Motores de cogeneración

SECTION 1.

Institution of criminal and civil actions

Changes in the Rule at a Glance

a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.

Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from crime including the civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal unless the offended party waives the civil action reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

b. Under the former rule a waiver of any of three civil actions extinguishes the others.

The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

This is no longer provided for.

The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged.

This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation.

c. The rulings in Shafer v. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, allowing a third-party complaint, and the ruling in Javier v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, as well as Cabaero v. Cantos allowing a counterclaim are no longer in force.

Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, these pleadings are no longer allowed.

Any claim which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

Thus, a court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused.

The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability.

A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant's civil liability.

d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the check involved.

In other cases, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

History of Amendment

No other rule in criminal procedure have been as hotly debated upon as the rule on prosecutions of civil actions. The rule have been amended four times.

a. Juridical Basis of the Principle of Implied Institution of the Civil Action with the Criminal Action

Dual Concept of Civil Liability

Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, obligations may arise, inter alia, from acts or omissions punished by law (ex-delicto) and from quasi-delict.

Civil obligations arising from the criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII on Human Relations, regulating damages.⁴

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable shall also be civilly liable (ex-delicto) while Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that

"whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."

The Code expressly provides that responsibility for the fault or negligence for quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code, subject only to the limitation that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Briefly stated, the negligent act causing damages may produce two kinds of civil liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

The distinct nature of the dual concept of the civil liability was stressed in Diana v. Batangas Transportation Co., citing the earlier case of Barredo v. Garcia, in the following words:

"These two cases involve two different remedies.

As the Court aptly said: A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal

Code, or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code."

The other differences pointed out between crimes and culpa aquiliana are:

1) That crimes affect public interest, while quasi-delicts are only of private concern;

2) That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage;

3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, quasi-delicts, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

The plain inference is that the civil liability based on delict springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime.

Such civil liability is a necessary consequence of criminal responsibility, and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding except where the injured party reserves his right to avail himself of it in a distinct civil action.

b. Modes of Enforcement

The dual concept of civil liability, ex-delicto and quasi-delicto, has thus brought about a dual mode of enforcement.

The same act or omission which gives rise to two separate and distinct sources of civil liability may be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, subject only to the limitation that the satisfaction of either bars recovery of the other, on the principle that plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission.

Otherwise stated, civil liability, although arising from the same act or omission, may not only be prosecuted either in a criminal or civil action, but in a criminal and civil action.

The procedural enforcement of these distinct civil liabilities, albeit based on the same act or omission, are likewise separate and distinct, subject only to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of civil liabilities.

c. Civil Liability Based on Crime

The civil liability based on a crime, unless reserved, is generally enforced in the criminal action, and was governed by the Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Rule 111 on the prosecution of civil actions, which provides that when a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Civil liability under Article 2176 was then enforced separately by means of a civil action and is governed by the Rules on civil actions.

Consequently, when a criminal action is filed, what was deemed impliedly instituted thereunder was only the

civil liability arising from or based on the crime.

Thus, the accused may be held civilly liable in the criminal action, if he is found to be criminally liable.

If the accused is acquitted, he cannot be held civilly liable in the criminal action.

The obvious reason, as stated in People u. Amistad is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, since what was deemed impliedly instituted, unless reserved, was the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged, and no other.

This is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal even with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist."

d. Early Rulings

In the early stages of criminal procedure, the policy was to strictly adhere to the distinct and discrete nature of the criminal from purely civil actions, and the civil liability that is sought to be enforced thereunder.

What is deemed impliedly instituted and governed by the rules on criminal procedure, unless reserved, was only the civil liability arising from the crime, while civil liability based on other sources of obligation such as quasi-delict may be enforced only in a purely civil action.

While the criminal action may have a dual purpose,

namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party, its dominant and primordial objective is the punishment of the offender.

The civil action is merely incident and consequent to the conviction of the accused, which may even be waived or the prosecution thereof reserved in a separate civil action.

This is because criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the State, and to impose the corresponding penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender; the action between the private person and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.

Thus, where the accused is acquitted in the criminal case, the interest of the State ends, and no civil liability arising from the crime charged could be imposed upon him.

What the private offended party should do is to file a separate civil action.

e. Original Rule, The 1940 Rules of Court

The Rule was originally governed by Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court which then provided that:

"When a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. Thus, what was deemed impliedly instituted unless there is a waiver or reservation is the civil liability arising from the crime."

f. The Independent Civil Actions

In 1949, the (new) Civil Code of the Philippines introduced the so-called independent civil actions.

These are Articles 32, 33, and 34.

These articles allow the injured party to file a civil action for damages in the cases mentioned therein which may also constitute criminal offenses entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

This has raised the question of whether or not a reservation to file a separate civil action for the cases mentioned therein is necessary for the exercise of such right.

The Supreme Court flip-flopped from one extreme to the other.

One school of thought is of the considered view that the provisions of the Civil Code are substantive in nature which may be exercised by the injured party even without any reservation.

A contrary rule is unconstitutional.

Thus, the criminal action as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from a crime may proceed simultaneously and independently of the other, without any reservation subject only to the limitation that,

the injured party cannot recover twice for the same act or omission as provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

The other school of thought is of the view that the provisions of the new Civil Code or the exercise of the right granted under the Civil Code is merely procedural which may be regulated under the Rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

To simplify the proceedings and avoid conflicting decisions, all civil actions for the recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission should only be litigated in one proceeding.

The injured party must have to elect whether he chooses to prosecute his claim in the criminal action or in a separate civil action either by a timely reservation or the filing of the civil action prior to the institution of the criminal action.

The gravity and complexity of the question is best exemplified by the four amendments of the Rule.

The minutes of the proceedings from the Fernan to the Davide, Jr., committee disclose the heat of the debate and the numerous sessions not only of the Committee but also by the Court en bane.

By no means can it be said that the issue had been finally laid to rest.

If the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure have been delayed, it is because of Rule 111. It took the court several sessions before the present rule was reluctantly adopted, which ended with a rule similar to the 1940 Rules of Court, prior to the four amendments.

g. The Amendments

1) First Amendment

In view of the provisions of the new Civil Code on the so-called independent civil actions, the rule was amended in 1964 by adding a new section, viz.

The reservation requirement for Other Civil Actions:

SEC. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed,

a. Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal ac-tion has been commenced the civil acac-tion can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

b. After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been ren-dered;

c. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

The Supreme Court, however, declared Section 2 as inoperative. Thus, in Mendoza v. Arrieta, quoting from Garcia v. Florida, that:

"* * * the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.

The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.

Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.

Hence; the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x a and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.

The prouiso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32,33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso. x x x"

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."

2. Second Amendment

Accordingly, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure did away with the need for RESERVATION in cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and instead recognized that "an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case.

Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Under the 1985 amendment, what is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless there is a reservation or a prior civil action filed is the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.

This is the civil action that may be reserved in the

criminal action. The 1985 amendment did not live very long.

3. Third Amendment

In 1988, Rule 111 was amended for the third time.

It actually restored the 1964 amendment.

The rule further clarified the civil actions that are deemed impliedly instituted is not confined to civil actions arising from a crime but also the civil actions to recover civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Explaining the amendment, Justice Jose Y. Feria, then a member and later chairman of the Revision of Rules of Court Committee elucidated:

"The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted x x x.

Such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said code. x x x"

Such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said code. x x x"

In document ESCUELA POLITÉCNICA DE INGENIERÍA DE GIJÓN (página 60-64)