La necesidad de regulación legislativa en el Estado de Puebla

piloting the machine” he “worried a bit” and lost sleep for the night. After all, he “did not relish the idea o f killing Germans.”^^ Bishop’s mental and moral equilibrium depended on the suppression of the realisation that aerial fights resulted in human deaths. He professed that when the suppressed thought emerged, he felt his personal moral integrity was jeopardized.

Several reasons help explain why British narratives cast war pilots as tragic heroes who struggled to avoid moral incrimination while serving their country. First o f all, accounts o f fighter pilots constructed an image of British military masculinity in sharp contrast with British official representations o f German soldiers as inhuman “evil Hun” who habitually committed atrocities.^'* Narratives of British fighter pilots, therefore, underscored the moral superiority o f British forces over their enemies.

Moreover, repeated emphases on the moral impact o f war service on the individual reflected a wider public justification for Britain’s participation in the Great War. British politicians stressed that the country had entered the conflict to restore a moral order in Europe which German aggression had disrupted. Thus, flying aces personified the moral dilemmas which the British nation at war faced as a whole. The re-establishment o f a morally acceptable order posed an ethical problem because it required violence. The defence of “freedom” justified the use of force.

In addition, British depictions of fighter pilots’ masculinity drew heavily on the idea o f the gentleman as is borne out by the references to Ball’s gentleness and

chivalry. While this model of British masculinity underwent significant transformations during the late Victorian and Edwardian periods and increasingly foregrounded

demands for toughness and physical strength, older conceptions o f the gentleman as “brave, loyal, true to his word, courteous, generous, and merciful” had by no means

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simply disappeared.^^ British representations of fighter pilots thus conformed to a model o f masculinity whose norms problematized rather than affirmed the use of violence.

Finally, British war propaganda was never conceived under the sole direction o f the military establishment which might have encouraged the use of more emphatic rhetorics affirming combat violence.^^ As Lloyd George’s contribution to Ball’s biography illustrates, British war propaganda represented a collaborative effort between the military and civilians, many of whom harboured an ambivalent attitude to the moral implications of the Great War. As a result, British war propaganda

addressed soldiers’ moral dilemmas.^^

British technological nationalism, therefore, possessed three distinctive features. First, Britons repeatedly argued that innovation consolidated the empire. Second, British public rhetorics of technological change for the sake of the nation were deeply inscribed with defensive motivations o f maintaining the status quo. Third, public representations addressed the moral dilemmas faced by fighter pilots who attempted to preserve their “gentlemanly” masculinity amid the conflagration of technological war. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for Liberal and Socialist pacifists to mount effective public critiques o f British technological nationalism. It

On British stereoptyping o f the Gennan anny during the Great War, see Cate Haste, K eep the Home F ires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War (London: Allan Lane, 1977), 79-107.

The quote is from Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 16. On British concepts o f masculinity during the Great War, see also liana R. Bet-El, “Men and Soldiers: British Conscripts, Concepts of Masculinity and the Great War,” in Borderlines, Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870-1939, ed. Billie Melman (London: Routledge, 1998), 73-94. On the renegotiation of elite masculinities since the late

19th century, see James A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation o f an Educational Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1981); Michael Roper and John Tosh, “Introduction: Historians and the Politics of Masculinity,” in Manful Assertions: M asculinities in Britain since 1800, ed. Michael Roper and John Tosh, (London: Routledge, 1991), 1-24.

On the organization o f British war propaganda, see M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War, I 9I 4 - I 9 I 8 (London: Macmillan, 1982), 15-100.

was practically impossible for them to speak out against imperial maintenance in principle. Moreover, Liberals and Socialists could not openly argue against initiatives proposed by innovators when the latter claimed merely to respond to foreign

developments whose origins lay beyond their control. Finally, the notions of masculinity informing dominant representations of fighter pilots tended to

problematize the military potential of technological innovation. This aspect o f British technological nationalism produced no rhetoric affirming violence which would have made an easy target for Liberal and Socialist pacifists. Thus, technological nationalism instigated relatively little open political hostility in the British public at the time for its defensive and imperial narratives tended to mute potential critics. How do these findings compare with the distinctive features of German technological nationalism?

