It was noted in the previous chapter that the distant water fishing industry has been undergoing a process of economic decline, which has been exacerbated by international developments. The Japanese government, in response, has taken various measures to support the industry and to alleviate the effects of adjustment. But there are also limits to what it considers politically feasible; hence the importance of fisheries grants and OFCF aid as a less direct but also less politically contentious form of support The policy objectives of the Fisheries Agency, as set out by an official in the mid-1980s were:
1) To achieve stable operations in overseas fishing grounds. In this context, Japan has enhanced international fishery cooperation wth various coastal states enabling Japanese vessels to fish in overseas fishing grounds.
2) To maintain and cultivate fishery resources in coastal waters around Japan and to effectively utilise these resources.
3) To improve the economic conditions of fishermen suffering from sharply increased costs of production, stagnated prices and gradual decrease in fish consumption. [Therefore] the Agency encourages the fishing industry to reduce production costs through rationalisation of fishing operations and introduction o f energy saving types of fishing vessels and gears through special financial loan program and favoured tax policy for fishing industry.83
The third point above reflects the changing economic conditions of Japan’s fishing industry. The economic problems of Japan’s tuna fleets have been the ostensible reason why Japan’s fishing industry and government have resisted paying higher access fees. The 4 per cent rate of return was described by one industry official as the ‘break even’ point for their operations. The fact that they paid higher rates of return to countries such as Australia was because of the higher market value of the catch (bluefin tuna).84
83 Takayoshi Horikoshi, ‘Japan’, Fishing and Industry in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Productivity Organisation, Tokyo, 1988, p.327.
84 Interview, Nikkatsuren, Tokyo, June 1993. This claim is treated with some scepticism by the FFA. The FFA has estimated that fishing fleets could afford between 6 and 8 per cent, depending on the vessel size. It has been estimated that the access fee as a proportion of total operating costs varies between 0.2 per cent and 6 per cent, depending on vessel size and gear type. Fuel and labour account for the bulk of
The availablility of fisheries grant aid and OFCF cooperation, and the willingness of the Japanese government to use this aid to support access negotiations with the Pacific island states, meant that industry had a way out of paying higher rates of return.
But the Fisheries Agency has not always supported policies favoured by the distant water industry. A key factor shaping government policy has been the domestic political climate in Japan. This was evident in policy on a multilateral agreement with the region and whether or not the government should directly contribute to access fees.
When the FFA members first proposed a multilateral access arrangement with Japan in 1987 it was the Fisheries Agency and Special Advisor who led the strong opposition against the initative. The Japanese tuna industry, on the other hand, was supportive in principle. Not only did they favour a regional access agreement in order to secure access for their fleets in the face of competition from other fleets, they also favoured a government contribution to access fees, similar to that provided by the US government. The problem was that they were unsuccessful in persuading government to ‘change its policy ... and use direct linkage between fishing access and aid’.85
Why were they unsuccessful? This negative response by government is especially striking in view of the political rhetoric at the time that had declared Japan’s concern about Soviet intrusion and the intention to contribute to the region’s economic and political development and stability. It is obvious from this that fisheries issues were not considered to be part of Japan’s foreign policy initiative (the Kuranari Doctrine).
Apart from the different positions on questions of management of tuna,86 domestic political factors were of importance. There was a view, reflected by senior fisheries officials that the proposal would not have sufficient political support, and therefore that MOF would not be pressured to allocate the necessary financial resources.
On the one hand, MOFA and the Oceania Division in particular, did not lobby for the proposed multilateral agreem ent This would be a logical source of political support. Wfrile MOFA appears to have taken its cue from the Fisheries Agency, who led decision making in this area, it was nevertheless apparent that MOFA officials did not support the use of government funds to subsidise the operations of Japan’s fishing fleets.87
the industry’s operating costs. David J. Doulman, ‘Japanese Distant-Water Fishing in the South Pacific’, p.25.
85 Interview, Tsutomu Watanabe, Executive Director, Nikkatsuren, Tokyo, May 1993. The industry representatives seemed resigned to the position taken by government on this issue.
86 It is apparent that Japan’s fisheries negotiators used the issue o f a multilateral access arrangement to try and gain ground on a broad-based regional fisheries organisation in the region, that would have given Japan some say over questions o f resource allocation and utilisation.
87 This was discussed earlier. Former Oceania D ivision Director, Nobuaki Tanaka, argued that the proposal for a multilateral access agreement was not taken seriously by his Division because it did not appear to have the full support o f the region; nor was the regional position clearly stated.
On the other hand, there was an assessment by the Fisheries Agency that political support for the multilateral agreement would not be forthcoming in the Diet. This was seen to reflect the following factors: 1) a decline in political influence of the fishing industry due to population decline in fishing areas, thus a smaller voting basis for the fishing industry; 2) financial difficulties of the large and medium-sized fishing enterprises, which meant they were not as significant political contributors as in the past; and 3) fragmentation of the fishing industry due to competition and rivalry between different groups, which also reduced their political influence.88
Strong political support was regarded as a prerequisite for persuading MOF to allocate resources as part of a fisheries agreement. It was the assessment of the Fisheries Agency and Japan Fisheries Association that a proposal for providing a direct subsidy to the fishing industry in the form of a contribution to a multilateral access agreement would be strongly opposed by MOF on the grounds of ‘keeping financial discipline’. It was argued that the ‘subsidisation of access fees would trigger increased demands from coastal nations’. Moreover, the Japanese negotiator would not seek ‘to ensure the lowest possible fee for Japanese industry’.89
A final factor that may have influenced policy on the multilateral access
agreement was the changing priorities of the Fisheries Agency. Increasingly, Japan was facing the prospect of environmental concerns and campaigns threatening closure of fishing grounds not only in EEZs but also on the high seas. Thus there was a new imperative for fisheries aid: to build diplomatic support for Japan in international fora (where new policies and international laws were being developed) and to use aid in ways that demonstrated Japan’s concern about environmental consequences of fishing and conservation of stocks. Access to foreign EEZs for Japan’s fleets was not the sole (or principal) objective of fisheries grant aid. The priority was to keep the seas open to all fishing activity. This new aid agenda is discussed below.90
88 These assessments were given by a number of observers in Japan interviewed by the author. They included senior government officials, industry leaders and scholars. Population decline in the fisheries sector is evident in census figures. See MAFF, Fisheries Statistics of Japan 1991, Statistics and Information Department, Tokyo, 1993, pp.24-5
89 That is, the negotiator would not aim to keep fees low. Interview, former Director General o f the Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, June 1993.
90 It was suggested by a former Director General o f the Fisheries Agency that this new priority for fisheries grant aid would mean less emphasis on using aid in concert with access negotiations. Interview, Tokyo, June 1993.