the other (silver-manifestation) subsequent. It cannot be maintained that the silver-manifestation is due to some other cognition
(i.e., not the one generated by defective cause) for then the (right
cognition of some other person also would manifest this (errorcontaminated) silver.
36. How could it be argued that the cognition of another
person also would have that (i.e., the silver as its object) ? It is in fact the cognition resulting from vitiated causes only that has that (the silver) as its object (and not the right cognition
—
samlclnajnana).
Akhyativadin : Not so. Even a separate cognition, if it is of the same character (i.e., generated by dustakarana), has its function fulfilled in creating a distinct * silver (manifestation) *
just like the first cognition (i.e., it cannot have the silver in question as its object). Hence (it all comes to this that) the silver is
as good as not having come into existence. As such what is left
(i.e., the right conclusion) is (that the illusory knowledge is caused by) the obscuration of memory.
XIII. 37. Objection: Has it not been said that obscuration of memory cannot occur ? (The Akhyativadin is reminded by Anyathakhyativadin). This is also what the followers of other schools of thought aver. ' Memory is that which recalls the
object of past experience and is free from the obscuration (of the cognition that it was an object of past experience) \*6
Akhyativadin-. Then what is the solution of the manifestation of silver when the sense-contact is (only) with the shell ?67 38. Anirvacantyakhyativadin : This is the solution—It is not that the memory, caused by the mental impressions (samskara) and divested of the knowledge that it is memory
(smaranabhimanasunya), arises distinct from the cognition arising from sense-contact (viz., of the ' this '). On the contrary it is a unit cognition only, (arising) from the sense allied with the mental impressions.
56 Cf. Pataftjala Yoga Sutra, I. i-ii. It cannot be said that it is memory and at the same time obscured.
57 Which are the ingredients (Hlflsfl) in the production of shellsilver?
The answer is that the impression left on the mind by the
past experience of silver, together with the vitiated sense, constitutes the instrument. The sense-aberration not only revives the past impression but it is the cause of the illusory silver also,
28 PAtfV-ApADlKA OF PADMAPADA [XIII. 39 Akhyativadin: How could it be so?
Anirva^amyakhyativadin: Well, thus it is: the vitiated
cause having inhibited its (sense) potency to porduce the proper result {i.e., to give rise to correct knowledge) revives at the same time the particular mental impression (causing illusory apprehension).
It is from the effect that the potency of the vitiated
cause is inferred. Hence the impression as associated with the vitiated cause is the single instrument. And that produces a single cognition and a single phala (practical end).58
39. And of that cognition which has arisen through the
instrumentality of the particular impression revived by some
perverted cause, the erroneous silver-in-thc-shell manifests itself 58 Akhyativadin: The sense-contact is with the 'this' so that a
single cognition relating to the 'this' alone should arise and not that
relating to the 'silver'. We know the sense cannot establish its contact either with unreal silver or silver out of its ken. In your doctrine (referring to the anirvacanlyakhyati) the silver-cognition is not due to the force of impression, for you admit only similarity to memory
(^fasrcsr) and not memory itself; nor is dosa competent to bring about any result of its own accord. Again the explanation offered by
the anyathakhyativadin also is void, for if it be held that the 'silverin-the-mart' is seen here, it may be questioned, why not the intervening objects also manifest themselves in the presented object ?
Anirvacanlyakhyativadin: The correct explanation is what follows:
first, from the contact of the vitiated sight with the object dn one's
vicinity arises the cognition of the 'this' only; then does avidya pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the 'this' stirs itself into
being; lastly this avidya ministered to by the mental impression revived
by similarity, desire, etc., transforms itself into the 'silver' (arthadhyasa).
Likewise avidya pertaining to consciousness mirrored in the vrtti (mental mode) appearing as the 'this' transforms itself into the ' silver-cognition ' (jnanadhyasa).
Akhyativadin: Well, since the mental modes, viz., that relating
to the 'this' and that relating to the 'silver' are distinct, the consciousness as limited by the one must be different from the one limited
by the other. There can therefore be no single consciousness.
Anirvaacriiyakhyativadin: No, it is a unit consciousness—1*5 ?!#, It means this:—though there is difference between the mental modes,
as the real (this) and the unreal (silver) arc undifferentiated (<X*wq]W%' cRr Tr^TTr!:), the consciousness delimited by these modes is one only, and as the two cognitions are identical, the mental modes also of which the one is real and the other is not, are imagined to be single.
