The successful conclusion of the campaign against the rebel shizoku in the Seinan War emphatically ended the possibility of armed resistance to the government. By 1878, the last major armed insurrection against the new centralized government had been safely quelled and the Restoration leaders could look forward to moving on to, using O–kubo Toshimichi’s phrase, “the more thorough fulfilment of the Restoration.”1 From ther-
eon in, other avenues of sedition and activism—either through the pro- motion of political organizations, the founding of an anti- government press or the carrying out of isolated acts of violence—would be the only remaining options.
Of equal significance was the fact that Satsuma, which up until the war had been the source of a considerable degree of dissent toward the central government, was finally forced to follow suit and join the rank and file. That this was accomplished by force of arms under the direc- tion of a government that included Satsuma leaders signifies the degree to which the government had committed itself to a totally centralized form of government and, in having done so, alienated that segment of the shizoku population who either wanted to preserve the shizoku traditions practically unreconstructed or simply did not understand the administrative necessity of the seamlessly integrated nation state. O–kubo, Kido and Ito- were all well aware of what was at stake and pushed forward regardless of the potential for instability and even personal harm. Kido is said to have never recovered from the trauma of engaging his former comrades in war—and O–kubo was to bear the mortal consequences of his government’s decisions: he was assas- sinated by a group of samurai from Kanazawa on 14 May 1878. This left a smaller coterie of 1868 leaders, including Ito- Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru and O–kuma Shigenobu, to pick up the pieces and attempt to give
administrative and social substance to what was now still the sturdy but nonetheless relatively bare frame of government.2
There was a palpable difference in the nature of the political chal- lenges that lay ahead; since widespread violent rebellion was no longer an option for the opponents of the government, the modes of resist- ance and agitation became much more subtle and complex. Moreover, the government was no longer the fledgling reform party that swept into control amid the turmoil and feverish anticipation of the Sonno-
Jo-i movement, but was itself now being held to account for the failure
to revise the unequal treaties and the equally galling failure to keep Western influences—commercial, political and cultural—at bay.
Consequently, from 1879 the nation entered what could be described as a prolonged period of intense popular agitation against the govern- ment through the popular press and by means of organizing political associations and meetings with public speakers throughout the country. The government was to become increasingly aware that they were not the sole arbiters of the social agenda, as disaffected elements within the body politic, more often than not disaffected samurai, came to be gal- vanized through the popular (or populist) press.3 Over time, it became
evident that Ito- Hirobumi needed to develop an ideological platform to underpin their policies—for sure enough, any glaring contradictions or inconsistencies in the raison d’être of state policy would be swiftly pounced upon and used to fan urban discontent in print. The most famous association active at this time was the Aikokusha (Society of Patriots) under Itagaki Taisuke which self- consciously adopted the radi- cal democratic theory of Rousseau, an angle guaranteed to put Ito- on the spot in front of Western observers who were anxious to see signs of Japan’s political maturity4; alongside this was a counter- movement
favoring the English model of constitutional monarchy that found an important advocate in Fukuzawa Yukichi who had a government- connected sponsor in the person of O–kuma Shigenobu (who was later to establish the Constitutional Reform Party).5 For Ito-’s part, he had no
intention of committing himself to any Western model of representative government and, in any event, he could not claim to be well- versed enough in constitutional theory to argue substantially in favor of one model or another.6
O–kuma, possibly sensing the void and an opportunity to “steal a march” over Ito-, in 1881, boldly submitted a constitutional reform proposal to the Emperor that entailed, in essence, the immediate establishment of a parliamentary form of government modeled after the Westminster system. Ito- was livid and the event sparked the major
political purge that saw not only O–kuma but also those associated with agitation in any form for the English model—including the former students of Fukuzawa Yukichi—removed from official posts. Ito- real- ized that the time to take the initiative in constitutional matters was at hand—an edict was issued by the Emperor promising a constitution and representative government within ten years. Within time, however, it became apparent that the government would brook very little intensive political organizing, and ultimately drastic legislation was passed which made it illegal for specified agitators to remain within the capital.7
Eventually, Ito- managed to acquit himself adequately in the arena of juridical conflict, yet the ultimate prize would be to establish une- quivocal control over the one institution in Japanese society that was, for most intents and purposes, “inviolable”; the Imperial Household. A written constitution, in and of itself, would not safeguard the legiti- macy of the government or be enough to achieve sufficient purchase within the electorate to maintain a consistent support for national policy. And a premature experiment in democracy was perhaps quite rightly regarded as a dangerous distraction from the more pressing mat- ter of consistently promulgating and implementing national policies. The word of the Emperor was destined to become increasingly relevant to the arbitration of political influence and it was clearly with a view to ensuring that the Emperor’s word would be held under tight institu- tional control that Ito- instigated, in the first instance, a cabinet system of ministerial government along with the establishment of a Privy Council, an institution that would have as its main purpose the formali- zation of Ito-’s position as first confidant and advisor to the throne.8 As
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Ito- increasingly had to rely on the Privy Council but even then he was not able to enjoy an exclusive hold over affairs at the Imperial Court. The Ministry of the Imperial Household would slowly but surely become a separate insti- tutional entity that attracted high- ranking and influential opponents to the government, ultimately leading to a bifurcation of sovereignty away from the very constitutional framework that was supposed to house it.9
