Niveles de accesoriedad

FACTS:

The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by TCT issued in the name of Jimenez.

1. Fermin Jimenez (formerly owns the parcel of land w/ an area of 2, 932 sqm) has 2 sons – Fortunato and Carlos.

2. Fortunato has one child – Suplicia Jimenez (petitioner). After death of Fermin, entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos and Suplicia in equal shares pro-indiviso.

3. OCT was issued in their name.

4. Carlos died. His illegitimate daughter – Melecia Jimenez took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 sqm.

5. Melecia sold the 436 sqm to Edilberto Cagampan and Teodora Grado (resp) w/ a contract (Exchange of Real Properties).

6. Petitioner Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. TCT was issued in Sulpicia’s name alone covering 2,932sqm.

7. Sulpicia then instituted this action to recover the eastern portion of the property (436sqm).

8. TC: Grado (resp) is the absolute owner. Sulpicia appealed to CA, which affiremed the decision of TC; MR denied.

ISSUE: WON Sulipicia is entitled to recover the eastern portion of the parcel of land?

HELD: Yes. Sulpicia is not barred by laches. RATIO:

[PRESCRIPTION and LACHES]

● CA relied on Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property under litigation by prescription – UNTENABLE.

● since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name.

● Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro- indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in question

● No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title

● Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her

proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.

● There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance.

[MELECIA AS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD]

● From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.

● To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died

and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child — for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit.

● Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.

Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 (1978) Author: Mark

(Please try to see the original. Ang labo ng case. Baka mas maintindihan niyo sa original. Sana. Ewan. Basta,

ang labo.) Facts:

(This suit involves the heirs of Concepcion Rallos and the estate of Atty. Filemon Sotto.)

● This involves 5 parcels of land in Cebu City.

● It originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Florentino and Maria Rallos

● They had 2 children, Carmen and Concepcion

● When Florentino died, his properties were bequeathed to Maria, Carmen and Concepcion

● Maria, Carmen and Concepcion entrusted the settlement of the estate to Atty. Sotto.

● The probate proceedings closed in 1913.

● It was agreed that the property would be preserved for the family, through a co-ownership

● Afterward, Atty. Sotto married Carmen ● Maria then passed away

● Carmen died in 1945 without having any children ● However, Atty. Sotto has children out of wedlock. ● Concepcion died, leaving behind many children. ● When Atty. Sotto was already old and under

guardianship, the heirs of Concepcion found out that the 5 parcels in Cebu were in the name of Carmen only, then passed to Atty. Sotto

● All along, Concepcion’s heirs believed that the properties would be passed to them.

● Since the properties were now in the name of Atty. Sotto, it was in danger of being passed to his illegitimate children.

CFI

● Hence, Concepcion’s heirs went to the CFI, suing Marcelo Sotto (administrator of Atty. Sotto’s estate) for recovery of possession and ownership of the 5 parcels in Cebu.

● Concepcion’s heirs claim that there was a trust relationship between Atty. Sotto and Maria, Carmen and Concepcion

● Thus, Atty. Sotto violated the trust by placing the properties solely in his wife’s Carmen’s name, and ultimately, to him.

● Concepcion’s heirs say that the decree is null and void because it should have been issued not just in

Carmen’s name, but also in Maria and Concepcion’s names as well.

● Marcelo says that the decree adjudicating the lots in the name of Carmen was pursuant to an express agreement between Carmen and the other heirs that such parcel be given to her

● CFI dismissed the complaint of Concepcion’s heirs. ● No trust was established over the lots

● The transfer of the lots was done through actual and legitimate partition, wherein Carmen got the 5 lots. ● Thus, Carmen was entitled to register them in her

name. CA 8th _Division

● Concepcion’s heirs appeal to the CA ● CA 8th _{Division affirms the CFI Decision} ● Concepcion’s heirs file a MR

● CA Special Division reverses the CA 8th _Division ● CA Special Division held that Atty. Sotto’s special

relations with the family made him a constructive trustee of his wife Carmen and Maria and Concepcion. ● Hence, as a trustee, he should not have put his

interests above those of the family.

