NORMA DE CALIDAD AMBIENTAL Y DE DESCARGA DE EFLUENTES: RECURSO AGUA

The spark was provided on June 25 1950 when North Korean forces invaded South Korea.

The size of the North Korean force crossing the 38^th parallel worried American officials on the peninsula to such an extent that they reported the information with great urgency to their bosses in Washington. Upon hearing the news, Secretary of State Dean Acheson telephoned President Truman, who was home in Independence, Missouri, to inform him of the situation.

Truman’s initial instinct was to stay in Missouri to wait for further updates. At this point the magnitude of the North Korean invasion was not fully clear, and Truman did not wish to alarm the US public by cancelling his trip to return to Washington. However, by the afternoon, Truman had decided the situation was too urgent to ignore and he decided to fly back to Washington. Upon his arrival Truman scheduled a meeting with his highest ranking national security and foreign policy advisers to take place that evening.⁵⁷

Although the initial discussion focused on what appeared to be the most pressing issue facing the president, whether the US should supply additional arms and equipment to help the South Koreans push back the invasion, attention quickly turned to placing Korea within the wider Cold War context. Two themes were enunciated that would quickly form the heart of US policy towards Korea, and would be repeated again and again at future meetings of Truman and his foreign policy team.

The first was the assumption that the North Korean invasion was being directed by the Soviet Union. The invasion was viewed as part of the communist grand plan for subversion of the free world. As a result, Truman was determined to ‘draw the line somewhere’ and wanted to discuss the military options the US had available if he decided US military intervention in Korea was required.⁵⁸ At this stage both Truman and his advisers were unsure of the Soviet Union’s intentions in Korea. They were convinced the Soviet Union had orchestrated the invasion, but they were unsure of whether the Soviet Union would send troops to support the North Koreans, ask the Chinese communists to enter the fighting, or whether they would use Korea as a distraction to open a second front elsewhere. Truman focused the discussion on Soviet military strength in the Far East. The fear was that if the US decided to intervene militarily to help South Korea, US forces could end up in combat with Soviet troops which could lead to a wider conflict. The severity of the situation can be shown

57 Ayers, E.A. (1950) Diary, June 24-26 June, Ayers Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library

58 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), Blair House Meeting with President, 25 June 1950, FRUS 1950, I, p157-158

by Truman asking if the US could “knock out [Soviet] bases in the Far East?” General Vandenberg replied “it might take some time,” but “it could be done if we used A-bombs.”⁵⁹ The atomic bomb was never used, but the fact it was discussed as an option demonstrates how serious the situation was becoming.

The second theme was Truman’s belief that the North Korean invasion of South Korea proved a threat to the United Nations and his hopes for world peace. Korea would stand as the first true test of the US’s commitment to the notion of collective security upon which the UN depended. The UN had issued Security Council Resolution 82 on June 25. This resolution determined that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace, demanded that North Korea removed its forces north of the 38^th parallel, and called upon “all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.”⁶⁰ At the meeting Truman announced clearly to his administration “we are working entirely for the United Nations.”⁶¹ No one in the administration challenged the president on this point as they appeared to be in agreement with Truman. The meeting concluded with Truman ordering General MacArthur to send supplies to the South Koreans and a task force to assess the need for further US assistance. The president also ordered the State and Defence departments to survey “the next probable place in which Soviet action might take place.”⁶² Truman

“emphasized the importance” of this last point.⁶³ North Korea had invaded South Korea but Truman and his administration found it impossible to isolate this incident from the wider Cold War and remained focused on Soviet intentions. This again provides evidence to support the argument that presidential worldview is crucial to the foreign policy decision-making process. By June 1950 Truman had firmly adopted the Cold War mindset. Therefore, the North’s invasion of the South was not viewed by Truman as a civil war, but instead as a bold move by the Kremlin to spread communist influence in South East Asia. Combined with Truman’s anti-authoritarianism and support for the United Nations, this narrowed Truman’s focus to options in support of US intervention to protect South Korea. As will be shown in the next section analysing the decision to cross the 38^th parallel, this situation was compounded by Truman’s management system, which had resulted in the president surrounding himself with advisors who shared a similar view of the situation.