Apart from the intensifying struggle in the public sphere domesti- cally, there were also several diplomatic developments abroad that were to compound Ito-’s difficulties. From 1878 onward rather intense diplomatic maneuvering arose between Japan and China. In 1874, Sir Thomas Wade, Britain’s representative at Peking, had facilitated a convention that recognized Ryu-kyu- Islanders as Japanese subjects but the Islands had not as yet been practically incorporated within the
structure of the national government. The Japanese were aiming to revise the earlier Sino- Japanese Treaty of 1871, offering to incorporate a most- favored nation clause in return for which they indicated that they were prepared to cede some of the southern- most islands.10
Things were brought to a head in 1879 as the government aimed to capitalize on its good relations with the US to cajole the Chinese government into acquiescence. The visit of the former US President, General Ulysses S. Grant in 1879 established a basis for representatives of Japan’s diplomatic corps to make personal approaches to Grant to act as a mediator between the two countries. Ultimately Grant’s influence was limited, certainly so far as the Chinese were concerned. Nevertheless it emboldened the Japanese government to pursue its plans regardless of Chinese opposition; Japan formally announced the incorporation of the Ryu-kyu-s as the Prefecture of Okinawa in April of that year.11
This was the beginning of a period of sustained hostility between Japan and China, the focus shifting from Okinawa to Korea. The Chinese proved that they were able to cultivate ties with the Americans too, succeeding in brokering a new treaty between Korea and America in 1882 after Japanese cooperation had inexplicably failed to materialize for the US envoy, Commodore Shufeldt. Moreover, Chinese support for the reactionary and strongly anti- Japanese faction of the Taewonkun nearly led to full- scale war in July of 1882 when a Japanese military advisor was murdered and the Japanese Legation was burnt down by Taewonkun supporters. By the time the Japanese Minister returned with warships and troops, the Chinese had also sent considerable numbers of troops to the Korean capital. The stalemate was finally resolved in 1885 with the Treaty of Tientsin which stipulated the withdrawal of Chinese troops, the cessation of Japanese military training and an undertaking to keep each other informed of any intention to dispatch troops in future.12
Overall, it is hard not to be critical of the manner in which this diplo- macy was conducted by both sides. Much of the substance of the dispute could have been sorted out through diplomatic channels if communi- cation had been maintained in a professional manner. The Japanese were hampered by the continued reliance on a relatively small group of talented men who had the linguistic ability and tact to handle such delicate negotiations. Yoshida Kiyonari was entrusted with much of the liaison with the US while Mori Arinori was entrusted with handling the notoriously sage but prickly Chinese diplomat, Li Hung Chang. On the Chinese part, there was continuous prevarication and provocation in their communications, a fact that the former President Grant was
himself to lament. On both sides, there was also the constant clamor from those critical of any compromise with foreign powers which made even the slightest appearance of “going soft” a marked domestic liability. This was indeed the essence of the government’s predicament in diplomatic relations—the greater population expected immediate revisions to the unequal treaties but such a wholesale reworking of Japan’s position in the world order was unlikely to be achieved without considerable compromise and flexibility—at least that was the case if immediate progress of any sort was to be had.13
Consequently, the great political upheaval of 1881 had implications not only so far as dealing with the advocates of representative govern- ment was concerned, but also in relation to the relative balance of power among the various conservative factions in government who had a con- stant eye on the disruptive potential of shizoku activists and the public clamor for a successful renegotiation of its place vis-à-vis the powers. In other words, Ito- Hirobumi not only had to deal with the strident pro- reform clique that had formerly been within the oligarchic circle, but also with an articulate and often aggressive body of intellectuals and public figures who knew they had a rod, in the shape of failed treaty revisions, to beat the government with.
It is customary for the so- called “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement” to gather attention in relation to developments both prior to and after the 1881 purge. The establishment of the Liberal Party under Itagaki Taisuke and the attempt to forge a national network of popular political associations seem to conform with the preconceived notion of the inevitability of agitation for popular representation in modernizing societies. Yet the Liberal Party was surprisingly short- lived, snuffed out as it was through internal bickering and political excesses that even Itagaki Taisuke himself had to disown. In the end, Yamagata Aritomo, who moved from the post of Minister of the Army to Minister of the Interior in December 1883, was able to stifle dissent of this kind with relative ease, ultimately even banning approximately three hundred political activists from the capital. Itagaki was packed off to Europe at the government’s expense to observe the nations whose theories he so ardently subscribed to first hand. These forms of dissent were rela- tively easy to contain because they relied on a coinage that was at once idealistic and foreign. The greater awareness of the defects of Western societies was becoming more apparent among those who had been at the forefront of the Restoration reforms and it was expected that an adequate “reality check” for Itagaki would do a great deal to calm his enthusiasm.14
Some qualification of the use of the term Freedom and Peoples Rights is warranted for several reasons, although it must be acknowledged that it is now part of the common vocabulary of Meiji political history. The main difficulty with the title is that the Japanese phrase Jiyu- Minken
Undo- (呹䟀㺠㲸拚╤) rather unhelpfully blends together the activities of the Liberal Party under Itagaki Taisuke with other disparate agitations for representative government, including those of the non- Satsuma and Cho-shu- officers of state such as O–kuma Shigenobu and the more generally disgruntled elites who had decidedly selective conceptions of constitutional reform—including downright illiberal conceptions of government—but were nonetheless apt to adopt the catchphrases of “justice” and “fair representation” all the same to chastise Ito- Hirobumi’s “despotic” regime.