● Also, Carmen did not acquire the lots, but was rather entitled only to the usufruct thereof, as administratrix of the trust between her, Maria and Concepcion.

● Thus, Carmen could not have passed the property to her husband Atty. Sotto.

● CA Special Division thus declares Concepcion’s heirs as the rightful owners of the properties.

Issue:

Can a trustee who registered the property in her/his name rely on the registration as against the beneficiaries?

Held:

No. The SC affirms the decision of the CA Special Division. Ratio:

● Marcelo Sotto claims that Carmen already had the property registered in her name, so she was well within her right to transfer it to Atty. Sotto.

● However, the SC says that Carmen could not have done that because she held the property in trust for Maria and Concepcion, and as such she could not dispose of the property to the prejudice of the others. ● The trust over the properties was present since 1913 ● It is true that Torrens titles were issued in the name of

Carmen Rallos, but the principle holds that a trustee who takes a Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate

the trust by relying on the registration, which is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a decree of title.

● Because of the very nature of a trust relation which existed between Carmen Rallos and her co-owners, she cannot obtain and secure a torrens title to the properties in her name much less dispose of them by testament to her husband, a constructive trustee, to the prejudice and deprivation of the rights and interests of said co-heirs.

● A fiduciary relationship may exist even if the title to the property subject to the trust appears in the name of the trustee alone, because in cases of trusteeship, the legal title usually appears in the name of the trustee, while the equitable title remains with the cestui que trust.

Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 102881, Dec. 7, 1992

Author: Delgado Facts:

i. This case is a boundary dispute between Toyota Motor Phil. Corporation and Sun Valley Manufacturing and Development Corporation. Both are the registered owners of two adjoining parcels of land situated in La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila which they purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). ii. The properties in question formerly belonged to Delta Motors Corporation (DMC). They were foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and later transferred to the national government through the APT for disposition.

iii. APT then proceeded to classify the DMC properties according to the existing improvements, i.e., buildings, driveways, parking areas, perimeter fence, walls and gates and the land on which the improvements stood. The entire DMC property is called GC III-Delta Motors Corporation, divided into Delta I, Delta II, and Delta III. Further subdivisions for the separate catalogues were made for each division e.g. Delta I into Lots 1, 2 and 3. After this classification, APT parcelled out and catalogued the properties for bidding and sale.

iv. Part of the duly parcelled Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold to Toyota through public bidding on May 12, 1988 for the amount of P95,385,000.00. After its purchase, Toyota constructed a concrete hollow block (CHB) perimeter fence around its alleged property.

v. On October 5, 1990, another part of the parcelled Delta I (Lot 1) covering an area of 55,236 square meters was

purchased by Sun Valley from APT for the bid price of P124,349,767.00. Relying upon the title description of its property and the surveys it had commissioned, Sun Valley claimed that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps Sun Valley's property along corners 11 to 15 by 322 square meters and corners 19 to 1 by 401 square meters for a total of 723 square meters.

vi. Negotiations between the corporations for a possible settlement of the dispute bogged down. Court battles ensued, grounded on purely procedural issues. In pursuing the resolution of the dispute, both Toyota and Sun Valley opted to file separate actions. Much of the complications that arose and are now before us can be traced to the two separate cases pursued by both parties.

vii. Toyota Case: Toyota filed an action for reformation before Judge Tensuan on September 11, 1991, before Judge Tensuan alleging that the true intentions of the parties were not expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359 Civil Code). The instrument sought to be reformed is the deed of sale executed by APT in favor of Toyota. Toyota alleges that there was a mistake in the designation of the real properties subject matter of the contract. Sun Valley was impleaded in order to obtain complete relief since it was the owner of the adjacent lot. viii. Sun Valley Case: Sun Valley filed an action for recovery of possession before Judge Gorospe of the disputed 723 square meters boundary with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati. On the same day, Judge Gorospe issued a TRO enjoining Toyota from committing further acts of dispossession against Sun Valley. It argues that Toyota’s complaint for reformation states no cause of action against it since an action for reformation is basically one strictly between the parties to the contract itself. Third persons who are not parties to the

contract cannot and should not be involved. Thus, Sun Valley contends that it should not have been impleaded as a defendant.