* * *

Given the later acquisition, smaller size, and subsequent loss in 1919 of overseas possessions, imperial themes played a more marginal role in German technological debates than in Britain. Instead, German accounts underlined the nation’s position as a successful newcomer on the international scene whose

technological achievements bore out novel status claims during the Wilhelmian period. When the Hamburg-American Line celebrated the beginning of the new century with the launch o f its Xmtx Deutschland on 10 January 1900, German foreign secretary Count Billow’s christening speech related the nation’s foreign policies to progress in marine engineering. Maintaining that the country’s bid in colonial and world politics [Weltpolitikl represented a “necessary” consequence o f its economic rise. Billow

ranked the new ships among the foundations and indicators o f Germany’s recently gained international prominence/^ In 1908, a Liberal Reichstag member argued along similar lines. Asserting that Germany had become a “world power [Weltmachty he provided examples from marine engineering to illustrate the “unimaginable change [ungeahnter Wandel]” o f the country’s shift in international position. In the previous ten or fifteen years, German shipyards had risen to “count among the most powerful companies in the world,” and German shipping lines consequently ceased to order their boats in Great Britain.^^ Thus, passenger liners made in Germany objectified German claims to novel international status.

Defeat in the war as well as regulations o f the Versailles Treaty ended dreams o f global politics and intensified narratives o f national tenacity which had already shaped a range o f tales about technological success during the imperial era. German lines had to transfer practically all their vessels to French, British, and American competitors to compensate for Allied marine losses during the Great War. In addition, severe restrictions were placed on German aviation. While lengthy negotiations led to the repeal o f a ban on airship construction as well as many restrictions on civilian airplane design in 1926, Germany failed to gain permission to maintain a military airforce during the Weimar years. Germans repeatedly attacked the peace settlement for creating an international environment hostile to German technological aspirations.

Promotional literature issued by public relations departments often interacted with conservative political “propaganda” to generate support for political initiatives aiming to restore Germany’s ability to engage in unrestricted technological

development. In 1929, Ernst Jünger edited an expensively produced volume for the

example o f T.E. Lawrence, see Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining o f M asculinités 1994), 191-207.

Berliner Tageblatt, 10 January 1900, (evening edition), 4. Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 288, 4169.

Deutsche Luftfahrerverbatid [German Aerial Association]. Its preface by former government minister Alexander Dominions predictably lamented “the exceptional disadvantages” arising for German aviation from the ban on military flying.*® Three years later, Lufthansa sponsored a book featuring contributions by academics, retired war pilots, government officials and lobbyists. Prominent pilot Wofgang von Gronau, who had crossed the Atlantic several times in previous years, set the tone in his opening remarks. He argued that the book not only demonstrated Germany’s “productive power and creative ability [deutsche Leistungsfahigkeit und deutsche SchaffenskraftY" it also documented the spirit o f resilience which enabled the nation to travel the “thorny road [LeidenswegY towards economic and technological recovery.** Public relations material of German shipping lines argued along similar lines.*^

The Conservative press employed metaphors o f physical mutilation to convey to readers the extent to which Germany suffered from unfair international treatment. One paper considered the country a “slave o f the world whose sinews [had been] severed to beat him into submission.”*^ The organ of the Nazi party lamented that the German aviation industry had been “gagged and raped by the shameful dictations of Versailles [Versailler Schanddiktaty^* Although the Social Democratic and Liberal press abstained from comparably drastic language, they agreed in principle about the unjust character o f the peace settlement. After Germany had delivered airship Z.R.3 as a reparation to the United States, where the public welcomed the vessel with great

Alexander Dominicus, “Geleitwort,” in Luftfahrt ist not!, ed. Ernst Jünger (Leipzig: G. Kreysing, 1929), 5.

** Wolfgang V. Gronau, “Vorwort,” in Luftfahrt varan! D as deutsche Fliegerbuch, ed. J.B. Malina (Berlin: Neufeld und Henius Verlag, 1932), 7.

Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Wiederaujbau der deutschen Überseeschiffahrt (Berlin: Maximilian Maul, 1923); DSB library, Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen, Columbus (Hannover: Sponholtz, no year), 5.

enthusiasm, even the Social Democratic press found the ban on German airship construction absurd. After all, even a victorious power considered this artefact an admirable invention.*^

Given the widespread conviction that German technological innovations had to be achieved in an unfavourable international setting, public invocations of

“German” resistance and perseverance in the face o f adversity became a prominent feature of German technological nationalism. Reports of events in aviation and shipping often resorted to this strategy. In 1928 a report o f the launch o f liners Bremen and Europa argued that these boats testified to “the strong will. . . to regain the place which German shipping lost with the outbreak of the war.”*^ President Hindenburg struck a similar note in his christening speech:

When the harsh conditions o f the Versailles Treaty robbed Germany of its entire naval fleet, German shipping . . . set out with unbroken courage and a firm belief in the future to rebuild what had been destroyed and taken away. Not even in the hardest times did German shipping lose the belief in a new German future on the sea.*^

These narratives described the construction of the ships as acts o f national self- assertion. The boats emerged as symbols of a national resistance struggle against an international community denying Germany its legitimate status.

The most eloquent rhetorics of national resistance were devoted to airships. The transfer of airship Z.R.3 as a reparation to the United States sparked off a host of tales about the national significance of this event. When news reached Germany that the airship had arrived at its transatlantic destination, the Liberal press rejoiced: “The German name, disregarded abroad during the long war and postwar years, has a new

Vôlkischer Beobachter, 15-16 April 1928, 1.

Vorwârts, 15 October 1924, (evening edition), 1. For a similar liberal statement, see Berliner Tageblatt, 15 October 1924, (evening edition), 1.

^ B e rlin er Tageblatt, 15 August 1928, (evening edition), 3. ^ Berliner Tageblatt, 17 August 1928, (morning edition), 4.

ring due to this feat o f genius.” Germany had achieved a “peaceful conquest.”** Another article considered the delivery of the vessel a “proof German ability and German will [Beweis deutschen Konnens und deutschen Wollens]”^^

Liberals demanded that initiatives to reform the Versailles settlement should adhere to diplomatically acceptable, peaceful forms. Right-wing languages o f national resistance, however, resonated with aggressive revanchism which called into question Conservatives’ commitment to the avoidance o f armed conflict. After a German airship had circled the globe for the first time ever in 1929, the Conservative weekly Die Woche took the occasion to congratulate Germany on a successful revanche for military defeat. Although the “unprecedented struggle against. . . the entire world” led to German surrender after “heroic battles” in 1918, the nation’s “will and ability [was] unbroken.” The airship’s world tour finally brought redemption from military defeat because it deservedly invested Germany as “victor.”^ National resistance against international sanctions had proved successful. Further on the Right, Neue Preufiische Zeitung called to mind the obstacles against which German engineers “pondered and worked, fought and gained victory . . . Beslobbered by hatred and defamation, surrounded by inspectors and spies, exploited and maltreated, we have created a technological wonder under the most difficult conditions.”^^ In 1928, the organ of the Nazi party labelled German airships as “a simile of the German fighting spirit.”^^ An aggressive language of technological nationalism thus dominated the Conservative end of the political spectrum to demonstrate that national resistance against international sanctions had been successful.

Berliner Tageblatt, 15 October 1924, (evening edition), 1. Frankfurter Zeitung, 16 October 1924, (morning edition), 1. ^ Zeppelin fâ h rt uni die Welt, 5.

Neue Preufiische Zeitung, 16 October 1924, (morning edition), 1.

^ Vôlkischer Beobachter, 17 October 1928, 1. For a similar statement in a trade journal, see Luftfahrt, 28 (1924), 276.

Vehement protests against Germany’s international position in radical languages of technological nationalism provoked criticism from the Left. Although Social Democrats repeatedly acknowledged fundamental injustices o f the peace settlement, they maintained that uncompromising and directly confrontational “clamour [Gehriill\" harmed Germany’s international position. Radical nationalism,

Vorwarts argued, smacked of militarism and played into the hands o f Germany’s opponents, providing them with reasons to insist on severe restrictions on the national economy. Social Democratic anti-militarism ruled out any alignment with the Right: “We decline any coalition with these intellectually and mentally impaired people \diese geistig Enterbteny^^ On some occasions the Social Democratic press fell silent as the rhetorics of radical technological nationalism unfolded in the wake o f German

airships’ exploits.^'* In contrast, the Communist press opted for vociferous

denunciations of airships as “symbol [s] of re-awakening o f German imperialism.”^^ Thus, German technological nationalism reflected and enhanced wider party political divisions. Unlike in Britain, where party political tensions over aviation remained muted, technological nationalism fuelled open conflicts on the national level in Germany. The political Left challenged Liberal and Conservative rhetorics of technological nationalism informed by languages o f resilience and resistance.

Despite fundamental political disagreements over national and international issues, both Liberals and adherents of the anti-democratic Right infused their rhetorics o f technological nationalism with narratives of national resistance and resilience because they shared similar conceptions of heroic masculinity. Both Liberals and

” Vorwârts, 14 October 1924, (morning edition), 1.

