NEUROTRANSMISORES EN LA RESPUESTA DE ANSIEDAD

War rhetoric established during the First World War underlies much of war memorialisation of the twentieth century and is suffused in the official memory of memorial avenues of that period. The specific language of the rhetoric of war was used by governments, the press, private institutions and organisations to influence public opinion and public morale in respect of the war and home front war efforts (Haste, 1977). Consequently, this language was internalised by the home front and framed their understanding and interpretation of the war and war’s public and private costs. It was also used as a weapon against those who were not supporting the war to their full extent (Baker, 1988; Acton, 1999). After the war the rhetoric survived in war memorial commemorations through the construction of official memory, articulating how post-war communities were to remember the war and the war dead. In the case of many memorial avenues newspaper coverage offers the only access point to the community understandings of their memorial, the war and the war dead.

War rhetoric framed the interpretation of the war and high death tolls by drawing on values and principles that many communities held, esteemed and aspired to, appealing to the better qualities of people. It was sustained by propaganda and the ‘fog of war’, that is military censorship that severely limited the release of accurate, factual military information (The Press, 5/8/1914; 14/8/1914; Haste, 1977). There developed “… a system of information dissemination which inflated minor successes, concealed disasters, incited hatreds and disguised the nature of battlefield experience” (Williams, 1999:1). Central to the broad scope of the rhetoric of war was the manipulation of public opinion in support of governments, their aims and the war (Messinger, 1992). This rhetoric was used across the Empire to inspire, castigate, arouse guilt and cajole both men and women into accepting, comprehending and participating in the war.

The British government entered the war to prevent a hostile enemy from gaining control of continental Europe and the Channel ports and to neutralise the threat to Britain’s sea-borne trade and its existence as a great power (Todman, 2005). The British declaration of war on 4th August, 1914 effectively bound the colonial dominions of the British Empire to a war that they were not legally obligated to support or fight, but for “compelling strategic reasons” of security, defence and economic stability chose to support (Sheffield, 2007:39; McGibbon, 2007). Justification for this move was articulated through abstract ideals such as ‘duty’, ‘Empire’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘crisis of civilisation’. The British Government and British propaganda agents mobilised such ideals to engage the public in the discourse on the acceptance and physical participation in the war (Johnson, 1975; Hastie, 1977). The colonial dominions drew heavily on the war rhetoric emanating from Britain (Lineham, 2007). Outrage at the German invasion of Belgium and atrocities perpetrated by the soldiers gave the British government a platform from which the public could see their attempts at preventing further conflict (Todman, 2005). Thus, when war was declared the cause was presented as a “moral campaign” (Haste, 1977:24), ‘just’ and ‘right’, in defence of the weak and drawing on sound principles and values commonly held by the Anglophone dominions (Ziino, 2003; Davidson, 2007; Lineham, 2007). War rhetoric responded to events and needs. Those advocating official rhetoric held to the most useful for as long as practicable.

On announcing the British declaration the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Massey, called upon every New Zealander, stating it their responsibility to “keep cool, stand fast, do your duty to New Zealand, and the Empire” (The Press, 6/8/1914). The public response to war was mixed but in general greeted with enthusiasm. Expressions of patriotic zeal, calm tempered by the acknowledged seriousness of the situation and outright horror were voiced around the country (The Press, 4/8/1914; 5/8/1914; Baker, 1988). The voices that declared their opposition to the war (Hutching, 2007; Parsons, 2007) were overwhelmed by the tide of enthusiasm supporting a call for a “full and active part in the war” (McGibbon, 2007:51). Within days the Government announced that sacrifices had to be made, primarily in terms of money, goods and the sacrifices made by volunteers in leaving home, family, and jobs (The Press, 10/8/1914). Baker (1988) and Wright (1993) both argue that during the first year of the war there was little need for the persistent articulation by the Government of

official war rhetoric in motivating the general public. Newspapers articulated the rhetoric daily and the churches supported the war from the pulpit. Both used a blend of “imperial loyalty, patriotism and jingoistic rhetoric” (Davidson, 2007:450), reinforcing official idealised rhetoric of duty, justice and the righteous nature of the cause. It was not until bulletins on the fighting at Gallipoli started to be received that the naivety of many on the New Zealand and Australian home fronts was dispelled (Baker, 1988). Duty and sacrifice now held the spectre of death, an aspect of war not previously openly discussed.

As war progressed and the mood of the country changed so did the rhetoric. Ministers and priests drew on themes of “comradeship, bravery, endurance, patriotism and the values of blood sacrifice” enmeshed in Christian principles and the suffering of Christ to help their parishioners to understand and accept their own trials and sacrifices (Davidson, 2007: 453). By the middle of 1917 conscription and war weariness had thoroughly undermined the ‘spirit of voluntarism’, rendering the rhetoric of duty almost superfluous (Baker, 1988:102). War rhetoric was not able to compete with the reality of war experiences on the home or military front. Realism undermined war rhetoric leaving a void in the way war was to be understood. Attempts were made to address this through the memorialisation of the war dead. Religious rhetoric of duty, sacrifice and supreme sacrifice was co-opted by the state (Davidson, 2007) and in turn by the memorial committees during and after the war.