Others have identified a further breakdown of the policy debates based on divisions within the liberal and realist schools of Russian international relations scholarship. Understanding Russian schools of realism is critical for analyzing perceptions of threat and alignment strategies regarding how Russians view NATO, the CIS CSTO and the SCO. Many Russian realists, as well as liberals, view the international order as one which is currently unipolar in nature. However, each views the
116 Sergounin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads: Changing Paradigms.” Sergounin highlights contours of this consensus around several key points: Russia national interests came before any other considerations international social values and that its foreign policy should be subservient (as a means to an end) for Russia’s domestic needs; Russia should remain a great power with a strong voice in the international system; The Russian foreign policy elites tacitly accepted a moderate version of Eurasianism, in which Russia should cooperate with all countries in a even handed manner, neither favoring East or West; The Russian ‘near abroad’ should be at the top of Russia’s regional priorities that the Russia should be recognized as the unchallenged leader in the FSU based on its special geopolitical, strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests. Finally, NATO’s eastward expansion had to be delayed if not halted by Russia strengthening its military ties with CIS states, China, and India while maintaining a limited security issue dialogue with NATO. Ibid.
117 For an excellent analysis of Russia’s foreign policy prior to and after NATO’s 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE and the formation of consensus, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The final triumph of the Pax American? Western intervention in Yu goslavia and Russia’s debate on the post-Cold War order,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001): 133-156.
118 Such as supporting a multipolar world and toting increased importance of the United Nations for debating the legitimacy of military interventions, if not outright preventing military interventions without UN Security Council Resolutions which were seen as setting a dangerous precedent and a destabilizing force within the international system. Tsyganov, 153.
pillars of the world order differently. The Russian liberals’ emphasize democratic institutions and norms119 while Russian realists prefer power centers or poles.120 Liberal
ideas dominated in the first half of the 1990s followed by the reemergence of realism in the second half of the 1990s. Those that study this literature contend that since 1997, the idea of balance of power has returned in official Russian rhetoric and foreign policy discussions, which is prior to the Asian financial crisis and NATO’s Operation Allied Force. Increasingly, Russian foreign policy became defined in terms of supporting a multi-polar balance of power in the international system.121
However, there is room for disagreement among Russian realists, especially in threat perceptions. Some realists, as represented on the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, favor concentrating on the CIS. They recognize that while Russia remains in a weakened economic position, Russian foreign policy resources will be limited and that domestic imperatives should be the priority for solving a number of pressing internal problems over foreign policy initiatives. Another group favors a “Russia–China axis against the U.S. and supports establishing deeper economic cooperation with other Asian countries in response to global challenges. Others support alliances with Western countries, including relationships with both the U.S. and the EU, “but only on conditions acceptable to Russia.”122 These policy prescriptions are
119 The most mainstream group of Russian liberals is that of the so-called westerners, who acknowledge Russia’s dissimilarities with the West, but attribute these variations with the Russia’s backwardness. However, within the westerners there are also deep divisions and disagreement. While all generally agreed that Russia must adopt from the West, the westerners vary on the dilemma of which West to follow. Some see the U.S. as the ultimate model to emulate, while others associate Russia’s progress with learning from the experiences of Germany, and Northern and Eastern Europe. See Pavel A. Tsygankov and Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Dilemmas and promises of Russian liberalism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37 no. 1 (2004): 53-70. Pavel A. Tsygankov (Moscow State University); Andrei P. Tsygankov (Department of International Relations/Political Science, San Francisco State University).
120 Russian realists are concerned over issues related to the structure of the international system as well as Russia’s strategy for adjusting to the post-Cold war international environment. In general, Russian realists share similar views of the U.S. however; they diverge on foreign policy orientations. A common realist theme is that any Russian foreign policy strategy must be solely based upon national interests from the outset and on the state’s resolve in defending these national interests in relations with the outside world. A large number of Russian “realists also do not trust the US, pointing to multiple examples of unilateralism, arrogance even towards its allies, disregard for international organizations, and excessive reliance on the use of force.” See Tatyana A. Shakleyina and Aleksei D. Bogaturov, “The Russian Realist school of international relations,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37 no. 1 (2004): 37-51 [42]. Tatyana A. Shakleyina (Institute of the United States and Canada, Moscow); Aleksei D. Bogaturov (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow).
121 Shakleyina and Bogaturov, 42. 122 Ibid.
attributable to divergent external threat perceptions. On one side, there are those that associate the primary threat emanating from U.S. hegemony with an increasingly aggressive foreign policy in an effort “to turn the world into an American sphere of influence.”123 The opposing viewpoint is that the U.S. is not the main threat. For these
Russian realists:
Russia must cooperate with the US and other countries in addressing more serious threats, such as controlling nuclear and conventional arms proliferation, terrorism, and drug-trafficking. This group faults [the] US not for its hegemonic foreign policy, but rather for the inadequate attention it gives to Moscow’s similar interests in addressing these threats.124
The policy “position of the majority of Russian realists is one of pragmatism,” according to Shakleyina and Bogaturov, which “is significantly different from the views of both the liberals and of the realists of extreme orientation. At the core of these differences lies the question of the very identity of the Russian State.”125 Russian
“realists believe that [the] Russian identity should be associated with the historical tradition of a great power.”126 Shakleyina and Bogaturov argue that E. Ya. Batalov’s
view of “velikoderhavnost (commitment to great power status) is at the heart of the culture and psyche of Russia. This cultural archetype will continue to shape Russian perceptions of international events, regardless of its internal conditions.”127 Based on the
foregoing, if Russian realism maintains a central position in the foreign policy debate within the inner circles of the Kremlin, then one might expect that any political, economic or security motivations toward the SCO are only part of a short-term solution to a means of achieving great power status in the long-term. One might also argue that Russia is using the SCO as part of a long-term strategy to re-exert its hegemony over Central Asia. Additionally, one can expect to see fluctuations in alliance partners over time. This will largely depend on which Russian realist group has the most influence in Russian foreign policy circles at any given moment in time.
123 Shakleyina and Bogaturov, 42. 124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 48. 126 Ibid, 49. 127 Ibid.