Moldeado

LLB III-B

VELAZCO vs. VIZMANOS G.R. No. L-21244 February 7, 1924 Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Encarnacion Saenz de Vizmanos died intestate on November 16, 1921, leaving no heirs by force of law ( herederos forzosos). The appellee was appointed the administrator of the estate of the deceased and, in the administration proceedings, the Court of First Instance issued an order of distribution in which certain collateral relatives of the deceased in the fourth degree were declared heirs. The appellants herein are relatives in the sixth degree and claim participation in the inheritance, but were excluded there from in the order of the distribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants contention of claiming participation in the heritance is valid as they are in the sixth degree?

HELD:

There is no dispute as to the fact that the persons declared heirs are nearer to the deceased in relationship than are the appellants, but counsel for the latter argues strenuously that the former were not properly represented in the administration proceedings and that, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over them and could not properly declare them heirs.

There is of course, no merit whatever in this contention. Under articles 657, 658, and 661 of the Civil Code, the title to the inheritance is transmitted to the heirs immediately upon the death of the predecessor and, upon sufficient proof that certain persons are the heirs of the deceased, it becomes the duty of the court to order the distribution of the estate to them in the due course of the administration proceedings no matter whether such persons have formally appeared in the proceedings or not.

The order of distribution appealed from is in conformity with article 921 of the Civil Code and is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.

LLB III-B

FULE vs. FULE G.R. No. 21859 September 30, 1924 Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. The special administrator presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.

The petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their petition for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had been requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition of the property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors is denied.

ISSUE:

1. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law?

2. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?

HELD:

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable judge, revoked the

appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an account. On the same day, the Honorable Judge denied the appointment of an administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for the partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case he should fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the appointment of an administrator is denied.

Upon the second question, it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.

In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other co-owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other co-owners of undivided property. And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of a will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. It is difficult to conceive of any one class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the co-owners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.

LLB III-B

REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATU G.R. No. L-17818

January 25, 1967 Topic: Effect of Inclusion of Intruder in Partition FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project of partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Upon the widow’s death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. Plaintiff then filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of properties left for them under Bibiano’s will. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all theother properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio. This was based on Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889: “A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.” CFI rejected plaintiff’s contention that since Bibiano was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from

Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Art 1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirerin implied trust for the real owner.

ISSUE:

1. WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano is void.

2. WON there was preterition?

HELD:

1. NO

The agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles inthe name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of theheirs, long before the decree was attacked. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, insteadof an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another courtor judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence,the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article.

2. NO.

The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime does not invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. There was no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.

LLB III-B

Dais vs CFI of Capiz 51 Phil 396 Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Serapion Dais died intestate. The court appointed a judicial administrator to do the transactions on the inheritance according to the orders of the court especially on the liquidation and partition processes. The Dais Heirs filed for a complaint to dismiss the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. The Dais heirs wanted that their respective portions be delivered to them immediately because they contested that the they already acquired ownership from the moment the decedent died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs after accepting inheritance can demand delivery of respective portions even there is an appointed administrator.

HELD:

No. Although the heirs acquired ownership over the inheritance from the moment of death of the decedent, they cannot compel the administrator to deliver to them their respective portions to which they are entitled. The judicial administrator, by virtue of his appointment, acquires the right to the possession of the estate subject to the orders of the court.