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Love is also at the root of the two most important sets of activities: virtuous activity and contemplation. In both cases love explains why the agent takes pleasure in the activity. Aristotle emphasises that ‘excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pain’ (II. 3.1104b8-9). This is not only because pleasure and pain may interfere with virtuous action, but rather because it belongs to excellence to ‘delight in and be distressed by the things on should’ (II.3.1104b12). This is possible only through proper education (ib.).42

Aristotle observes, as a general point about learners, that knowing what to do is not good enough for excellence: this knowledge needs to be integrated into their nature (sumphuênai, VII.3.1147b22) by habituation which, of course, takes time. It is not even enough that the agent habitually acts in the way in which a virtuous agent acts, e.g. by copying his teacher, or even because the agent knows that this is the right thing to do: virtuous action, for Aristotle, must stem ‘from a firm and unchanging disposition (hexis)’ (II.3.1105a32-33). These states from which virtuous action springs ‘resemble nature’ (VII. 10.1152a30-33), so much so that we could say that they are second nature.43 _{This means not only that, like natural states, one can lose}

them only in terrible circumstances, but also that the agent has a

42 _{I will not here give a full account of moral education in Aristotle. Rather, I will} highlight only that pleasure plays a crucial role. Excellent accounts of moral education has been given by M. Burnyeat 1980 (my discussion is indebted to his account), and S. Broadie 1991:103-110. For the difference between Broadie’s and Burnyeat’s account see esp. p. 122, n.46, and p. 121, n.37.

43 _{This is the lesson Aristotle takes from Evenus whom he cites in this context: what} we practise can become, at last, our nature (VII.10.1152a30-33).

certain attitude towards his second nature. We all love by nature to use our senses, a fact which seems to be confirmed by our choosing to use the senses for their own sake, not merely as a means for something else. Now, this is exactly the attitude which the virtuous person must have once his education is over: he must have learned to appreciate doing what is fine for the sake of the fine - even if nothing further accrues from it (e.g. IV.2.1123a25). So, on the way to becoming virtuous, the learner must become a lover of doing what is fine (I.8.1099a13-15) - which shows itself in his caring for what is noble for its own sake, rather than merely for its consequences or for other reasons.44 _{So, it is part of any given virtue to love what is fine}

in this domain (e.g. justice, cf. I.8.1099a8-11). What this means for Aristotle is clear: it means that the virtuous person, a lover of the fine, will usually take pleasure in doing fine actions because it is part of the state activated in virtuous action to love the fine.

This explains why ‘the pleasure or pain that supervenes (epiginomenên) on what people do (tois ergois) should be treated as a sign of their dispositions’ (II.3.1104b3-5). If a person does not usually take pleasure in doing what is fine, this person would not seem to be a lover of what is fine. Yet if he is not a lover of the fine, he will not have the right attitude towards the fine: he will not do the fine for the

44 _{It may seem as if the learner must first become a lover of the fine before he can} acquire the relevant excellent state, for at X.9.1179b29-31 Aristotle contends that ‘before he acquires excellence, then, a person must in a way already possess a character akin to it, loving (stergein) what is noble and hating what is shameful’. But this is not quite so, for he could be a lover of the fine but still be acratic sometimes, hence lacking the virtue. Shame, remember, is bound up with one’s sense of the fine, but is not a virtue because the virtuous agent has no reason to feel shame (see 1128b10-34). At any rate, for my argument I can leave out the exact developmental stages; all I need is that the virtuous person must be a lover of the fine - and that is clear enough.

right reasons: he does not care about the fine itself, he rather cares

about the consequences of doing or not doing what is fine.45

Not only moral virtue is pleasant, however. Aristotle points out that the philosopher finds incredible pleasure in doing philosophy (X. 7.1177a25). Again, the explanation for this is found in the agent’s love - here even contained in the name: only a lover of wisdom is a philosopher. If the relevant states are exercised by suitable material, the agent will engage in a fitting activity which he loves - and therefore he will, usually, take pleasure in it.