XIII. 40] SUPERIMPOSITION 29
as the appropriate object (alambana). Hence that cognition which has something unreal as its object is unreal cognition, for unreality cannot be attributed to cognition as such, since its sublation does not take place.
40. (Akhyativadin): How is it pertinent (it may be questioned) that a single cognition is produced by ingredients which
serve as the cause of disparate cognitions ? There is nothing wrong. It is well known that the apprehension of the probans and the mental impression (of the concomitance between the probans and the probandum—vyapti) conjointly produce the inference. Recognition also arises from sense (contact) and mental impression (samskara). In both cases (inference and
recognition) there is only a single valid cognition having intimate relation with memory.59 For without the revival of the impressions it is impossible that it (i.e., either inference or recognition) could arise. Hence it must be said that it is only the perception of the probans that, having recalled the impression of vyaptijnana (i.e.,, the samskara left by the former experience of the
concomitance between the probans and prabandum) generates in association with it, the inferential cognition.
41. [Page 10] The same reasoning holds good even as
regards recognition. And there is no valid means by which to
prove (here) the (origination of) two cognitions, (viz., recollection and perception). Even so is to be exemplified the unit
cognition of a portrait drawn from (a variety of colours) like
blue, (red, green, etc.) which serve as causes of separate cognitions.
There is this difference however: cognitions of the nature of inference, recognition and cognition of complex colours (i.e., a portrait) manifest themselves as being true to reality (vyavaharika) because they have originated from non-vitiated causes.
42. Here (in the case of ' shell-silver \ 'rope-serpent', etc.),
owing to vitiated causes, the cognitions are not true to reality.
59
*3fcTT*t—Coming under the category of memory partly. This
phrase is used to point out that mental impressions which are the special ingredients in memory-revival are also found to operate both
in inference and recognition. In 'the hill is fiery-—"AcTI ^rifflR. ', we have
memory-revival in regard to fire—^f? and perception in regard to hill —llrf. Again i n 'this is that Dcvadatta\ ^? ^T^rT:, we have memoryrevival
in regard to ?IW*r, and perception in regard to Devadatta.
But they are not distinct cognitions.
30 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XIII. 42
Hence (in the light of what has been said) since the manifested
silver is the object of cognition (illusory), there is no going counter to experience.60 Hence the * silver * is the product (i.e., transformation) of maya.61 Were it real it would have been apprehended
by all, since the real silver (relatively paramarthika) does 80 Jn3*TWr%(te:—The doctrine of illusory cognition as expounded here does not offend experience. According to the Akhyativadins, two cognitions are posited—perceptive and recollective (silver). If the
cognition of 'silver' is recollective, its experience as presented becomes inexplicable. According to the Anyathakhyativadins, the relation
between the 'this' and the 'silver-in-thc-shop* is false, but this is against experience since in the perception of silver on the spot the relation is actual. « According to the atmakhyativadins of the Yogacara school, it is not possible to account for the external manifestation of silver when it is but a transformation of internal consciousness.
Objection: Well; how, on your (referring to the siddhantin) own
theory either, can you avoid inconsistency when it is argued that the false silver appears as real ?
Answer: Though the 'silver' is distinct from the real silver, it is
related to the reality of the shell; as such we perceive the 'shell-silver'.
Hence the experience ' & l^ ' is not contradicted.
Objection: Well ; is that relation of 'satta', real or unreal or both ? It cannot be the first for then it cannot be negated, nor the second, for it is against experience, nor the third, for no experience of a thing that is both real and unreal is possible.
Answer: Your objection is not valid. We admit three grades of
reality: the ultimate (<?rcmffi^>) reality of Brahman, the empirical (wjWfrffa) reality of the world of space, time and cause, and the illusory (5mcWU%$) reality of the shell-silver variety. Now in the case of the 'shell-silver', what is conceded is not that the reality inherent in the shell manifests itself as related to silver; but we admit that the illusory reality existing in it only does appear. It is on the basis of this kind of reality that the notion 'sadrajatam'—'here is the silver' arises.
Objection; But then when you admit illusory reality, why do you characterise it as anirvacaniya—inexplicable ?
Answer: As contrasted with the pre-eminent reality of Brahman,
the reality assigned to the sensible world and illusion is inexplicable since neither existence nor non-existence can be attributed to either.
