La necesidad de aplicar la acción de habeas data para casos de derecho al olvido

In the previous chapter, I examined how early leaders of Atlanta’s homeless movement gradually came to articulate their individual understanding of homelessness. In this chapter, I examine the process by which the early framers – Joanna Adams, Eduard Loring, Bob Bevis and Bill Bolling created a statement calling for a community-wide effort to end homelessness. In this process, this network of leaders collectively developed an early statement in which they

contended that homelessness was taking on some new characteristics and they proposed forming a group to decide what should be done about Atlanta’s problem of homelessness. These first attempts by the early leaders reveals the differing emphases among them in their diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames as they sought to suggest a broad institutional response to homelessness. Ultimately, their efforts to forge a collective response to homelessness in Atlanta led to the creation of the Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless.

None of the early leaders had a well thought out theory of homelessness with which to guide their efforts. The first free night shelter of the new movement, Clifton Presbyterian Night Shelter, emerged out of a desire to respond concretely to poverty in the community. It drew inspiration from the Catholic Workers and Mitch Snyder. The experience of Clifton highlighted the pent up demand for free shelter and revealed the hidden population of the unhoused in Atlanta.

Of the early leaders, Ed Loring and his colleagues at the Open Door Community were best positioned to articulate a basic frame for homelessness. As I have shown, the formation of the Clifton Presbyterian Shelter was primarily attributable to the inspiration of the Catholic Worker Movement and the challenge by Mitch Snyder to respond to people on the streets. Ed Loring in particular maintained an ongoing relationship with Mitch Snyder and his Community

for Creative Nonviolence. Through this connection Loring already had a relationship with the national-level networks that were forming in response to growing homelessness.

Bill Bolling’s view of homelessness was shaped by his experience at St. Luke’s

Episcopal food program on Peachtree Street, which later led to the establishment of the Atlanta Community Food Bank, which he has headed since 1979. The common diagnostic frame shared by the early providers was that homelessness was an emergency that demanded a response. The seasonal night shelter reflected and was the logical manifestation of that frame – shelter was provided to keep people from freezing to death, but discontinued as the season warmed.

By the end of the second shelter season (1982-1983), the loose collection of shelters that had emerged through the efforts of Loring, Bevis, and Bolling had begun to develop a more formal networking and support structure. The Open Door Community, founded by Loring, provided the physical location for an important series of meetings. Unlike the seasonal night shelter spaces located in churches, the Open Door was an institution that continuously served the homeless from their building on Ponce de Leon Avenue. As a result, each meeting held at the Open Door brought participants face-to-face with homelessness. An informal group of volunteer shelter directors and interested others began meeting on Tuesday mornings to share experiences. This became the Tuesday Morning Group.

The Tuesday morning meetings at the Open Door Community brought together the core group of new leaders who were engaged in the response to homelessness. Initially, it was a small and informal group – Ed Loring and Murphy Davis from the Open Door, Robert Bevis from First Presbyterian, Joanna Adams of Central Presbyterian, Bill Bolling of St. Luke’s Episcopal and the Atlanta Community Food Bank, A. B. Short of Oakhurst Baptist, and others associated with shelters attended. Universally, all the participants were associated with religious,

almost exclusively Christian, organizations. Loring, Davis, Bevis and Adams were Presbyterian Ministers, Bolling was a lay worker at St. Luke’s Episcopal Church, and Short was the shelter coordinator at Oakhurst Baptist Church.

The impetus for the Tuesday Morning Group meetings was to provide support and solve problems through informal discussion and meals. The first conversations primarily focused on the logistics of providing shelter, pooling knowledge, providing updates and solving problems. Individual shelter directors undertook experiments and tested new innovations. As the basic mechanics of providing shelter became more routinized, and particularly after the close of the Central Presbyterian Shelter after its second season (spring of 1982), these leaders had the space to consider what else should be done to address homelessness. As they developed the collective understanding that their shelters were inadequate for the need, they explored how to encourage other churches to develop shelters of their own. Their collective experience was that the demand for emergency night shelter was continuing to grow in Atlanta.

The idea of a “task force” to address homelessness was first presented at the Tuesday Morning Meeting in March 16, 1982. At this session, Bolling circulated the first written draft in the form of an “Outline on Task Force for Homeless (And Hungry).” Over the next three months, the idea was further developed and negotiated through two subsequent drafts authored first by Bevis, then Bolling. The sequence of drafts reveals both alternative framing of

homelessness by the early movement leaders and their attempt to broaden the institutional response to homelessness in the city. In addition, what I find in my analysis is that the

presentation of homelessness and proposed solutions are rooted in a strategic decision to frame homelessness in particular ways so as to align the frame with other interests, particularly that of the Atlanta business community. In the following section I examine in depth the Bolling and

Bevis memos and how they reflected and shaped the emerging positions of those in the forefront of concern over homelessness in Atlanta.

BOLLING – TASK FORCE FOR THE HOMELESS (AND HUNGRY)

The March 16, 1982 draft introduced the idea of a task force, specifically a “Task Force for the Homeless (and Hungry).” The composition of the Task Force was to include religious community, city and county government, judges, public safety, medical institutions, business interests, the organized charitable community, and the homeless. As envisioned by Bolling, the Task Force would have three tasks: (1) research; (2) documentation; and (3) recommendations. The Task Force would investigate homelessness in Atlanta, particularly who the homeless are, where they congregate, and why they are homeless. In addition, the Task Force would examine how other cities were responding to homelessness. The legal and economic implications of homelessness also would be researched. In Bolling’s draft, most lines are topic headings with little fleshing out. It is the economic implications of homelessness that are the most fleshed out, as follows:

2. Economic Implications

a. Cost of our present system of dealing with the homeless to city, county and churches.

b. Cost of police, judicial system, jails, business community (perceptions of public) & homeless. (Bolling 1982:1)

Bolling’s diagnostic and motivational framing emphasizes the economic cost of

homelessness. The most salient aspect of the problem, in Bolling’s view, is that it costs the city, state, county, and community a great deal of money for homelessness to persist. In turn, this emphasis on the economic dimension of the problem of homelessness (“cost to city, county, state and business community”) served as the key lever to motivate the involvement and participation

of these other actors. Bolling envisioned having a broader Task Force representing many aspects of the community, while continuing the religious community’s existing networks.

In the strategic commentary attached to the memorandum, Bolling describes how his framing of homelessness directly tracks back to an earlier experience he had dealing with a broad social problem. Bolling describes his experience as a participant in the coordinating committee for the Atlanta Public Inebriant Program (PIP). The PIP program was established by local government agencies out of the realization that many agencies, units of government, and providers were seeking to address problems related to “the public inebriant – the street alcoholic.” While there was broad awareness of the overlapping missions of different groups serving street alcoholics, the coordinating committee was “reluctantly formed.” The PIP served as the only forum which brought together “medical, judiciary, public safety, business community (CAP), and the religious community (a late entry) to discuss the interrelationship of these groups and the problem of running” programs for public inebriants. Its participants viewed PIP as

ineffective, as Bolling stated: “the perception of almost everyone was that PIP [sic] would not

work and a coordinating committee has little function.” In Bolling’s experience, the “committee has realized that it has no power or authority to make policy or call for changes.” Addressing the problem of public inebriants was “a very political issue on all levels – state, county and city” as it involved “funding for programs, jobs and legal issues.” Despite this, members of the PIP coordinating committee indicated to Bolling they would join the proposed task force on homelessness as individuals, not as representatives of their organizations.

Another aspect of Bolling’s PIP experience shaped his prognostic framing of

homelessness. Bolling anticipated that homelessness, like PIP, would be “political”; that is, leading to struggles over power between elements of the state, civil society, and the business

community. His solution to this “political” problem sought to engage diverse elements of the community in a broad based study of the problem. Research and documentation creates a shared body of information providing the basis for rational consideration of the problem. Bolling follows this line in arguing the approach for the proposed Task Force.

The logic here is that by getting to the facts of the situation, a common understanding, a collective action frame, would developing through the process of research would lead to

recommendations to solve the problem. The outcome Bolling envisioned was a “cooperative model of city, county, community, business community working together” to address

homelessness. In this early draft Bolling mentions a theme that occurs frequently in the evolving idea of a Task Force. What early leaders envisioned was the development of a cooperative approach to the problem, a consensus over the dimensions of the problem and the necessary action. Linked to this idea of a “cooperative model” is a de-emphasis on diagnostic framing, especially the issues of blame or culpability for homelessness. For example, in Bolling’s draft, the economic costs of homelessness are emphasized but the identification of responsibility is de- emphasized. Bolling, for instance, chose not to mention economic conditions in Atlanta, housing costs, downtown development, released mental patients, or any number of possible candidates to explain homelessness. Bolling’s proposal emphasizes that homelessness exists as a problem that costs the city, but there is little attribution of who or what is responsible for the condition. As in the earlier discussion of how Atlanta leaders constructed diagnostic frames, in this instance framing is done in a way that minimizes conflict and avoids critiquing existing social arrangements.

Bolling’s de-emphasis on diagnostic framing was in line with his strategy to “de-

the problem as a way to understand it. By focusing on process rather than presenting a fully fleshed out analysis of the problem, Bolling appears to have been making a strategic choice to minimize the attribution of blame in order to elicit the support and participation of important sectors of the community. Building on the PIP experience, the key, in Bolling’s view, was to attract people with the power to make decisions to a common forum to research and develop a solution to homelessness. The Task Force model was to be such a forum.

The Bolling proposal outlined three alternate approaches for moving forward with the creation of a task force:

I. Put pressure on city and county commissioners to form group. II. Research & document, then apply pressure.

III. The religious community could call for a task force, or the religious community along with key community people calls for the formation of a task force. (Bolling 1982:1)

From his experience with the PIP coordinating committee, Bolling concludes that “the key to getting everyone on board is to approach this primarily from a economic point of view (cost to city, county, state and business community)” while “at the same time having a separate religious task force” such as the Tuesday morning group or a downtown churches group.