59 Ibid., p159

60United Nations (1950) United Nations Security Council Resolution 82, June 25, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm, accessed 14 October 2012

61 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), Blair House Meeting with President, 25 June 1950, FRUS 1950, I, p160

62 Ibid., p160

63 Ibid., p161

5.6.1 Initial Involvement: Air and Naval Forces

Over the next five days South Korean forces struggled to hold back North Korean advances. At the next meeting of his national security advisers on June 26 President Truman ordered the US air force and navy to provide military support to the South Koreans, authorising them to attack any North Korean forces south of the 38^th parallel. Truman explained that “no action should be taken north of the 38^th parallel...not yet.”⁶⁴ Truman was clearly worried that any US military action north of the border could run the risk of escalating the situation with China, the Soviet Union or both. However, the fact he did not rule out the possibility of sending US forces into North Korea suggests Truman had not completely given up on the possibility of reuniting Korea through military conquest. The president also ordered the navy’s Seventh Fleet to move to the Strait of Formosa in order to prevent a communist attack on the nationalists holed up on the island of Formosa, as well as increased aid to the Philippines and Indochina.⁶⁵ The administration continued to focus on what they believed to be the wider Soviet threat. The president also again reiterated that he was authorising US air and naval power to be used in Korea “for the United Nations.”⁶⁶

The two themes of Soviet complicity and the United Nations’ doctrine of collective security continued to shape the dialogue and agendas of meetings both within the administration and between the administration and Congress. The first meeting of the president with Congressional leaders since the outbreak of hostilities provides an illuminating example. Truman informed the congressmen he “couldn’t let this go by default.”⁶⁷ The spectre of communism hung over the meeting as the president explained to the Congressmen,

“The communist invasion of South Korea could not be let pass unnoticed...This act was very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union. If we let Korea down the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some time or let all of Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and [there is] no telling what would happen in Europe.”⁶⁸ Truman had ordered the deployment of troops and he was adamant that it was equally important a line should be drawn at Indo-China,

64 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), Blair House Meeting with President, 26 June 1950, FRUS 1950, I, p179

65 Ibid., pp178-180

66 Ibid., p183

67 Acheson, D. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Acheson Papers, Box 67, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, p1

68 Elsey, G. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Elsey Papers, Box 71, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, p4

the Philippines and Formosa. This is a clear enunciation of the domino principle and shows the extent to which Truman subscribed to the idea. The invasion of North Korea into South Korea was interpreted purely in Cold War terms. There was no room for debate or dissent.

No one challenged the assumptions underlying this prognosis. This was interpreted as a threat to world peace, led by the Soviet Union, and it was the responsibility of the United States to use military force to restore the peace. According to Truman, there was no alternative.

No congressman challenged the president on the issue of Soviet involvement. The congressional leaders were broadly supportive of the president’s decisions so far. Senator Wiley said it was “sufficient for him to know we were in there with force and that the President considered this force adequate.”⁶⁹ Instead, most of the discussion focused on the issue of the United Nations. Senator Connelly declared “this was a clear cut case for the UN.

This was an opportunity to test its methods.”⁷⁰ Truman agreed and stated he was going to,

“make absolutely certain that everything we did in Korea would be in support of, and in conformity with, the decision by the Security Council of the United Nations.”⁷¹ The remainder of the meeting revolved around clarifying the role of the US in relation to the UN and which other countries were prepared to offer support for the UN in Korea. However, when Senator Wiley asked for clarification on policy in Formosa, the Philippines and Indochina, President Truman was quick to explain that the UN was not involved and that all actions undertaken in these areas were for purposes of US foreign policy only.⁷² This is important to note because it demonstrates that support of the UN was restricted to Korea only.

Truman was not a utopian. He did wish to develop and strengthen the UN, but he was aware that this could only take place within the complex environment of post-war US foreign policy and at this stage the UN was a means towards an end in Korea.

President Truman reiterated these themes after the meeting in a private conversation with his assistant, George Elsey. In one of his most famous quotes, Truman stated, “Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do if we

69 Acheson, D. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Acheson Papers, Box 67, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, p2

70 Ibid., p3

71 Elsey, G. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Elsey Papers, Box 71, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, p7

72 Ibid., p4-9

don’t put up a fight now.”⁷³ According to Elsey, “The president appeared sincerely determined to go very much further than the initial orders that he had approved for General MacArthur the evening before.”⁷⁴ Truman viewed Korea as part of what he believed to be the wider Soviet conspiracy for global supremacy. He was therefore prepared to use Korea as an opportunity to ‘draw the line’, to teach the Soviet Union an important lesson concerning US resolve in protecting its post Second World War national interests. However, at this stage Truman did not know how far the US would have to intervene in Korea in order to achieve this objective.

5.6.2 Ground Troops

Even with US air and naval support, the South Koreans found it increasingly difficult to hold back the North Koreans. The sense of deepening crisis is evident from the minutes of the NSC meeting held on June 29. President Truman ordered a complete reassessment of “all policy papers affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.”⁷⁵ The fear of Soviet involvement framed and intensified the discussion of policy options available. Truman was determined to meet the challenge: “we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action.”⁷⁶ The seeming inability of the current choice of US naval and air forces to meet the commitment made by Truman to the United Nations prompted Secretary of State Acheson to inform the president “what has been done may make it imperative to accept all out war.”⁷⁷ This would require the involvement of US ground forces in large scale military combat for the first time since the end of the Second World War and possible attacks on North Korean air bases. The president was not prepared to authorise such actions at that moment and asked for intelligence reports on Soviet actions in Korea, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Iran.⁷⁸ Truman still feared that Korea might be a ruse to distract the US from potential Soviet advances in more important regions.