•t ajrf;—Because of the unsatisfactory character of the explanations offered by other systems. In the akhyati doctrine, we have to
premise two cognitions, memory as regards the silver-cognition and XIII. 43] SUPERIMPOS1TION 31
not presuppose a vitiated cause in the origination of its cognition.
If it (real silver) did require (the aberration) in the origination of its cognition, then where it is absent there its cognition will not arise, as when the light is absent, the form (of a thing) is not perceived.
43. If on the contrary (the shell-silver is admitted to be)
the product of maya, it would be right to conclude that only those whose knowledge-giving senses have been rendered morbid, perceive (the illusory silver), very like the person whose sight has
been assailed by incantations, etc. Moreover sublation also
non-presentation; obscuration of the fact that it is memory and its cause, viz., non-discrimination and as a result, activity in relation to the object perceived, and the experience of past births in special cases.
In the anyathakhyati doctrine, wc have to presume the existence elsewhere of an object apprehended on the spot, the competency of
the senses to grasp things existing elsewhere beyond their ken, extraordinary potency to aberrations, and perceptibility of a relation that
is false, viz., that between the 'this' and the 'silver'.
In the atmakhyati doctrine, we have to presume the internality of
that which manifests itself as out there, the sublation of the 'this' which experience points to as really existing, and the non-sublation of
'silver' which really suffers sublation.
JTWWT IsicTJj;—The silver in the shell-silver is verily the product of maya; it is anirvacanlya or inexplicable. Anirvacanlya and mayamaya convey the same sense; otherwise it would be illogical to
conclude that the 'shell-silver' is the product of maya, having set out with the object of proving that it is anirvacanlya.
A question of some importance is raised here. Can wc equate maya with avidya? Some hold the view that the two are different.
Maya is dependent on the agent and as such cannot delude him
whereas avidya deludes the person willynilly. They, therefore, urge that the shell-silver cognition is the product of avidya and not of maya as stated in the PP. This view is contradicted on the ground that the definition of the one identical with that of the other. The note of inexplicability is common to both, as well as the potency to obscure reality and project the unreal. Further, these words are used as of identical import in the Scriptures and in later authoritative works, vide V, p. 31, beginning with—3?ft3Il*refa[% ^s^R; * *Ml*W*n%.
Where however viksepa (or manifestation of a thing as other than itself) is emphasised, the term maya is used; but where the potency to conceal reality is emphasised, the term avidya is used (vide SLS, p. 56).
32 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XIII. 43
which takes the form * this is not silver ' points to its being only the product of maya. How ? (it may be asked). It is indeed
from that (i.e., the cognition of sublation) that its (shell-silver) maya-origin is brought to mind preceded by the negation of its
(silver) very essence.62 Witness the nature of the cognition that arises after sublation, viz., ' this is not silver; what manifested itself was false only \63 And such cognition would be inappropriate if (the shell-silver) is admitted to exist in its real nature in some form (as the mart-silver) such as it would be (inappropriate) to negate the shell with which the sense is in contact and
(as it would be inappropriate to negate) cognition where its
object is regarded as a nullity, (the Buddhist idealists admit jnana alone as real, but regard its content as non est).M
•2 In addition to the evidence of arthapatti pramana by which it was shown that the illusoriness of the 'shell-silver' could be accounted for in no other way than by ascribing the maya-origin to it, perceptive evidence is here adduced in its support. In the negative cognition 'this is not silver', maya-mayatva is perceptive for the silver manifests itself in the substratum (the 'this') as the counter-correlate of abhava (negation). Where the silver manifests itself but docs not actually exist it must be the off-spring of maya.
f%W*T?Tra1^115^—The sublating knowledge removes, to begin
with, the notion of the silver in the substratum, viz., the shell, and
such removal must lead to the conclusion that the apprehended silver was the product of nescience. 'How?' it may be asked. The definition of maya or mithyatva is nothing other than the counter-correlatedness of negation in a known substratum. Here the shell is the known
substratum; the negation of silver is revealed in it by the sublating cognition, *ftr ^srcHj and the silver is the counter-correlate of the negation, amrf.
* 3 *i V3(^ t ft%$?r*nfog—should be taken as a separate sentence.
The sublation is expressed in the words *%5 WP3(\ The use of the word fcpafa immediately following is to emphasise that erroneousness.
