Moldería y forrería: campera de cuero

DOMINGO VICENTE, petitioner, vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner.

Sarmiento, J. Facts:

The petitioner, Domingo Vicente, was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. On August 5, 1981, at the age of forty-five, and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional retirement (effective August 16, 1981) under the provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as reason therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits claim for payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. Both applications were accompanied by the necessary supporting papers, among them being a "Physician's Certification" issued by the petitioner's attending doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, Dr. Avelino A. Lopez, M.D., F.P.C.S., ** F.I.C.S. *** (Section Chief, General, Thoracic & Peripheral Surgery, Surgical Department, Veterans Medical Center, Hilaga Avenue, Quezon City), who had diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from:

Osteoarthritis, multiple;

Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease; Cardiomegaly; and

Left Ventricular Hypertrophy;

and classified him as being under "permanent total disability."

The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16, 1981 up to March 1983.

On March 14, 1983, the petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him and prayed that the same be extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his attending physician, as indicated in the latter's Certification. As a consequence of his motion for reconsideration, and on the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation" of the Medical Services Center of the GSIS, the petitioner was granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months benefits. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on November 6, 1986, insisting that he (petitioner) should be compensated no less than for "permanent total disability." On June 30, 1987, the said manager informed the petitioner that his request had been denied. Undaunted, the petitioner sought reconsideration and as a result of which, on September 10, 1987, his case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Later, or on October 1, 1987, the petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA probably thrombosis of the left middle cerebral artery."

On August 24, 1988, the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal.

Issues:

The respondent Commission argues that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from "permanent total disability." The findings of the petitioner's attending physician is not binding on the GSIS, nor on the Commission, as the proper evaluation of an employee's degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical experts who have specialized on the subject.

Held:

Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service.

Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer, the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, categorically certified that the petitioner was classified under permanent total disability. On this score, "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification." And, "[N]o physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection."

The fact that the petitioner was granted benefits amounting to the equivalent of twenty-three months shows that the petitioner was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. This kind of disability is precisely covered by Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensability.

There being no showing that the petitioner's disability is "temporary total" as defined by the law, the inescapable conclusion is that he suffers from permanent total disability.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability. Respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is accordingly ORDERED to award the petitioner the benefits corresponding to his permanent total disability.

GSIS vs. Court of Appeals and R. Balais G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998 FACTS:

Private respondent Rosa Balais an employee of National Housing Authority suffered from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm, because of this she can no longer perform efficiently. For this reason, she retired and filed for disability benefits. GSIS granted her application for temporary total disability and later was changed to permanent partial disability. She again filed with GSIS an application for permanent total disability, which GSIS denied on the ground that her condition does not qualify for permanent total disability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Rosa Balais is entitled of her permanent total disability?

HELD:

“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause” (GSIS vs. CA. G.R. No. 116015, July 31, 1996)

In the case at bar, the denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent who, for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on account of her worsening conditioning would indeed subvert the salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The court, therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondent’s disability from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability.

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SSS) vs. EDMUND SANICO G.R. No. 134028. December 17, 1999

Ponente: Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

Private respondent Edmund Sanico was a former employee of John Gotamco and sons as a wood filler from 1986 until he was separated from employment on December 31, 1991 due to his illness. According to his medical evaluation report he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis PTB.

On November 9, 1994, private respondent filed with the Social Security System (SSS) a claim on the ground of prescription. The SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor Code, a claim for compensation shall be given due course only when the same is filed with System three (3) years for the time the cause of action accrued. According to SSS the three (3) year prescriptive period on 21 September 1991 when his PTB first became manifest. When he filed his claim on November 9, 1994, the claim had allegedly already prescribed.

On appeal, petitioner ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. Private respondent then elevated the case to the CA, which reversed petitioner’s decision and granted private respondent’s claim for compensation benefits. In ruling that the private respondent’s claim was filed well within the prescriptive period under the law the CA reconciled Art. 201 of the Labor Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code. That “an action upon an obligation must be filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues and that private respondent’s filing of his compensation claim on November 9,1994 was within, even long before, The prescriptive period.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent’s claim for compensation benefit had already prescribed when he filed his claim on November 9, 1994?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Private respondent Sanico.

The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the time the employees lost his earning capacity, terminated from employment, due to his illness and not when the same first became manifest. In this case the private respondent’s was terminated on December 31, 1991 due to his illness, he filed his claim for compensation benefits on Nov. 9, 1994, accordingly, private respondent’s claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 201 of the Labor Code.

“Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.” Permanent disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income.

ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner,

vs.

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Highways), respondents.

Facts:

Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), Batangas Provincial Office. His Service Record further shows that thereafter, from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21 June 1973. Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, Batangas Province. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa City, Batangas, attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident'.

On 5 March 1975, petitioner, as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with Regional Office No. IV of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Department of Labor, a claim for compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended). In this claim, the decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage due to Hypertension. 3 Petitioner's claim was referred by the WCU to the BPH which, however, controverted the claim of petitioner. In a letter dated 26 June 1975, BPH asserted that there was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in [petitioner's] claim with the nature of the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 24, Act No. 3428, as amended, regarding the giving of notice and subsequent filing of claim.

BPH, further, asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that claim had been filed against the wrong party, Artemio's employer at the time of his death being the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, rather than the BPH.

The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC)

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that it had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits.

Ruling:

It is well settled that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. The burden of proving non-compensability of the cause of death is shifted to the employer. Respondent Batangas Provincial Engineer had failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, none of the respondents even attempted to present any evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability; all of them chose to rely upon the formal defenses discussed above. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the statutory presumption. In legal effect, no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset that legal presumption. The Court, therefore, is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of petitioner's claim.

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 115497 September 16, 1996

FACTS:

Deceased seaman, Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels, "MV Amazonia", owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties.

On September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila. His flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked on and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila.

Thereafter, Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; According to the Thai police, Pineda approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda.

The heirs of Pineda filed a claim for death benefits against herein petitioners. The POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial expenses.

Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA.

Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari. ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Pineda can claim death benefits and compensation against the employer.

HELD:

Yes, the employer should pay compensation and death benefits of Pineda to his heirs. According to the Supreme Court, attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta , was the 2nd _{Engr. of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course}

of his employment with petitioner . The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. He was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 at the time of his death.

In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.

Ministry of Labor and Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following:

I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;

II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses; III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees. It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.

Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor.

On December 11, 1979, the Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows: The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the questioned Order. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law of Singapore should not be applied

ISSUE: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case?

HELD: We rule in the affirmative. It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and

quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue immediately.

In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention, including hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury

incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall