NIVEL DE EXPOSICION AL RUIDO.

In the present chapter I detailed the problematic relationship that ensues when the challenges of naturalism upon positivity are taken seriously. I then elaborated on Quine’s (1995a, 1995c) attempt. Quine failed because he assumed that contextually sourced knowledge could have non-problematic and unaccounted purchase in another context. This translated into ontological transcendentalism. Fuller identified this problem as “internalism” and realised that all naturalist accounts of knowledge that did not consider the relationship between context of production and context of reception were problematic. Not only was this problematic in naturalist terms, but it also resulted in important practical consequences as the assumed “internal” source of authority provided capacity of arbitrary action to scientists (A) vis-a-vis laymen (B). Both accounts, however, required a retreat to the transcendental in order to fulfil their desired objectives.

The seemingly impossible naturalisation of knowledge and other positive values has led to a convergence in analytic philosophy and the philosophy of the social sciences. The position that ensues, however, is unwarrantedly conservative, as it assumes that things should be on account of how they are. Or in other words, it assumes that no other understanding of knowledge and meta-contextual norms is possible.

The way forward, however, could only be justified if naturalism, in its strictest rendering, were proven to be able to sustain itself. This is, to provide for an account of norms and positivity, a point of arrival that would allow its point of departure to have normative consequence beyond its own site.

From what has been discussed so far, it can be predicted that such an account would be characterised by the following:

i. It would be sourced from scientific evidence; and congruent with precise philosophical form;

ii. As a result it would maintain all of its ontological posting within the bounds of that which falls under the purview of strict, disciplined scrutiny (namely entities and phenomena contingent to context and space time);

iii. This implies that it would not assume any source of normative import for its determinations that are able to hold beyond the possibility of revision, correction, scrutiny or change; and,

iv. Would be capable of positivity. Or in other words, capable of having non- arbitrary normative consequence in another context (B) independently (without excluding the possibility of agreement or consent).

The discussion so far, however, already hints as to where such an account can be sourced. As has been explained on various occasions, science has no problem locating

norms in nature. Again, value determinations and prescriptions are perfectly understood as the difference between an actualised circumstance and a desired, required or expected outcome. The problem, rather, is to find positivity, which so far I have described as normative consequence beyond context. In social terms, this is equal to the capacity of a determined value determination or prescription, which is sourced or holds non-arbitrary consequence in (A) to also hold non-arbitrary consequence in (B), independently (without excluding the possibility of agreement or consent).

So far, the challenge to provide a positive account has been addressed by the proposal of a normative meta-context (X). This is a framework that contains both (A) and (B),9 and in which certain values and prescriptions hold for all those included within its bounds. The ultimate meta-context, of course, is reality, understood as the ultimate framework of value. My proposal then, is that if we can already account for normativity within context, and therefore account for non-arbitrariness in regards to determined outcome, I propose that instead of looking for positivity in meta-context, we look for it in the natural relations that exist between contexts. This includes agreements and consent, of course, but also relations between sites that could be understood as being necessary or constrained.

In other words, if the key to understanding the ontological nature of science and society resides in understanding the phenomenon of reference, instead of trying to find reference in circumstances that seem to be inaccessible to the practice of strict and disciplined scrutiny, I suggest we search in those places where strict disciplined

9 _{There are some proposals of a meta-framework that do not fit this description. Bruno Latour (2010) calls} for a new “universality” composed by the relations between both “subjects” and “objects”, acting in line

with something that could roughly be recognised as citizenry. Latour here is not claiming a prior meta- context, for example, but neither is he attempting to provide an account of positivity. Within his account, non-arbitrary consequence results from “composition” which implies the interplay of all the actors

scrutiny is able to account for reference. If positivity involves non-arbitrary consequence between these sites, I suggest that instead of looking for this source of non-arbitrariness in a meta-site, we look for it precisely in the “natural” relations that occur between these sites. In regards to humans then, positivity is to be found in the “natural” relation that is present between human minds.