Consequently, while we may well regard the outcome of the 1881 political turmoil as a significant turning point for the evolution of the “Freedom and Peoples Rights Movement”, there was in fact an equally significant movement emerging in quarters within the military wing of the oligarchical circle that would appear to champion the same cause but, as will become more fully apparent in the next chapter, was actu- ally more deeply tied to the aim of presenting a challenge to the line of “Westernizing” reform being promoted by Ito- Hirobumi and his government.
There were two dimensions to the crisis as it emerged: on the one hand O–kuma was developing a circle of patronage that included Fukuzawa Yukichi and other like- minded intellectuals, and he did not baulk at the use of the press to expose the rather shady aspects of some government land sales in Hokkaido that were due to proceed to the great personal benefit of Godai Tomoatsu. The reportage started with the To-kyo-- Yokohama Mainichi and spread to the Yu-bin Ho-chi, which ran a four- part series of stories. Very soon there was a veritable “feed- ing frenzy” as the mainstream papers competed to voice dismay.15 At
the same time, however, there was also the submission of a highly critical memorial by four Generals—Tani Tateki (1837–1911), Torio Koyata (1847–1905), Miura Goro- (1846–1926) and Soga Sukenori (1843–1935)—on 12 September 1881, which marked a new phase of conservative activism that was to have far- reaching implications for the future political configuration of the state. Known as the “Four General’s Memorial”, the paper was submitted to Arisugawanomiya, the Minister of the Left, and called for a constitutional form of government that retained a firm focus on moral rule centered on the Emperor. They were also out to protest the manner in which the superintendent of the
settlement of Hokkaido, Kuroda Kiyotaka, had arranged for state assets to be sold off to Satsuma entrepreneurs such as Godai Tomoatsu on highly favorable terms.16
Superficially there is a degree of parallel in the nature of the Generals’ criticisms and demands with those of O–kuma Shigenobu who had already earned Ito- Hirobumi’s opprobrium for promoting the adop- tion of a British- style system of government and publicly opposing the Hokkaido deal. However, the Four Generals did not conceive of constitutional reform along British lines—their conception (as will be discussed in the ensuing section) was decidedly anti- Western and pater- nalistic. When the Hokkaido deal was called off and O–kuma paid for his series of indiscretions with his dismissal on 11 October, there was something of a sigh of relief that emanated from the conservative camp and, ironically, Ito- actually found himself restored to some extent in their estimation.17
It is worth noting a number of commonalities and distinctions among the “Four Generals.” First, they were all relatively young at the time of the Restoration (Tani being the eldest at 31, the others being in their early to mid-twenties) which meant that their distinguished achievements in the Boshin War did not translate immediately into political influence. They were also relatively marginalized within the top circle despite their early connections. They remained faithful to the Restoration leadership throughout the turmoil of the mid-1870s and distinguished themselves yet again in suppressing the Seinan Rebellion of Saigo- Takamori—Tani especially earning fame for doggedly holding the Kumamoto Fort against Saigo- for over fifty days.
Yet there were signs of discontent and misgivings that began to develop in the aftermath of the Seinan War that were to grow into open opposition to Ito- Hirobumi’s leadership. The “Bunmei Kaika” move- ment was now recognized as an expensive failure, and yet the govern- ment seemed to blame the failure on the ignorance of the people rather than question the probity of adopting Western models in the first place. Moreover, it seemed that Ito-, in his association with O–kuma Shigenobu and other Anglophile progressives, had in mind an even more far- reaching program of reform which threatened to destroy the traditional substance of Japanese moral life.
On top of all this, it was clear that the circle of influence within gov- ernment was slowly but surely shrinking to encompass a close- knit elite of the former Satsuma and Cho-shu- Clans. Tani and Miura were both from Cho-shu-, granted, but they were not affiliated with the leading faction of the clan that Ito- Hirobumi had come to control. The others
were from the former Tosa and Yanagikawa Clans,—important allies at the time of the Restoration militarily but increasingly marginalized thereafter.18
All the foregoing factors conspired to engender a profound disquiet among the more retrospective elements of the military elite about the nation’s direction, and the focus of blame became increasingly directed toward the person of Ito- Hirobumi himself. It was not always clearly articulated as an ideology; the ideal of the moral ruler in the modern context was rendered using a variety of terms and framed in reference to a variety of Japanese religious and philosophical traditions, from Buddhism and Shinto- to Confucianism. Yet by the late 1880s it would have the clarity of a social movement and involve a network of political organizations—some merely consisting of loose “clubs”, others being full- blown political parties.