^ Vorwârts, 22 August 1925, (evening edition), 3. A similar pattern emerges in reports about airplanes. See Vorwârts, 21 June 1928, (morning edition), 6; Vorwârts, 28 August 1931, (morning edition), 5; Vorwârts, 26 May 1932, (morning edition), 3.

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Rote Fahne, 12 October 1928, 7. See also Rote Fahne, 14 October 1924, 3; Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 425, 2452, 2484.

Conservatives favoured models of manliness which prescribed unwavering belief in, and unflagging commitment to, aims which had to be achieved against seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Thus, notions o f masculinity bridged the deep chasm between Liberal and Conservative political ideologies. Public assessments o f Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, the most prominent inventor of German airships, support this. From the inception of airship construction before the Great War, the figure of Count Zeppelin publicly personified the conviction that persistence and patience would eventually overcome even improbable odds - in his case: even numerous crashes and explosions. Although one Bavarian General described Zeppelin’s plans as “rubbish [Schmarrn\'" the Count disregarded contempt and subsequently rose above ridicule and insult.^ Descriptions o f the inventor changed in 1908 when his airship exploded outside the village o f Echterdingen after a long-distance flight over South Germany. In his steadfast refusal to give up, Zeppelin became a national icon.

According to one Conservative newspaper, here was a man “who completely lives up to ideals of German heroism, a man who devotes great energy to a great enterprise and who will not be diverted despite obstacles, resistances, and misfortune.”^^ Liberal publications echoed this view: “Those familiar with Count Zeppelin know that no buffet o f fate can discourage him . . . We have to contradict most vehemently those arguing that this last blow . . . has ended the count’s quest. Proponents o f this view know neither the Count Zeppelin, nor the significance of his enterprise, nor the German people.”^* Together with a state subsidy, the national collection mentioned above restored production activities. During the war, the figure o f Zeppelin was invoked as an example of male heroism demonstrating that national survival in

^ Frankfurter Zeitung^ 5 August 1908, evening edition, 1. ^ Neue Preufiische Zeitung, 6 August 1908, (evening edition), 1.

struggle required resilience and unshakeable strength o f character: “Being like the count means being German.”^

This rhetorical pattern continued to command prominence in the Weimar Republic. As one Liberal paper pointed out, “the nearly legendary figure o f Count Zeppelin can teach the German people that one achieves one’s aims if one believes in them firmly,”^®® In 1929, Die Woche thanked the crew of the airship for their display of virility: “The airship men have shown us that only those who give up are

doomed.” ^®^ Liberal and Conservative publications depicted Count Zeppelin as a national role model because he achieved his high-flying aims despite seemingly insurmountable resistances. It was repeatedly argued that his eventual success stemmed from his manly qualities of perseverance, unshakeable self-confidence, and purposeful determination. Liberal and Conservative rhetorics o f national resilience and resistance were therefore predicated on a specific concept of masculinity. Germany, it was pointed out, could only assert itself internationally if the nation displayed the same qualities o f masculine firmness which inspired the aristocratic engineer Count Zeppelin.

Resting on models of masculinity celebrating toughness and firmness in the face o f adversity, rhetorics of national resistance through technological achievement served two purposes. They provided a critique o f the international status quo and formulated demands for its fundamental transformation. Moreover, narratives of resilience implied that the German nation was unfairly denied its appropriate

^ B.Z. am M ittag, 6 August 1908, 1. For similar rhetorics, see G ra f Zeppelin und sein Lujïschijf: Luxusausgabe (Nürnberg, Kunstanstalt Zerreiss, 1908), 7-9; Peter Hoogh, Zeppelin und die Eroberung des Lufimeeres (Berlin: Uranus Verlag, 1908), 202.

^ Z ep p elin : D erM ensch, der Kûmpfer, der Sieger, ed. Adolf Saager (Stuttgart: Robert Lutz, 1915), 11. See also ibid., 96-97, 105-106, 120; Arnold Jünke, Zeppelin im Weltkriege (Leipzig: Abel und Müller, 1916), 7.

Frankfurter Zeitung, 21 August 1925, (morning edition), 1. Zeppelin fâ h rt um die Welt, 5.

international status. Technological feats revealed the potential which Germany could not develop efficiently to assert itself in the international arena. As a consequence, German rhetorics of technological nationalism differed in two respects from British statements. Aiming at a fundamental reversal o f the international status quo, German