Bolling’s proposal primarily emphasizes the prognostic and motivational frames for the responding to homelessness in Atlanta. In the effort to enhance the salience of homelessness to the groups that have the power and capacity to address the problem, he relies upon his earlier experience with PIP to shape the issue in a way that will attract the interest of these groups. From the earlier experience, Bolling has learned that merely being concerned about

homelessness and bringing well-intentioned persons to a meeting is insufficient in light of the “politics” of the situation. In Bolling’s view, the key to captivating, motivating the interest of state and business actors is to highlight the economic costs of homelessness. Framing

homelessness as an economic problem, a problem that has a quantifiable cost to the city’s resources is a strategic decision based on an assessment of the kinds of problems that will attract attention from city, county and state.

Bolling’s reliance on the PIP model is ironic. He discusses at length the shortcomings of the PIP program, highlighting that while well intentioned and attended by knowledgeable people, it was ultimately frustrated from achieving its goals by the lack of power to coordinate the

different levels of government. Framing the response to homelessness like the public inebriate program had the effect of shaping the perception of homelessness. In other words, if the response to homelessness is the same as the public inebriate program, then persons who are homeless must be like public inebriants. By using the model of the public inebriant, the street alcoholic, and arguing that a similar approach is needed, Bolling implies it is a similar problem. Bolling’s heavy reliance on his PIP experience serves to place homelessness within an existing set of understandings. Ironically, Bolling takes this approach at a time when other advocates and social scientists were arguing that homelessness was no longer a problem of the street people, but a new kind of problem.

THE BEVIS DRAFT – STREET PEOPLE STRATEGY

A month after Bolling’s outline, Robert Bevis circulated a second draft of the proposal for a broad based planning process to address homelessness. The subject and title of Bevis’s memo is “Coalition for Street People Strategy” and it is structured in the form of a memo from the “Tuesday Morning ad hoc Group” addressed to Mayor Young (City of Atlanta),

Commissioner Lomax (Fulton County), Dan Sweat (Central Atlanta Progress) and Don Newby (Christian Council of Metropolitan Atlanta). In Bevis’s formulation the Task Force for the Homeless and Hungry is refocused as a call for a “Coalition for Street People Strategy.”

Bevis opens the memo acknowledging “most people,” and implicitly the leaders to whom the memo is addressed, “wish they [street people] would go away – back home, to another city, another state, etc.” Bevis goes on to say: “Let us be up front with you. We are not sure what needs to be done and what will be the best strategy to follow. We are committed to seek a consensus strategy, if possible, that will be acceptable to all of us” (Bevis 1982).

In his opening statement Bevis acknowledges the lack of both diagnostic and prognostic framing. The Bevis memo diagnoses the problem population as those people living on the street – “the street people.” Bevis begins by reiterating the common view that street people are not part of the community. But Bevis makes a practical argument; the strategy of wishing the street people to depart has not been effective as they remain in the community. He calls for a new way of framing the problem.

Bevis has characterized the problem as one of “street people” rather than “homeless.” Street people was the predominant term employed in the 1960’s and 70’s to describe those who presumably lived on the streets, visible to the public eye and often presumed to be addicts of one kind or another. While “homelessness” was used occasionally in public discourse, most church workers, agency staff, and media were more likely to use “street people” in their descriptions. Like Bolling’s elicitation of the public inebriant, Bevis evokes a set of images in using the term “street people” rather than “homeless.” The problem becomes people on the street and how to respond to them, rather than people who are homeless – without homes. Framing unhoused persons as homeless implicitly suggests homes might be a solution, but framing the unhoused as street people perhaps evokes a disparate set of images, but most notably, that which Bolling elicits – the public inebriant.

Bevis’s opening statement that the group is “not sure what needs to be done and what will be the best strategy to follow,” admits to a lack of prognostic framing on the part of the early movement. While they had established a network of “literally hundreds of volunteers from congregations” and “7 shelters housed in churches,” they lacked an idea about what steps needed to be taken to address street people.

While Bevis makes no strong assertions about what was to be done, he provides some suggestions on what should be done. First, in referring to those in the religious community who have engaged in volunteer sheltering, “[we] have a growing commitment to find a humane, tough-love way for our city to address the needs of our homeless sisters and brothers.” The key words in this prognostic frame are “humane” and “tough-love.” To an imagined audience of political and business leaders, Bevis positions the argument for services as different from handouts. Bevis also attempted to lay out a programmatic dimension to the response. Bevis evokes key values of mutual responsibility, structure and accountability in his humane and tough love approach. While Bevis positioned his argument to address business and government

leaders, he also invoked the religious language used by Loring, Adams and Abercrombie when he referred to “our homeless sisters and brothers.” Bevis argues for inclusion with

accountability, homeless persons are members of the community. Community life involves both responsibility for the most needy and their responsibility to the community.