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In 1847, Irish insurgents were advised to engage the British Army in the following way:

“The force of England is entrenched and fortified. You must draw it out of position; break up its mass; break its trained line of march and manoeuvre, its equal step and serried array… nullify its tactic and strategy, as well as its discipline; decompose the science and system of war, and resolve them into their first elements.”

3-103. Terrorist tactics employ violence primarily against noncombatants. Terror attacks generally re- quire fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare or conventional warfare. They allow insurgents greater secu- rity and have relatively low support requirements. Insurgencies often rely on terrorist tactics early in their formation due to these factors. Terrorist tactics do not involve mindless destruction nor are they employed randomly. Insurgents choose targets that produce the maximum informational and political effects. Terror- ist tactics can be effective for generating popular support and altering the behavior of governments.

3-104. Guerrilla tactics, in contrast, feature hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed groups. The primarily targets are HN government activities, security forces, and other COIN elements. Insurgents using guerrilla tactics usually avoid decisive confrontations unless they know they can win. Instead, they focus on harass- ing counterinsurgents. As with terrorist tactics, guerrilla tactics are neither mindless nor random. Insurgents choose targets that produce maximum informational and political effects. The goal is not to militarily de- feat COIN forces but to outlast them while building popular support for the insurgency. Terrorist and guer- rilla tactics are not mutually exclusive. An insurgent group may employ both forms of violent action simulta- neously.

3-105. Insurgents rarely use conventional tactics. Conventional operations are not always necessary for an insurgency’s success. However, insurgents may engage in conventional operations after the insurgency develops extensive popular support and sustainment capabilities. The insurgents can then generate a con- ventional military force that can engage HN government forces.

3-106. Knowledge of violent capabilities is used to evaluate insurgent courses of action. Commanders use this knowledge to determine appropriate protection measures and tactics to counter insurgent actions. In

addition, knowledge of how insurgents conduct attacks provides a baseline that helps determine the effec- tiveness of COIN operations. The following should be evaluated to determine insurgents’ capabilities for violent action:

z Forms of violent action used.

z Weapons available and their capabilities.

z Training.

z Known methods of operating.

„ Frequency of attacks. „ Timing of attacks. „ Targets of attacks. „ Tactics and techniques.

z Known linkages between violent, political, and information actions. How do the insurgents use violence to increase their popular support and undermine counterinsurgents?

z Means of command and control during attacks (including communications means used). Insurgent Organizational Structure and Key Personalities

3-107. Conducting the preceding activities requires some form of organizational structure and leadership. Insurgencies can be organized in several ways. Each structure has its own strengths and limitations. The structure used balances the following:

z Security.

z Efficiency and speed of action.

z Unity of effort. z Survivability.

z Geography.

z Social structures and cultures of the society.

Organizations also vary greatly by region and time. Insurgent organizations are often based on existing so- cial networks—familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, professional, or others. Analysts can use social network analysis to determine organizational structure. (See paragraphs B-15 through B-18.)

3-108. An insurgency’s structure often determines whether it is more effective to target enemy forces or enemy leaders. For instance, if an insurgent organization is hierarchical with few leaders, removing the leaders may greatly degrade the organization’s capabilities. However, if the insurgent organization is non- hierarchical, targeting the leadership may not have much effect. Understanding an insurgent organization’s structure requires answers to the following questions:

z Is the organization hierarchical or nonhierarchical? z Is the organization highly structured or unsystematic?

z Are movement members specialists or generalists?

z Do leaders exercise centralized control or do they allow autonomous action and initiative?

z Are there a few leaders (promotes rapid decision making) or is there redundant leadership (pro-

motes survivability)?

z Does the movement operate independently or does it have links to other organizations and net-

works (such as criminal, religious, and political organizations)?

z Does the movement place more weight on political action or violent action?

3-109. As explained in paragraphs 1-58 through 1-66, insurgents fall into five overlapping categories: movement leaders, combatants, political cadre, auxiliaries, and the mass base. Movement leaders are im- portant because they choose the insurgency’s organization, approach, and tactics. The movement leaders’ personalities and decisions often determine whether the insurgency succeeds. Therefore, the movement leaders must be identified and their basic beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities understood. Important leader characteristics include the following:

z Role in the organization.

z Known activities. z Known associates.

z Background and personal history. z Beliefs, motivations, and ideology.

z Education and training.

z Temperament (for example, careful, impulsive, thoughtful, or violent).

z Importance of the organization. z Popularity outside the organization.

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3-110. When an insurgency has widespread support, it usually means the HN government is weak and losing control. In such situations, other armed groups—particularly criminal organizations, militias, and terrorist groups—can be significant players. Moreover, these groups can support each other’s operations. Criminal Networks

3-111. Criminal networks may not be a part of an insurgency. However, their activities—for example, banditry, hijackings, kidnappings, and smuggling—can further undermine the HN government’s authority. Insurgent organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistic support. In some cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. As commanders work to reassert government control, they need to know the following:

z Which criminal networks are present. z What their activities are.

z How they interact with insurgents.

Nongovernment Militias

3-112. As the HN government weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect them- selves. If the government cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed militias to provide that essential service. Examples of this sort of militia include the following:

z Loyalist militias formed in Northern Ireland.

z Right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in Colombia to counter the FARC.

z Militias of various ethnic and political groups formed in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. If militias are outside the HN government’s control, they can often be obstacles to ending an insurgency. Militias may become more powerful than the HN government, particularly at the local level. They may also fuel the insurgency and a precipitate a downward spiral into full-scale civil war.

3-113. Militias may or may not be an immediate threat to U.S. forces; however, they constitute a long- term threat to law and order. The intelligence staff should track them just like insurgent and other armed groups. Commanders need to understand the role militias play in the insurgency, the role they play in poli- tics, and how they can be disarmed.