However, the situation in South Korea worsened overnight. General MacArthur sent a telegram to the State Department and Joint Chiefs-of-Staff explaining he had conducted a

73 Elsey, G. (1950) President Truman’s Conversation with George Elsey, June 26, Elsey Papers, Box 71, Harry S.

Truman Presidential Library, p1

74 Ibid., p1

75 National Security Council (1950) Summary of National Security Council Meeting, June 29 1950, Personal Secretary File, Box 187, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, p1

76 Ibid, p1

77 Ibid, p1

78 Ibid., p3

review of the South Korean military position. In his opinion the South Korean army was incapable of halting the North Korean invasion. The only option left to prevent further North Korean advances was the deployment of US ground troops. He requested a regimental combat team be deployed and recommended two divisions be sent from Japan. At 5am Secretary of the Army Frank Pace called President Truman to inform him of MacArthur’s request. With surprisingly little discussion Truman authorised the deployment of the combat regiment but said he would have to consult with his advisers before he could order the additional two divisions.⁷⁹

The consultation took place a few hours later at a meeting of the NSC and Truman authorised the deployment of the two divisions. Aware of the magnitude of the decision, the president wanted to make clear in public pronouncements that although US ground forces would be committed to Korea, there would be no war with the Soviet Union. In private, Truman declared he was prepared to defend Korea if the Soviet Union invaded, but did not want to make it public. The sole objective of current, public, policy was to push North Korea back across the 38^th parallel and restore the border. However, Truman “wanted to be sure that we were not so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of other situations which might develop.”⁸⁰ The president authorised the air force to attack North Korean munitions supplies across the 38^th parallel. Truman stated “such operations should be designed only to destroy munitions supplies” and he “wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to keep peace in Korea and restore the border.”⁸¹ This point is important because it demonstrates two key issues. The first is that US policy in Korea at this time was firmly rooted within the broader doctrine of containment. Truman and his administration were primarily focused on pushing the North Koreans back across the 38^th parallel and restoring the border. At this stage there was no serious long term plan to reunite Korea on the battlefield. In the face of the North Korean onslaught this did not appear to be a realistic ambition. The second is the inability of Truman and his advisers to place themselves in the position of other states’ decision makers. Truman believed it was obvious that the decision to deploy ground forces and any US air or naval attack north of the 38^th parallel was purely in support of the overall plan to restore the border. However, there is no guarantee that neighbouring states, particularly China, would perceive the operations in the same light.

Truman did not comprehend that these actions could be interpreted by China as hostile and it

79 Elsey, G. (1950) MacArthur Requests Ground Troops, June 30, Elsey Papers, Box 71

80 National Security Council (1950) Summary of National Security Council Meeting, June 30, Personal Secretary File, Box 187, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, p1

81 Ibid., p1

could be argued this constituted the first step on the road to Chinese intervention in November. This final point is particularly troubling in light of two telegrams the US had received from the USSR and China. Acheson interpreted the notes to indicate that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea, but they might request the Chinese to intervene on their behalf.⁸² This information does not seem to have given Truman and his advisers particular cause for concern, and they carried on with the decision to deploy US ground forces in Korea.

Later on the same day Truman held a meeting with his cabinet and congressional leaders to update them on the developing situation in Korea. The president was less than forthcoming with information regarding the deployment of US troops. He explained that he had not committed any troops to “actual combat” but had merely sent “base troops to Pusan to keep communication and supply lines open.”⁸³ In light of MacArthur’s report that US troops would be required to hold the line in Korea it was inevitable that US forces would soon be in ‘actual combat’ against the North Korean army. Senator Wherry appeared to understand this and told the president he should advise the congress before sending troops to Korea. Truman explained this had been an emergency and there was no time for lots of talk: “I just had to act as Commander-in-Chief and I did. I told MacArthur to go to the relief of the Koreans and to carry out the instructions of the United Nations Security Council.”⁸⁴ This demonstrates the extent to which Truman subscribed to the concept of presidential prerogative in times of national security crisis. Truman had defined the conflict in Korea as a legitimate emergency and it was in the interests of US national security to engage ground troops in military conflict.

As a result he believed he was under no obligation to ask Congress for permission to take this

As a result he believed he was under no obligation to ask Congress for permission to take this