Modelos teóricos del proceso de duelo

place within the CCW – the only worldwide multilateral negotiation arena for

disarmament matters. Many other countries feared that the requirement for consensus would postpone the materialisation of a ban indefinitely. These countries did not aim for the participation of all relevant countries but for a more speedy process and ongoing expansion. The Netherlands joined the latter group.246 _{Although speed seemed to be of}

overriding importance to the Netherlands, the Dutch delegation was surprised to learn from Canada during the closing session, that this country aimed for a signing conference in the fall of 1997. Yet it voiced its sympathy for the ambitious Canadian plans and offered administrative support to the Belgian offer to host the preparatory conference in June 1997.

Once the Ottawa process had started, the Dutch participated in a series of four meetings in which the Ottawa treaty was negotiated. During a relatively short period of

negotiations the Dutch delegation made several efforts to promote the Dutch position. In January 1997, the Netherlands was invited to the Vienna Expert Meeting to discuss a first draft for a ‘Convention to Ban Anti-personnel Mines’. During this meeting, it became clear that many countries (including the UK, US, France, Finland) were reluctant to adopt a total ban, in spite of the joint support for such a ban in October 1996 during the First Ottawa Conference. What is important here is that the opinions of the EU countries differed greatly. The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Sweden and Ireland presented themselves as proponents of total ban on APMs, while the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Finland declared themselves openly against it. It was for that reason the Netherlands opted to exercise restraint in the absence of EU consensus. At the same time it was also decided at the political level to strive to overcome the differences of interest in the EU, in order to make the EU an active and stimulating actor in the realisation of a ban. It was for this reason that on 7 February 1997 a special EU meeting was convened by the Dutch Presidency.247

In April 1997, the Netherlands participated in a special International Expert Meeting in Bonn to exchange views on ‘Possible Verification Measures to ban Anti-Personnel Landmines’. During this Bonn Expert Meeting, new dividing lines emerged between a group of countries that advocated a strict verification regime and many countries that thought verification unnecessary. Together with Sweden, the Dutch delegation took the view that verification was useful, but not necessary. At the invitation of Canada, Dutch representatives also attended an informal Ottawa Core Group Meeting preceding the Bonn Expert Meeting.

Two months later, in June 1997, the ‘International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti- Personnel Mines’ or Brussels Conference which served as the official follow-up to the

246 TK, 24292, nr. 13:3. 247 TK, 25000, V, nr. 72.

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1996 Ottawa Conference took place in Brussels/Belgium. The primary task of the Brussels Conference was to adopt a declaration forwarding the latest Austrian draft text for negotiation and adoption to the Diplomatic Conference being convened in Oslo in September 1997.248 _{For this purpose Belgium had sent around a draft text of a joint}

declaration. Again the Dutch took pains not to present themselves as fervent supporters of Ottawa, in view of the neutral role the Netherlands was expected to play as EU President. Instead, officials from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs dissuaded their colleagues at the embassy in Trinidad and Tobago from joining in on a Canadian démarche to promote participation in the Brussels Conference. Furthermore, they rejected the Belgian proposal to present the draft text on behalf of the Netherlands. During the Brussels Conference, Dutch policymakers once more made an effort to bring the EU countries into line on the issue of APMs. At the proposal of the Dutch chair, the EU abandoned the idea of a joint declaration on APMs, because of the huge differences of opinion. Instead, the joint action on 1 October 1996 and the EU support to mine clearance was brought forward by the head of the Dutch delegation in a panel discussion on regional activities. The Dutch representatives also participated in another core group meeting in Brussels to discuss further strategies. During this meeting too, differences of opinion on how to proceed in the Ottawa process came to the fore between the core group countries: Belgium, Norway and Brazil wanted a total ban without any reservations, while Canada, the Netherlands and Germany aimed to attract as many countries as possible, if necessary by means of transitional provisions. The Brussels Conference culminated in the signing of the Brussels Declaration by 97 of the 155 governments attending. In this declaration the essential ingredients of a treaty were formulated: a total ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs, the destruction of stockpiles and removed APMs, and international cooperation and assistance in relation to mine clearance. Nevertheless the Dutch delegation reported that the opinions in the international community still differed greatly on the issue of APMs. Most observer countries rejected the establishment of a total ban through the Ottawa process. These countries remained opposed to negotiations outside the CCW framework and appeared to support the use of APMs for the time being. Furthermore, the proponents of the Ottawa process held different views on the issues of special provisions, the obligation to provide international assistance and the need and usefulness of verification measures. With respect to these issues the Netherlands adopted a pragmatic approach. It aimed at getting as many countries as possible to agree to a total ban. If concessions were needed to win over hesitant countries, such concessions were acceptable as long as this did not undermine the overall goal of a total ban. Accordingly, the Dutch embassy in Brussels again emphasised in

communications to the Ministry the problems the US had with the Ottawa process. The US wanted special provisions concerning the presence of APMs in the northern border region of South Korea: without such provisions the Ottawa Convention would be of no

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