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1.11. BENEFICIOS

2.2.8 NORMAS PARA UNA CORRECTA INSTALACIÓN DE ENLACES

Variable 5: Lower Salaries and Other Rewards

Variable 5, children require lower salaries and are also content with other rewards, such as: protection, honor, revenge or a sense of purpose, is also a strong argument as to why children would want to become soldiers without being forced to it, but is it also applicable to the DRC?

A small shift in relative rewards might cause an increase in children being employed into armed groups (Andvig, 2006: 18). The situation in the DRC for a stable future for children is very poorly at this moment. Aurelie (9) from the DRC says in an interview with UNICEF: ‘’I know that it is bad to drop out of school, it is important to learn how to read and give good answers’’,‘’but, if I don’t work, there is not enough food’’ (UNICEF, 2013). The

government of the DRC tries to make primary education free, to make it accessible to every child, but this is not as easy as it might seem. Tuition for education in the DRC is 4500 francs at the moment ($5), per child. For many families this is too high and they cannot afford it. It is more beneficial for the families to have their children work (income) than go to school (spending) in the DRC at this moment (UNICEF, 2013). More than one in four children from the ages of 5-17 are not attending school in the DRC, which are almost 7.4 million children, these numbers include only primary schools (UNICEF, 2013). This occurrence is higher in rural areas; the province of Katanga has with over 1.3 million the highest number of children not attending school (UNICEF, 2013).

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Every armed group performs under some form of financial constraint, children should only be recruited if they are cost-effective (Andvig, 2006: 25). These groups can be seen in a principal agent model. The child soldiers become agents of a military organization (when recruited voluntary), they need to receive sufficient utility so they do not run off. The leaders should also find a way to reward them ‘’so that they choose to act in a way that will produce

the maximum increase of the probability of winning with the lowest financial costs’’, as also mentioned in explanation 2 (Andvig, 2006: 26). Since the other options are worse or are none for children, especially without education, they often choose to join for even lower rewards than they are entitled to, this is also the case in the DRC.

According to the United Nations a third of the child soldiers that escaped from M23 were lured from Rwanda. The children were lured with promises of money, jobs and education (Reuters, 2013). Cash, job opportunities and future prospects seem to be strong motivation points that children would want to endanger themselves in combat or that parents would even let their children go, because it would seem that if these things were promised coercion was low.

Poverty is a great concern for children in the DRC. A lot of children do not go to school, do not have a roof over their head, they lack everything. Steinar Johannessen and Helge Holgersen have used many interviews for their research (2014) about the problems and needs for former child soldiers in the DRC. One of the former child soldiers they interviewed argued that their behavior is related to the poverty: ‘’maybe he is aggressive because he does not have the means to produce anything to live on, he is dependent on someone. And his parents, whom he depends on, have nothing’’ (Johannessen & Holgersen, 2014: 59).

However, military work is not a very good substitute for schooling. Children need education in order to have a better future. Blattman and Annan (2010) have tried to look at the impact due to military services on human capital and labor market outcomes, they have used

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the case of Uganda. One of the statements they make: ‘’military service seems to be a poor substitute for schooling’’ (Blattman & Annan, 2010: 882). Not only Blattman and Annan have

researched this impact also Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) have looked into this phenomenon and came to the same statement: ‘’the microeconomic impact of war on civilian

populations can be substantial and persistent. Not only can people living in war zones suffer injuries and have their property destroyed, they may also be displaced from their homes, lose their means of survival, or be unable to attend school, all of which may result in a permanent decline in their productivity and earnings’’ (Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011: 41). This would be a pull-factor to become a child soldier.

In the DRC the situation is not that different than in other conflicts in Africa. Poverty, no education and too many youngsters have caused children, and also their parents, to make other decisions about their future lives. When a leader from an armed group promises salaries, education and protection a choice is easily made when nothing better is in sight. This is also because children are easier to indoctrinate and are obedient, which will be discussed in the next variable section.