The truncation of the DDG 1000 program sent shockwaves through all stakeholders in the surface ship acquisition process. The Navy has seen its reputation on Capitol Hill tarnished because of its inability to estimate cost and determine ship capability requirements. Congress has shown that its failure to provide adequate oversight at key points led to dramatic cost overruns and unrealistic expectations. Industry has shown that its inability to deliver mature technologies on time and at or under budget leads to a drastic course correction by its most valued customers (U.S. Navy).
To make sense of recent events, it is important to examine exactly what happened. The Navy established a requirement in the mid 1990s for a land attack destroyer that could operate in the littorals and project power ashore. Industry responded with dramatic warship designs that included new and exciting technologies that emerged in the recent technology boom. Over time, new complex technologies were added resulting in major cost overruns. The Navy, occasional victims of groupthink, defended DDG 1000 rigorously and ensured Congress it was the surface combatant of the future. Eventually, the Navy realized that the requirements of the 1990s were different from the requirements of today and came to the conclusion that DDG 1000 did not add enough capability to make it worth its tremendous cost. The result was a scramble by the Navy, Congress and industry to reestablish requirements based on threats, protect the industrial base, and set a new shipbuilding course for the future.
The Navy must now take a hard look at itself and rethink methods used to establish and update requirements, program surface ships and take them through the acquisition process. One lesson learned by the Navy is that it is never too late to make the right decision. The enormous amount of monetary resources already spent on DDG 1000 is a sunk cost and cannot be recovered. Another lesson learned is that there is no sense in continuing a program that will not be able to meet emerging threats, even if the program has been supported by top officials for several years.
In the end, the Navy deserves credit for re-evaluating the previous decision. The recommendation to truncate the DDG 1000 program at two ships and reopen DDG 51 production lines caused a stir, but will put the Navy in better position to take ownership of surface ship acquisition. In a period of declining defense budgets and increasing global responsibilities the prudent choice of building a larger number of ships that meet current capability requirements to include operational and fiscal was paramount. If the Navy did not reverse course, they risked the possibility being undercut by a new administration, a declining defense budget and a failing program. They also risked spending large portions of their ship construction (SCN) account on a ship that is not able to meet emerging threats.
The DDG 51 is the backbone of the surface fleet because of its affordability and versatility. The research shows the Navy is making the correct decision by trying to procure an additional eight DDG 51 Flight IIAs over the next five years. The DDG 1000 program, however, was not a waste of time or money. The Navy will benefit from the large amounts of research and development that was done when it comes time to procure the next large surface combatant – possibly the CG(X). Technologies such as the Integrated Power System, Automatic Fire Suppression System, Dual Band Radar and the tumblehome hull have the potential to change surface combatants forever. In the end, however, it is important to remember the successes of the DDG 51 program – proven technologies, incremental upgrades, predictable cost structure and manageable risk.
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