N ¿Las comparaciones son odiosas?

As mentioned, North Korea excludes other great powers from its share of the peninsula for a variety of reasons. It lacks the incentive to do so and opening to China’s main rivals would almost certainly initiate social changes threatening to the regime. Yet Pyongyang still asserts its independence from Beijing through its missile and nuclear programs. With such actions, it becomes essential to examine why China itself finds value in retaining this alliance.

A desire for social stability helps motivate China into maintaining the Sino-North Korean alliance. Abandoning Pyongyang would leave North Korea without the economic and security lifeline it has become so dependent upon. This would likely lead to regime collapse and could result in mass refugee flows, smuggling, and WMD proliferation

411 Yoon Hwy-tak, “China’s Northeast Project: Defensive or Offensive Strategy,” East Asian Review 16, no. 4 (2004), 119.

412 _{Andrew Scobell, “A Death in the Family,” U.S. News, January 21, 2014,}

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/01/21/china-north-korea-and-the-fallout-from- kim-jong-un-executing-his-uncle.

across the region.413 _{An influx of refugees could undermine domestic growth and cause}

unrest among China’s two million ethnic Koreans.414 _{Even under the current stable}

conditions, an estimated 200,000 North Koreans reside illegally in China.415 _{China sees}

this flow of people as a major issue and has answered by increasing border patrols, repatriation, and vigilance around embassies and consulates.416

Besides from preventing social instability, the PRC has strategic reasons for sustaining the Sino-North Korean alliance. Beijing wants to keep the status quo as it sees Western access to North Korea as a geostrategic risk.417 _{North Korea provides a buffer}

between China and the West and its realignment would have implications similar to the Seoul-led unification scenario. Given that Beijing has fought costly wars in the past to secure the peninsula, North Korean nuclear testing likely falls short in importance compared to maintaining the status quo.418 _{Although Beijing promotes denuclearization}

in the Six Party Talks, this policy has secondary importance compared to keeping a North Korean buffer.419 _{For example, after U.S. shows of force against Pyongyang’s 2013}

provocations, Beijing eased away from criticizing North Korea.420

Along with social and strategic incentives, Beijing also has economic gains to make in North Korea. As seen with the investments mentioned above, China wants to secure mineral rights, utilize North Korean ports for the landlocked northeastern provinces, and exploit cheap labor.421 _{Doing so expands resource availability, decreases}

transportation costs, and helps economies in the depressed Jilin and Liaoning

413 Lankov, Real North Korea, 180.

414 Nanto and Manyin, China-North Korea Relations, 10.

415 Min Noh Jung, “Doors Slam on North Korean Refugees,” Asia Times, August 7, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-02-070813.html.

416 Cha, Impossible State, 181. 417 _{Ibid., 418, 419.}

418 Lankov, Real North Korea, 181. 419 Ibid.

420 _{Snyder and Byun, “China-Korea Relations.”} 421 Lankov, Real North Korea, 182–183.

provinces.422 _{Additionally, these sectors can stabilize the North Korean regime as}

economic development might spillover to North Korea.423

Beijing’s motivations to maintain the alliance outweigh North Korean detractions. Pyongyang meets PRC expectations for preventing social crises, forestalling the West, and providing economic incentives. Pyongyang may provide the PRC with several problems including the potential for a regional arms race and the continuation of financially draining assistance.424 _{Yet the DPRK pursuit of nuclear weapons and}

provocations against Seoul do not motivate the PRC to discontinue its alliance with Pyongyang. To do so would risk upending the status quo. Even if North Korean actions may sometimes contradict PRC interests, they do not outweigh China’s desire to maintain stability on the peninsula and the Sino-North Korean alliance.425

D. CONCLUSION

The North Korean case does not share the same factors that deteriorated and split China from its Soviet, Mongolian, and North Vietnamese allies. China has a long history of valuing the Korean Peninsula and the PRC has supported the regime in Pyongyang despite highs and lows in their relationship. The notions of national sovereignty and political ideology, which factored into the demise of previous alliances, do not apply with North Korea. Unification is no longer a pressing concern and Chinese influence has failed to stifle North Korean national sovereignty. As such, Pyongyang lacks motivation to invite a competing power into its portion of the peninsula. Additionally, to do so would risk the stability of the Kim regime itself. China too has stakes in North Korea. To abandon the regime would forsake its goals of maintaining social, strategic, and economic security.426 _{North Korea likely understands its value to China and acts}

422 Cha, Impossible State, 239.

423 Park and Lee, North Korea, 284–285.

424 _{Nanto and Manyin, China-North Korea Relations, 6.} 425 Lankov, Real North Korea, 184.

provocatively without facing lasting or severe punishment from Beijing.427 _{As long as it}

continues to fulfill its role as a buffer from China’s competitors, however, the Sino-North Korean alliance will remain intact.

427 Cha, Impossible State, 317.

VI.

CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the main findings of the thesis, identifies challenges with research, considers options for follow-on research, and draws additional implications of the findings. In doing so, it notes the complexities in identifying common factors to compare alliance splits. It also finds that an expansion of research to pre-PRC alliances could deepen the value of the thesis findings. Yet as the preceding chapters argue, the national sovereignty concerns and great power competition that lead to PRC alliance- splitting are not evident in the Sino-North Korean relationship. Thus, the implication of findings concludes that the alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang will last for the foreseeable future.