Issue:

i. Who as between Judge Tensuan or Judge Gorospe has jurisdiction of the case.

ii. Who as between the parties has the rightful possession of the land.

Held:

i. Sun Valley's action for recovery of possession filed before Judge Gorospe now stands to be the proper forum where the following dispute may be tried or heard.

ii. Sun Valley has a better right. Ratio:

i. General rule: All persons to be affected by the proposed reformation must be made parties. However, these principles are not applicable under the particular circumstances of this case. Under the facts of the present case, Toyota's action for reformation is dismissible as against Sun Valley.

ii. The contention that the arbitration clause has become disfunctional because of the presence of third parties is untenable. The contract of sale executed between APT and Toyota provides an arbitration clause which states that:

In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the parties hereby undertake to submit the matter for determination by a committee of experts, acting as arbitrators, the composition of which shall be as follows:

a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR;

b) One member to be appointed by the VENDEE;

c) One member, who shall be a lawyer, to be appointed by

both of the aforesaid parties;

The members of the Arbitration Committee shall be appointed not later than three (3) working days from receipt of a written notice from either or both parties. The Arbitration Committee shall convene not later than three (3) weeks after all its members have been appointed and proceed with the arbitration of the dispute within three (3) calendar months counted therefrom. By written mutual agreement by the parties hereto, such time limit for the arbitration may be extended for another calendar month. The decision of the Arbitration Committee by majority vote of at least two (2) members shall be final and binding upon both the VENDOR and the VENDEE.

iii. Contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. As such, the parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their contractual commitments. Toyota is therefore bound to respect the provisions of the contract it entered into with APT.

iv. The arbitration committee is therefore the proper and convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the deed of sale. Having been apprised of the presence of the arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by APT, Judge Tensuan should have at least suspended the proceedings and directed the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration. Judge Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case.

v. The more apparent reason which warrants the dismissal of the action as against Sun Valley is the fact that the complaint for reformation amounts to a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals' 11th Division. Sun Valley has a Torrens title registered in its name by virtue of its purchase of the land from APT. Well- settled is the rule that a certificate of title can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law, thus an action for

reformation is improper. Reformation may often be had to correct mistakes in defining the boundary of lands conveyed so as to identify the lands, it may not be used to pass other lands from those intended to be bought and sold, notwithstanding a mistake in pointing out the lines, since reformation under these circumstances would be inequitable and unjust.

vi. Existence of a "clear positive right" especially calling for judicial protection has been shown by Sun Valley. Sun Valley has TCT No. 49019 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque embracing the aforesaid property in its name, having been validly acquired also from APT by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in its favor on December 5, 1990. There is therefore sufficient and convincing proof that Sun Valley has a clear legal right to possession in its favor to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary/mandatory injunction. Sun Valley's TCT gives it that right to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has not established its right over the said property except for the assertion that there was a mistake in an instrument which purportedly should have included the questioned strip of land.

Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 328 (1987)

Author: Monzon Facts:

Two adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by three distinct sets of Torrens titles

Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the CFI of Rizal referred to as Vera Court for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales

Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. The complaint alleged is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal referred to as the Reyes Court which issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original records the basis for the issuance of said order of were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title.

Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing the order, was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for the registration court which had rendered a decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga. It was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null and void, having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered under the Torrens System in favor of another.

With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party complaint against the Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation. QCDFC asserted the validity of its own title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint alleging that it bought