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Although Table 5.2 shows that Eurosceptic parties, primarily those with hard Eurosceptic stances, were mostly in opposition, this chapter did not find evidence that Serbian and Croatian party-based Euroscepticism was a product of the politics of opposition. Instead, opposition status represented one of the factors that triggered a fundamental reorientation of strategically-driven former Eurosceptic parties towards the pro-EU pole. Also, the Euroscepticism of opposition parties was not a result of government exclusion in these countries; rather these parties were excluded from government because of their pronounced Euroscepticism.

Analysis of Serbian and Croatian party systems did not find evidence supporting Sitter’s (2001) arguments that Euroscepticism was a product of party competition and ‘the politics of opposition’. The lack of relationship between parties’ opposition status and their stances on the EU was primarily due to the fact that the nature of these party systems and the patterns of party competition did not create conditions for ‘opposition based’

Euroscepticism. This was particularly the case in Serbia due to its highly polarised and atomised party system. As discussed in Chapter 3, classical political cleavages, particularly on the socio-economic left-right dimension, were blurred in these societies, while political parties were consequently weakly ideologically rooted. Moreover, it was difficult to precisely categorise the nature of these parties and their electoral strategies. While it appears that these parties exhibited some characteristics of catch-all parties, it was more difficult to argue that they transformed themselves into Western-style cartel parties. These features of parties and party systems, in turn, generated political conditions substantially different from those argued by Sitter and had consequences for ‘opposition based’ Euroscepticism, as detailed in the rest of this section.

Sitter (2001) argued that catch-all or cartel parties may become Eurosceptic when in opposition due to the natural tendency of opposition parties to oppose government policies and the fact that EU integration was government-driven process. However, this does not appear to have been the case in Serbia. As discussed earlier, there was a high level of electoral volatility and the party system was polarised pluralistic (Sartori 1999), which

resulted in the lack of stable patterns of competition between government and opposition parties. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Serbian opposition parties that expressed Eurosceptic stances, namely the Serbian Radical Party, were primarily ideologically and identity motivated. Moreover, the dynamics of party competition impacted parties’ rhetoric but not their broad underlying stances on the EU.

Additionally, following the transformation of the Serbian party system from polarised to more moderate pluralistic in 2008 (a shift that required the majority of parliamentary parties to reach a consensus on Serbian EU accession), opposition parties frequently criticised governmental parties for not being pro-European enough rather than adopting a Eurosceptic position. Paradoxically, this was most evident in the case of the leaders of the Serbian Progressive Party, which was in opposition until 2012. This party strongly criticised the ruling and traditionally Euroenthusiastic Democratic Party for ‘not understanding the essence of EU integration’ and for being unsuccessful in securing candidate status, since ‘it did not understand that Serbia cannot move forward without the EU’ (SNS 2010b). The Serbian Progressive Party stressed that it would bring Serbia into the EU quicker than ‘the current incompetent government, which was the key obstacle in the process of Serbian EU accession’. Its officials further castigated the Democratic Party, noting that ‘the corrupt Serbian government’ attributed all of its erroneous decisions and policies to EU demands’

(SNS 2009).

In Croatia, where consensus on the country’s EU integration was reached in the early 2000s and the political system was moderately pluralistic and less polarised, the opposition Social Democratic Party also criticised the ruling conservative Croatian Democratic Union for not being able to understand and lead accession negotiations with the EU. This party specifically accused the Croatian Democratic Union of adopting the social democrats’ pro-European politics out of necessity and political opportunism, not in accordance with its own beliefs (SDP 2007). The Social Democratic Party further accused the government of hindering reforms, argued that its capacity to lead the negotiations was modest, and described adoption of EU legislation as ‘inefficient’ (SDP 2007). These two cases again indicate that once the wider consensus on EU integration has been reached in candidate countries, major political parties, including opposition ones (unless they are identity-driven Eurosceptics), found it increasingly difficult to maintain Eurosceptic policies.

Sitter (2001) also argued that parties that compete on a cross-cutting territorial and cultural dimension may adopt Euroscepticism a result of their opposition to the social democrat-conservative cartel parties. However, in both countries, the parties that compete on this dimension, i.e., ethnic, minority, regional or liberal parties, were traditionally and primarily identity-driven Euroenthusiastic parties. This may be attributed to the lack of established cartel parties in both countries. Additionally, EU integration did not run counter to these parties’ fundamental values and the concerns of their core voters. Nevertheless, the conservative, regionalist, and soft Eurosceptic Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonija and Baranja appeared to be a notable exception. Given its focus on opposing the national centre and the nation’s two dominant parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Croatian Democratic Union, as explained by the party’s MP Boro Grubišić (Interview 2011), its Euroscepticism may be seen as a reflection of ‘politics of territorial opposition’. However, the party’s identity and genesis also suggests the presence of ideologically-driven scepticism. Finally, there were no relevant ‘new politics’ left and ‘new populist’ right parties (Sitter 2001), as discussed in Chapter 3, that may have developed Euroscepticism driven by opposition and protest strategies in relation to mainstream parties in these countries.

Parties that may be seen as belonging to this category, such as the Serbian Dveri or a number of Croatian single-issue Eurosceptic parties that emerged but also disappeared over the years were nationalist parties that primarily promoted an ideologically motivated opposition to Europe. Their Eurosceptic stances were reinforced, although not largely shaped by, their protest nature, as discussed later in this chapter.

Furthermore, contrary to Sitter’s arguments, opposition status served as one of the most important factors that triggered formerly Eurosceptic parties to adopt a pro-EU stance.

This thesis thus supports Haughton and Fisher’s (2008, p.437) conclusions regarding the Croatian Democratic Union that electoral defeat (and the desire for international respectability) led this party to rebrand itself as a mainstream European centre-right party.

Specifically, a combination of two factors arising from the domestic party systems, namely parties’ ‘office- and vote-seeking’ character and opposition status, created conditions for the transformation of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party and the Croatian Democratic Union. These parties initiated their transformations while all in opposition. The Socialist Party of Serbia experienced ‘political ostracism’ after having lost elections for the first time, which contributed to its transformation. The same can be observed in the case of the Croatian Democratic Union which, after having lost elections for the first time, initiated pro-EU transformation. Similarly, within the Serbian Radical

Party, leaders of the Serbian Progressive Party feared a long-term opposition status after many unsuccessful attempts to form a government. This was a particularly important factor in the case of the Serbian Socialists, who were isolated and strongly stigmatised by both the international community and other Serbian mainstream parties after being ousted from power in 2000. Party vice president Slavica Djukić Dejanović confirmed that this ostracism drove the Serbian Socialists Party to alter its position on the EU. Djukić Dejanović (Interview 2011) stressed in an interview that ‘the experience of opposition status and the fact that the Socialists were stigmatized, after 2000, as the Jews in Nazi Germany, significantly helped the party to adopt European standards as its own’.

In both Serbia and Croatia, therefore, the opposition experience motivated political parties to shift attitudes towards the EU. Most notably, the trauma of electoral defeat had significant consequences for these parties, particularly Serbian ones, which ‘were essentially more interest groups than classical parties’ since ‘intra-party structure and organization were set up as interest group’ (Gligorov 2007, p.224). As a result, electoral loss led to internal tensions within all three parties since losing political power also meant losing privileged access to state resources and the accompanying privileges. Opposition status thus triggered intra-party friction between ‘extroverts’ and ‘introverts’ (Konitzer 2011), with the former seeking to improve their electoral prospects and adopt more pro-EU positions and the latter seeking to maintain a Eurosceptic course. This ultimately led to either the marginalisation of Eurosceptic factions, as experienced by the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Croatian Democratic Union, or a split within the party and the formation of a new Euroenthusiastic party, as in the case of the Serbian Progressive Party.

The context of candidate and accession countries was also important for the transformation of former Eurosceptic opposition parties. As EU accession advanced, these parties found it increasingly difficult to remain anti-EU, unless they were deeply ideologically driven. Parties not involved in the process of accession while in opposition feared marginalisation because the political debate centred around EU accession and ruling parties were in position to capitalise on their direct involvement in this process. Moreover, while in opposition, these parties came to realise that due to the relatively advanced integration process and the fact that the EU effectively blocked hard Eurosceptic parties from government participation, they would never come to power without becoming pro-European. Hard Euroscepticism thus prevented these parties from securing political power which, in turn, contributed to their transformation.

Finally, this chapter argues that for opposition parties, repeated exclusion from government was a consequence, rather than a cause of, scepticism and hostility towards the EU. This is in line with Henderson’s (2008, p.113) study of hard Eurosceptic parties in Slovakia and Romania. In these counties, she noted, parties’ attitudes towards the EU appear to have resulted in their exclusion from government. Conversely, Henderson did not find that the development of such stances has been a consequence of government exclusion. In the case of hard Eurosceptic parties in Serbia and Croatia, their exclusion from government appears to be a consequence of both the parties’ respective political legacies and international pressure. Throughout the 1990s, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union maintained not only authoritarian and nationalist but also Eurosceptic positions. After the 2000 democratic changes, Euroscepticism was therefore perceived by the wider public and other parties as a position without political legitimacy and closely tied up with the nationalism manifested by these parties. This close association of Euroscepticism with extreme nationalism was widespread well into the 2000s, until the Democratic Party of Serbia adopted a policy of opposition to Serbian EU membership. This party’s policy was not based on nationalistic and anti-democratic political platform, but emerged as a result of concerns for the territorial preservation of Serbia in light of Kosovo’s proclamation of independence.

Moreover, Western countries worried about the possibility of Eurosceptic, unreformed, nationalist parties acquiring political power in Serbia and Croatia. Given the overall EU influence in the region, hard Eurosceptic parties were practically excluded from negotiations on the formation on government, most visibly in the cases of the Serbian Radical Party and Croatian Party of Rights. The Serbian Radical Party was an unacceptable coalition partner for other Serbian parties since it had been unofficially isolated by the Western countries and the EU, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Goati (2006, p.296) explained that the Democratic Party of Serbia was specifically warned in 2007 by the EU that ‘a coalition with the Radicals would mean ‘‘turning their back’’ on the EU and a step towards new isolation for Serbia’. Furthermore, Goati noted that after the Radicals’ deputy president Tomislav Nikolić temporarily became the parliament’s president, economic-financial dealings with EU countries and negotiations on investments, loans and credits were immediately blocked. Thus, faced with the negative effects of its decision, the Democratic Party of Serbia made an abrupt political turnaround and voted to depose Nikolić.

Kasapović (2003, p.55) termed this action ‘the Austrian syndrome’, noting a similar relationship between the mainstream Austrian People’s Party and the Eurosceptic Freedom Party. Kasapović (2003, p.55) explained that the Croatian Party of Rights was banned from negotiating on a coalition government in 2003 because ‘of an outcry by the international community regarding the ideological and political profile of this party’. Kasapović (2003, p.55) specifically pointed out that the Croatian Democratic Union forswore the coalition with the Croatian Party of Rights because it feared that the EU might use this alliance as a pretense to turn down the Croatian candidacy for EU membership since ‘the EU strongly objected to the possibility of the creation of such a coalition government’. As a result, the Serbian Radical Party and the Croatian Party of Rights failed to secure government positions. Henderson (2008, p.113) found the same in the case of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Party of Social Democracy of Romania. Both parties distanced themselves from their more extremist mid-1990s coalition partners on the right and left, due to their hard Euroscepticism, recognising that both the EU and NATO found this stance unacceptable.