk market which was affected by the international competition. Firms which specialized in higher-end good were not set to gain by it. Second, the conditions set by unions in return for implementing the scheme were also very stringent, especially with regards to wages, and the firms were unwilling to alter their existing wage arrangements.

Nonetheless, collective strategies continued to play a major role in meeting the challenge of rising imports and declining markets after the Second World War. In the post-War period, the Cotton Board, established in 1940 during the War, played a significant role in representing the industry’s collective concerns (Dupree 1990). The Board played a vital role in liaising between the industry and the Government on important issues; including charting the industry’s post- war trade (export) policy and representing its interest during the GATT negotiations. Yet, its ‘ambiguous dual role’, in representing both the industry and the Board of Trade, often proved to be a major handicap. This was evident when the Government failed to consult the Board during the negotiation of the crucial ‘Anglo-Japanese Payments and Trade Agreement’ (p. 120). Even at a broader level, the industry failed to receive much help from the Government in negotiating favourable trade agreements in important export markets such as Japan and India. More importantly, the industry had lost its ‘bargaining power’ and ‘many aspects of the Government’s policy were diametrically opposed to the interests’ of the industry (Rose 2000: 292). To an extent, the Government’s inability to assist was also due to its diminished political influence at an international level in the post-war era (p. 293). Another form of collective strategy employed by the industry during the post-war period was in the form of price agreements. In 1939 the Cotton Industry (Reorganisation) Act was passed with an aim to stabilize prices which had been destabilized since the end of the First World War. However, the act could not be implemented fully as the war broke out during that year. After the end of the Second World War, the Labour government, owing to inflationary pressures, was not keen to give official support to price schemes and withdrew the statutory price support mechanism in 1949, leaving the responsibility of formulating similar schemes to the industry. In response to this, the spinning section of the industry established the Yarn Spinners Association to formulate and oversee the minimum prices for yarns. However, this scheme was controversial right from its inception (Singleton 1991). The bone of contention was the negative effect of the yarn price agreements on the weaving section (p. 197). With a relatively high price level

maintained by the spinning and finishing section, the majority of weaving firms, who did not have their own spinning facility, felt their margins being squeezed. The yarn price agreements, however, were dismantled in 1958 under the Restrictive Practices Act which was introduced in 1956. Similar price agreements were not introduced in the weaving section of the industry. The main reason for this was the presence of a large number of small-sized firms in the weaving section (p. 202). While seven of the largest firms in the spinning section controlled 38% of spinning capacity, the seven largest firms in the weaving section controlled only one tenth of the total weaving capacity (p. 202).

Hence, collective strategies formed a crucial part of the cotton industry’s strategic response during the inter-war and post-war period, although implementing them was not always as straight forward owing to conflicting interests within the industry. As a result, they were not highly successful in helping the industry counter the growing international competition.