•* After sublation, the awakened consciousness takes the form
'what I saw was not silver, but was only a product of maya'; but it should not be so to the NaiySyika who, maintaining anyathakhyati, has to say 'this is not silver', but, it is
% that silver' referring to what exists
in the shop; as also to the Buddhist Vijnanavadin who has to say
"the external 'this' in which the silver appears is a false substratum;
the silver is only a form of internal consciousness"; and so on. But common experience is otherwise and expresses itself thus—" this is not silver, it is magic, it is neither here, nor there". The sublation XIV. 44] SUPER1MPOSITION 33
XIV. 44. Well, is not this definition (fallacious inasmuch
as it is) of partial applicability (navyapakam) since (illusions of) dream, sorrow, etc., cannot come within it* scope?65 In one's
would be quite otherwise on the theory of error held either by the Naiyayikas or by the Vijnanavadins.
A question pertinent to the present topic is, 'what is sublation (badha) ? ' It may mean (i) the turning away of one from an object
when in reality one is seeking another (say, silver) or (ii) the destruction of its (false object) capacity to provoke action; or (iii) the
discrimination of what was not previously discriminated; or (iv) cognition of mutual negation, i.e., cognition that this is not the 'silver'
and vice versa; or (v) the cognition in the known-substratum (say
the shell) that the silver is the counter-correlate of the negation; or (vi) eradication of ignorance (ajnana). The first five are objections;
the sixth is the siddhanta. (i) is untenable; in the case of an ascetic there is no action and hence no dissuation from it though he too
gets the knowledge of the non-existence of the silver, (ii) is untenable, for the badha, when once it arises, does not guarantee the disappearance of illusion for all time; the shell-silver cognition may arise more than once, (iii) is also untenable, for what was first observed as one undifferentiated object, like a heap of clothes, may be subsequently differentiated as white, red, etc., but there is no badha here though discriminative knowledge arises, (iv) is unsound. Whiteness which
appears as pot in 'the pot is white' is again spoken of as "quality and not as substance", e.g., *TC3? SH^T «T **%*{. But there is no badha here, (v) again does not stand. If it be argued that sublation (bhava) means the cognition of the counter-correlatedness of the
abhava {i.e., cognition of the absence of the silver in the 'this') in the presented substratum, the question will be whether the sublation is of the knowledge (jnana) of silver or of the silver (jiieya). The first alternative does not stand, because one cognition does not require another for its elimination, since cognitions are momentary; the
second also is untenable because the visaya (silver) is not effaced by either its own cognition or by that of the 'shell'.
The rejoinder for the criticisms thus advanced is that sublation
stands on a different basis altogether. Sublation is the eradication for all time of ignorance (ajnana) together with its effects {cf. V., p. 33, and V.P.S., pp. 38-39).
w ^ ST *wref3r< 55^r°m—The anirvacaniyakhyati's opponent argues
thus: One characteristic of illusion—adhyasa, is that it is the outcome of three factors: sense-contact, defective vision and revived impressions.
This is the indirect or indicative definition (tafasthalaksana) of 3
34 PA>igApADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XIV. 45
experience of dream, sorrow, etc., there is no sense-contact with anything (i.e., some sufcstratum) by which one object could be regarded as manifesting itself in another. Hence there being no cause other than the mental traces we must conclude (that the dream-experiences, etc.), are outright memory-pictures and not memory-like (smrtirupa).
This will be said (in answer) here—It is not in reality of the nature of recollection, for the manifestation is of a presented object.
Nor is it memory-like either (says the opponent), since the cognition has arisen only through the mental-impressions left by a past valid means of knowledge (say, perception).
45. Here we reply thus: 66 It has been stated that what
constitutes recollection is the mere manifestation of the object
adhyasa or illusion. Another characteristic is that it is the manifestation of one thing as another (cf. affifar^ ^ffe:—Bhasya). This is the
direct definition (svarupalaksana, i.e., of the very essence) of adhyasa.
In dream-illusion, as the senses are quiescent, there can be no sensecontact so that the first definition fails. The absence of the substratum
(adhisthana) rules out the second definition; if atman is construed as adhisthana, the dream-experience of say 'elephant' should take the form '1 am elephant', and everything other than atman comes under
the category of superimposition and so it cannot serve as the substratum.
Hence he concludes that dream-objects as arising from past impressions must be classed as recollective.
M The Siddhantin proceeds thus: It is evident that the dreamcognition is neither memory nor perception. All disputants have to
M The Siddhantin proceeds thus: It is evident that the dreamcognition is neither memory nor perception. All disputants have to