Norma aplicada

301 BC - 294 BC

"After the battle had been decided in this way, the victorious kings proceeded to carve up the realm which Antigonus and Demetrius had ruled like the carcass of some great slaughtered beast..."

Plut. Demet. 30

Suitably heroic in its imagery, frustratingly short on detail, Plutarch's description of the division of the spoils after Ipsus is characteristic of the shortcomings of the biographies which are now our major narrative source. Other literary and epigraphic evidence, combined with Plutarch's narrative of subsequent events, has, however, permitted a general reconstruction of the division of Antigonus' realm, although some grey areas still remain.1

As architects of the victory at Ipsus, it was Lysimachus and Seleucus who received the bulk of Antigonus' Asiatic kingdom. Cassander had preferred to concentrate on Greece and Macedon in 302 BC and was presumably content to see Antigonid influence in the Hellenic peninsula wane following the coalition victory.2 Though his brother Pleistarchus was given a kingdom in Cilicia, subsequent events seem to place h im in the role of Lysimachus' proteg6 rather than Cassander's representative; this arrangement may represent a reward for his participation in the campaign of 302 BC, rather than

1) The ownership of Lycia and Pamphylia, for example, is the subject of considerable dispute; see below. 2) See Ch. 3 and below.

a response to Cassander*s demand for Asian territory.3

Ptolemy, however, was surely less than happy to see himself excluded from the spoils, the result of his failure to join his allies on the field. Coele-Syria, which he had made his first priority in the months before Ipsus,4 was officially granted to Seleucus, whose n ew realm, according to Plutarch, stretched from the River Indus to the Syrian coast;6 it is probable that the border between his kingdom and that of Lysimachus in Asia was the river Halys.6 Appian gives more detail, listing his territories as comprising all of Syria from the Euphrates to the coast, Mesopotamia, Media, Persis, Parthia, Bactria, Arabia, Tapyria, Sogdia, Arachosia, Hyrcania and "the other peoples as far as the

Indus".7

Compared to this vast expanse of land, Lysimachus* prize, "the whole of Asia Minor north of the Taurus mountains"® might seem limited. These lands, however, in theory at least, gave Lysimachus control of both sides of the Hellespont, and represented a compact realm, advantageous in terms of communication and administration. If, moreover, he had any thoughts of re-uniting the two halves of Alexander's empire, the centreing of his kingdom on the Hellespont, a natural link between his territories in Europe and Asia, left h im

3) See below; D i o d , X X . 112.2 and Ch. 2 for Pleistarchus' shipwreck on the Black Sea; perhaps his later actions were more distinguished!

See Plut. Demet. 32 and below for Cassander's apparent indifference to the loss of Cilicia in 298 BC. 4) See Ch. 3. 5) Plut. Demet, 32.

6 ) The Halys had formed the eastern border of Antigonus' kingdom in 311 BC (Meyer, 1925 22) and, earlier,the boundary between the Mermnad and Assyrian kingdoms (Balcer, 1984 95). 7) App.Syr.55. Appian's ascription of the satrapy of Phrygia to Seleucus is generally accepted as a strategic and geographical nonsense; e.g. Meyer, 1925 28, Corradi, 1929, 29. 8) Meyer, 1925 28,

better placed to do so than Antigonus had ever been.9 In addition, the lands of the central Anatolian plateau and its western coast were rich in men and money, resources which were the mainstay of the Diadochs’ present power and the prerequisite for any future expansion.1°.

The victory at Ipsus had in essence given Lysimachus the realm which Antigonus had built up between 323 BC and 318 BC. Diodorus' account of Antigonus' career gives some indication of the potential resources of these lands. Adding Eumenes' satrapy (Cappadocia, Paphlagonia "and the adjacent lands") to his original holdings of Greater Phrygia, Pamphylia and Lycia, Antigonus had been able, In 319 BC, to support an army of 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. He expected, moreover, to be able to mobilise still greater forces "since Asia could provide pay without end for the mercenaries he might muster,"11

In terms of potential manpower, Lycia and Pamphylia were seemingly a fruitful source of mercenary troops.12 In 318 BC Antigonus conquered Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia; shortly before he was expelled, Arridhaeus, the satrap of the latter, could afford to employ over 10,000 mercenaries in the army which he took against C y z i c u s . 13 The rich treasuries of Northern Phrygia

9) Will, CAH VII 1984 110. 10) Austin, C & 1986 454-5.

11) Meyer, 1925 19, Diod, XVIII. 50.2-3, 12) Diod, X X . 113,3. If Lycia and Pamphylia "went with" Greater Phrygia, then logically they must have gone to Lysimachus, not Seleucus (as maintained by Segre, Aegyptus 1934 255), The idea of their inclusion in Pleistarchus' "buffer state" (e.g. Meyer, 1925 28) is now outdated (see below). 13) Diod, XVIII.51.

have already been mentioned.14

Asia Minor's proverbial wealth derived in large part from its natural resources; the mountainous Anatolian plateau, a rich source of timber and minerals, cut by great rivers like the Hermus and Cayster and their tributaries, forms fertile valleys and plains, Strabo describes the wide stretch of rich land round Sardis as "the best of all plains"; Sardis itself was already a famous centre for textiles under the Persian k i n g s . 16 The legendary wealth of the Lydian king Croesus was founded on the gold mines of Mt.Tmolus - by Strabo's day the supply was exhausted, but the functioning of the city as a major mint under the Seleucids and probably Lysimachus too, suggests that the mines were still being worked in the early Hellenistic p e r i o d . 16 The Troad too was rich in precious metals; gold was mined near Abydus and Lampsacus, copper in the central region and the mountains north of Pergamum; Strabo knew the area as a source of "mock-silver" (zinc), The valleys of the Hermus, Cayster and Maeander produced abundant olives and figs; the Caicus valley was the chief granary for Lysimachus' Pergamene successors; Lydia was famous for wine; Northern Phrygia and the Troad produced ship timber, pitch, marble and g r a p e s 17

Apart from Sardis, important urban centres in the hinterland included Celaenae, an Achaemenid royal residence, later used by

14) Diod. X X . 107.5, see also Ch.3. 15) Magie, 1950 47, Strab. XIII,4,5. 16) Strab.ibid; Balcer, 1984 34-5, 52 for mining there under the Lydian kings; Newell, 1941 242-69; Sardis' history as a major administrative centre makes it a likely mint for Lysimachus, though Price doubts whether the issues linked with Sardis by

Thompson (1968 165) are the correct ones (see below); 17) Magie, 1950 43-45, 50.

Antigonus as the centre for his administration, Synnada and Docimeium high in the mountains of Central Phrygia, an area famous for its m a r b l e , 10 Colossae in the Lycus valley, described as "populous and prosperous" in the fifth century, and Tralles on the eastern border of Caria; these last two cities combined excellent defences with commercial importance,10

That Lysimachus encountered little opposition in the Anatolian hinterland seems probable. With the dissolution of the Antigonid

land army after Ipsus, those garrisons remaining must have felt their isolation;20 in such circumstances capitulation would have been the only sensible course, Lysimachus' appearance, with his n ew queen Amastris, at Sardis, soon after Ipsus, may suggest that affirming control of the Anatolian hinterland and attending to its administration was one of the first tasks at hand,21 Little is known of his dealing with the indigenous communities of the interior22 but it is realistic to suppose that like Alexander and the Achaemenids before him, he would have levied tribute from these cities, many of them industrial centres of some importance.23

Nothing is known of his relations at this time with the independent dynasts of the interior, notably Zipoites in Bithynia and Mithridates in Pontus, Though the former was to cause h im

18) Magie, 1950 125,50; Tscherikower, 1925 155. 19) Magie, 1950 127-8, Meyer's theory (1925 32) that Caria passed from Pleistarchus to Demetrius and then to Lysimachus is unnecessary; see n. 13 above and below. It may be better to suppose that Caria was officially granted to Lysimachus in 301 BC, although the coastal cities initially remained in Demetrius' hands. 20) As opposed to the cities on the coast which had the support of Demetrius' fleet; see below. 21) Memn. FGrH 434 F.4.9. 22) For further discussion, see Ch 5. 23) For Alexander's levy of tribute at Sardis and in Cappadocia, see Arr. Anab. 1.17,7, App, Mith,8,

considerable trouble later on,2A it is possible that initially relations were amicable or at least neutral. Zipoites had suffered the humiliation of seeing the cities of Calchedon and Astacus, which he coveted, wrested from him by Antigonus, and it is clear from Diodorus' narrative that the alliance he then contracted with Antigonus was not made by choice.2® For him, any change of rule in Asia Minor was likely to be an improvement. From Lysi m a c h u s ’ point of view, conciliation of the Bithynian dynast, for the present, may have seemed advisable until his position in Anatolia was more secure. Mithridates too had started his dynastic career under the cloud of Antigonus' jealous hostility.2® In the immediate aftermath of Ipsus, moreover, it seems unlikely that much trouble would come to Lysimachus from this quarter, since Mithridates II had only just acceded to the throne.

In theory, the settlement after Ipsus gave Lysimachus also the Greek cities on Anatolia's western coast. Rightly described as the most valuable possessions of his n ew territory,27 control over them was vital for full exploitation of the resources of the interior. The cities of Ionia and Caria, like Ephesus, Miletus and Smyrna not only formed the termini of the trade routes from the interior, but themselves represented major industrial centres. Miletus was famous for textiles, Ephesus for perfumes and other luxury goods; the fame of her sanctuary of Artemis also assured a constant stream of visitors from all over the Greek world and the swelling of the city coffers,2® The Greek cities on the Asian side of the Hellespont,

24) See below. 25) Diod.XIX.60.2. 26) Plut. Demet.4, App. Mith.9. 27) Bengtson, 1987 74. 28) Magie, 1950 74-5.

Lampsacus, Parium, Sigeum, and above all Abydus, had strategic as well as commercial importance; without them Lysimachus' control of the Hellespont and its traffic was a chimaera and communications between the European and Asian sections of his realm were threatened.2®.

In practice, however, the situation was not dissimilar to that which had faced Lysimachus in 323 BC; the settlement on paper was very much better than the actual state of affairs. Many of the cities on Asia's coast would have to be wrested from Demetrius' control. H ow then did Lysimachus fare in this task ?

The evidence for Lysimachus' acquisition of the Greek cities in the first years after Ipsus is extremely sparse. Logically one might suppose that cities which had welcomed h im in 302 BC, only to be recaptured by Demetrius, might be among the first to capitulate; these include Lampsacus and Parium on the Hellespont and Teos and Colophon further down the coast in Ionia. Generally, the cities on the Hellespont and in the Troad might seem a promising target, since their proximity to Thrace rendered them more vulnerable than those further south whose citizens could hope for protection from Demetrius' fleet. There is, however, no literary or epigraphic evidence to confirm these hypotheses. There are of course the coins, identified with Lysimachus by his lion symbol or the legend, BAZIAEYZ AY2IMAXQI which have been attributed by Thompson

29) For Abydus as the best crossing point from Europe to Asia see Magie, 1950 82, Held. Eplt.FGrH 155 F. 10,45 ; Diod. X X . 107.2-3 for Lysimachus' failure to take the city by siege in 302 BC; in the same year Demetrius' control of these cities and those of the Bosporus had threatened to cut Lysimachus off from his territory in Thrace,

(Diod. X X . 111,3),

to different mints in Asia-Minor and dated with some degree of precision. For example, coins linked to Abydus and Lampsacus have been dated 301/00 BC - 300/299 BC and 299/8BC - 297/6 BC respect­ ively.30 Price, however, is critical of the methods by which the Lysimachus coins have been dated and classified. The issues are linked to different mints on the basis of a symbol similar to that used by the city on its autonomous issues (e.g. a bee at Ephesus, a lyre at Colophon). This symbol is, however, often only one of several on the coin, chosen as the one which seemed "dominant" for that particular issue after the coins had been grouped and arranged in a chronological series. There are several striking peculiarities in Thompson's picture of the Lysimachus coinage as it stands; for example, despite Sardis' status as a major trade and administrative centre, the bronze Lysimachus coins which have been linked to that mint are found only rarely,31 The numismatic evidence, then, cannot by itself support any firm conclusions as to the date at which Lysimachus gained control of these cities in Asia Minor.

Travelling down the coast, the first city where there is evidence for a change of control early in the third century is Priene, where civil disturbances culminated in Hiero's tyranny, established probably in 300 BC,32 Possibly this coup represents part of the same campaign which saw Lysimachus' unsuccessful attempt to capture Ephesus,33 but a connection between Lysimachus and Hiero is far from certain.34 If the installation of Hiero was Lysimachus'

30) Thompson, 1968 163-82; Baldus, Chiron 1978 195-201 for the lion as Lysimachus' emblem (see also Ch.6), 31) Dr, Price imparted this information verbally. 32) I. Priene no. 37 11.65-73, 80-1, 111-12. 33) Polyaen.IV.7. 4. 34) See Ch . 5.

work, then his control of Priene was shortlived. After a rule of three years, probably in 297 BC, the tyrant fell; a decree from Priene honours all those who participated in the recovery of freedom and ordains commemorative celebrations,35 Also connected with Hiero's departure is a decree restoring honours to a certain Evander of Larisa,35 Demetrius' friendships with others from that city, Medius and Oxythemis,37 are well documented and it is not impossible that Evander is yet another Thessalian <p(Xoc of that king.

Lysimachus may have profited, if only indirectly, from a temporary change of regime at Priene, but the greatest of the Ionian cities eluded his grasp. In flight from Ipsus, Demetrius had found refuge in Ephesus and it was from her harbour that he set sail for Greece. Though the Athenians refused to admit him, they returned to h im his fleet.33 Combined with control of Cyprus and the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon, this assured him the thalassocracy which Poseidon's image on his new coinage aimed to impress upon the world,33 For the great trading cities of Asia Minor's western coast, Demetrius may well have seemed a more dangerous enemy than Lysimachus, It may be presumed that fear of Demetrius' wrath combined with other factors - the presence of his garrisons, the self-interest of politicians whose regime had received Demetrius' support, feelings of gratitude inspired by Antigonid benefactions -

35) I, Priene no, 37 11, 65, 80-81, 123-30 for the chronology of these events; I.Priene n o . 11: Robert, Rev.Phi 1. 1944 6-9.

36) I. Priene no. 12; Robert, Rev. Phil. 1944 10. 37) Athen. VI. 62, for the altars erected to these two; Plut. D e m e t . 19 for Medius' friendship with Antigonus; SEG 26 no.89 - Oxythemis receives Athenian citizenship for his cavalry victory over Pleistarchus in 303/2 BC. 38) Plut. Demet. 30,31. 39) Newell, 1927 27-31; see also Ch.6,

to keep many of the cities loyal to the Antigonid cause. The Ephesian Srjpoc congratulated Demetrius and his officer Apollonides on their recovery of the city in autumn 302 BC,4° and Lysimachus' subsequent attempt to subvert Diodorus, the garrison commander, was foiled. A likely context for this incident, known only from Polyaenus, is 301 BC, perhaps following Demetrius' departure for Greece.41

Demetrius' continued possession of Clazomenae and Erythrae is probable. Both cities had successfully resisted Lysimachus in 302 BC and an inscription from Ephesus praises Archestratus, Demetrius' o t p«'ct)y o c in Clazomenae, for his part in protecting corn-ships headed for Ephesus.42 Dittenberger and Hicks connected this with Prepelaus' attack on Ionia in 302 BC, but a date in the first years of the third century is equally possible. The necessity for Ephesus to be supplied by sea suggests a context of prolonged assault upon the Ephesian y<j>poc. a situation which is echoed in the city's debt law c.297 BC. This takes its impetus from serious damage to Ephesian estates as a result of the xotvoc; noXepoc; fought on Demetrius' behalf against Lysimachus.43 By contrast Prepelaus' occupation of

40)S y l 1.3 352, 41) Polyaen. IV.7.4; Magie, 1950 90; Polyaenus

shows Demetrius rushing from Caria to save Ephesus personally; Corradi, 1929 38 dates the episode to 298 BC with Demetrius en route from the Thracian Chersonese to Syria (see below), but over hasty action by Lysimachus, hoping to exploit Demetrius' absence, and Demetrius' return from Caria is equally possible. By 298 BC, moreover, it is probable that Ainetus, not Diodorus, was phrourarch at Ephesus, see below. 42) Diod, X X . 107,5, Hicks, GHI 256 n o , 150; Dittenberger, OGIS 9 = Inschr. Eph. 1452/Inschr.Claz. 505; there is no archon date, 43) Magie, 1950 75 for the fertility of the Ephesian ympa which in normal circumstances provided subsistence for her inhabitants; Syll3 364 = Bagnall & Derow, 1984 20 no.9.

the city lasted only a few months at the most,44 The connection between prolonged resistance at Erythrae and Lysimachus' possible imposition of q>opoc; on the city has already been mentioned.45 It is probable that the cities on the Carian coast too, most importantly Miletus, remained under Antigonid control, since Lysimachus' operations in spring 302 BC do not appear to have extended this far.4®

Consequently, while his new vicinity to Seleucus and the great increase in power and status which both n ow enjoyed might mean trouble for the future, Lysimachus' real enemy was still Demetrius and his first priority the recovery of the Greek cities still in the Besieger's control. This tug-of-war was to last for fifteen years and, judging from the anecdotes which presumably reflect the propaganda of both courts, the competition for power between the two was further fuelled by strong personal antipathy. The bitter emnity between Demetrius and Lysimachus is repeatedly stressed in the narrative of Plutarch.47 Demetrius casts aspersions on Lysimachus' virility, Lysimachus sneers at his rival's subjection to an ageing courtesan, Demetrius ripostes with a slur upon the chastity of Lysimachus' wife.4®

DIPLOMACY IN ATHENS ; 301 BC - 299 BC

While Lysimachus' early attempts to wrest Asia Minor's great