A similar account holds true of the other activities mentioned, playing the flute, building and so on, even though being e.g. a flautist is not, really, anybody’s second nature.46 _{The difference to}

virtue is that one does not necessarily have to enjoy the activities presently considered. This is because it is part of being a good person to love the fine, and part of being a good philosopher to love sophia, but it is not part of being able to play the flute to love flute music.47

This is why Aristotle, in order to explain why these activities are pleasant, adds that in addition to having certain skills, one can also be a lover of geometry, a lover of music, a lover of building or

45 _{The difference between the virtuous and the wannabe virtuous is described,} twice, at X.9.11794-31. I agree with Burnyeat’s interpretation that what is lacking in the non-virtuous is not the that (i.e. knowledge of what is fine), but rather a conception of the fine as worthwhile in themselves (1980:81). This is, ultimately, why the non-virtuous person does not take pleasure in the fine. I hope to pursue the topic on another occasion.

46 _{There can be good reasons not to play the flute (or to exercise any craft), in} particular moral considerations trump non-moral ones. This is not so for virtue: the virtuous action as response to a given situation cannot be trumped by non-moral considerations, and thus non-moral considerations are irrelevant. Thus, the response as virtuous person is unconditional, whereas the one as a builder is conditional upon its being compatible with moral considerations. This is why only the former are second nature.

47 _{One could argue that in order to be a real flautist one has to love flute music, or} that a real doctor has to love health.

whatever (X.5.1175a33-35), in which case the agent will take pleasure because he engages in a beloved activity.

4.3.9 Conclusion

The upshot is that one takes pleasure customarily in activities because one loves them either because this love is innate - as in the case of perception, or because it is acquired - as in the cases of virtuous activity, mathematics, building or whatever. So, pleasure supervenes not only on the activity, but also on the agent’s love.

With this explanation for why pleasure supervenes on activities established, we can briefly compare Aristotle’s to Plato’s account. We saw that Plato officially claims that all pleasure is a restorative process, and that it is good only insofar as it pertains to a good state. So, for Plato pleasure is bound up with deficiency; it essentially requires being deprived of a good state. This is why Plato needs to postulate an unperceived lack to account for pleasures that do not obviously rely on a lack. Aristotle, on the other hand, emphasises in his account of pleasure the underlying state which is active when pleasure is taken. The relevant hexis is not only responsible for the activity, but it also encompasses love of the relevant objects. One might be tempted, then, to conclude that Plato’s postulated lack (perceived or unperceived) is replaced with love. So, it would seem as if on any occasion when an agent enjoys something, one would have to postulate that the agent loves doing that sort of thing - even if he does not know it.48

48 _{Taylor suggests a similar role for interests or preferences instead of love,} contending that ‘the description of good conditions for the exercise of the activity must include the condition that that exercise satisfies the agent’s preferences, interests, etc.’ He points out that ‘That is not to revert to the deficiency/ replenishment account of pleasure, since a preference or an interest is not a deficiency. Preferences etc. can indeed give rise to deficiencies.’ (2008:254)

Perhaps this is true, but Aristotle is not committed to this view: unlike Plato, Aristotle does not try to give a reductive analysis of why perceiving or walking is pleasant. Nor is he interested in any pleasure: he is interested in pleasures which customarily taken and habitual for the agent - and for these it is plausible that the agent should love the relevant activities. That Aristotle should focus on pleasure customarily taken is understandable because Aristotle is concerned with ethically relevant pleasures and pain (as is evident from the introduction to the essay, X.1.1172a19-26), and chance- pleasures show little, if anything, about character. This is why Aristotle does not discuss them at all in EN X.4-5; he concentrates on such cases as perception and activities which stand at the centre of people’s lives, such as doing mathematics for the lover of geometry or thinking for the lover of understanding.