Normativa Nacional

claiming responsibility for the abduction of Western hostages in Lebanon. This has led to a great deal of confusion among policymakers and academics alike in attempts to determine whether the perpetrating group has acted with­

" Although valuable, other studies on the hostage-crisis have examined the organisation and Iran's involvement in a vaccum without regard for the impact of clerical factionalism in Iran on Hizb'allah activity and the internal environment in which Hizb'allah operates, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, Anat Kurz, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv iMversity, 1988). Also see: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit. ; p.105; and FBIS, December 5, 1989.

" As briefly demonstrated by: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992).

" See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; al-Shira, March 16, 1986; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

in the framework of Hizb'allah's umbrella, semi-independently, or completely independently." As these groups have managed to maintain almost complete secrecy surrounding their identity and operations, any determination of their status and affiliation to Hizb'allah is a difficult task." Nevertheless, it is necessary and, more importantly, possible to discern the raison d'etré by the perpetrating organisation for the concealment of their identity as well as their connection with the Hizb'allah.

Although Hizb'allah's spiritual leader. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, debunked the idea of taqiyya, or dissimulation, when he urged his followers to organize along party lines with the publication of Islam and the Logic of Force in 1976," the Shi'a tradition of concealment, as practised by the Shi'a minority when religiously persecuted in ancient times, has been frequently used by the Hizb'allah when operating covertly, especially in the abduction of foreigners." The use of different cover names during covert operations has shielded the Hizb'allah movement and its leaders from perse-

" For useful examples of the confusion within academia and policy circles in analysing these groups, see: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, "Hie Kidnappings in Lebanon", TVI Report, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall, 1986): pp.2-11; Robin Wright, In the Name of God (New York, NY.: Simon & Schuster, 1989): p. 160; and John L. Espcxsito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY. : Syracuse University Press, 1991): p.253. For a cross-section of the shifts and different views within the mass media, see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, April 16, 1984; Le Point, July 30, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; Sunday Times, June 30, 1985; and Washington Post. May 15, 1990. .

" This secrecy was even critized by a leading Hizb'allah member, see: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); and Davar, January 30, 1987. For the difficulty in mapping individual responsibility with Hizb'allah's caimand leadership see: Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizbollah et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, no. 119, (janv.- mars, 1988): pp.39-59.

" See: Mianmad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-Jam'iyya li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi ', 1981): p.246-7.

" See: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Kevhan, February 12, 1987. For the practise of taqiyah, see: Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.28-29. For a useful exposition of concealment in Shi'ism, refer to lecture by Prof. Et an Kohlberg, Hebrew University, delivered at the Tel Aviv University, May 23, 1993. Also see: Xavier Raufer, "Ideology of Radical-Islamic Groups: European Implications", in Brenda Almond (ed.) Terrorism in the New Europe (Hull: The University of Hull, May 15-17, 1992).

cution and reprisals, while the the cover names themselves have been employed not only to confuse the enemy but also to signify the currents inside the movement at a particular time." While the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad,

or "Holy War", emerged in connection with Hizb'allah's multiple suicide ope­ rations in 1983, many Hizb'allah leaders openly admitted both involvement in

Islamic Jihad operations" and that the organisation did not exist as such,

but rather was merely a "telephone organisation"," whose name was "used by those involved to disguise their true identity".** The use of the term Jihad

by the Hizb'allah denoted the combat activity against the enemies of Islam and lent revolutionary credence to the movement in the eyes of the Shi'ite community." It was also used by the Hizb'allah in the abduction of foreig­ ners from 1984 until mid-198'5, which symbolically reflected the movements accelerated efforts to expel any Western political and military presence in Lebanon." Therefore, it was not surprising that Islamic Jihad as a cover name ceased to be used in new abductions of foreigners after Hizb'allah's

" See: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, February 26, 1987; al-Dustur, November 6, 1989; hnd al- Dustur, September 11, 1989.

" For statements by Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, admitting involvement, see: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985. According to al-Musawi, "in his eyes it is an honour to be called terrorist whenever the goal is to harass and expel oppressors", see: Nehzat, July 18, 1985.

" See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.19. For statement by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.

" For statement by Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, see: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, December 4, 1986. For a statement by Hussayn al-Mussawi, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1985; and Ha'aretz, July 30, 1985. Also see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Associated Press, October 5, 1984; Ma'aretz, April 2, 1985; Le Point, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, August 28, 1988; Nouveau Magazine. July 23, 1988; and New York Times, November 13, 1986.

" The Quranic notion of Jihad signifies the battle against evil and means the struggle to spread and to defend Islam, see: Patrick J. Bannerman, Islam in Perspective (London:

Routledge, 1988). For Hizb'allah's use of Jihad, see: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit..

" See: Kavhan, July 29, 1986; and Liberation, March 16, 1985.

successful victory in forcing not only the earlier departure of the Multi­ national Forces but also Israel's partial withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985."

The emergence of another organisation, using the nom de guerre of the

Revolutionary Justice Organisation, in claiming responsibility for the abduc­

tion of foreigners during 1986, signified Hizb'allah's concern over the im­ prisonment of a number of its members in France as most abductions involved French citizens. When the cover name was used in abductions of three Ameri­ cans in September-October 1986, (shortly proceeding the revelation of the US- Iran arms-for-hostages deal) it was believed the name signified a split with­ in the Hizb'allah which mirrored Iranian clerical factionalism." As later revealed by the confinement of these French and American hostages with other hostages held by Islamic Jihad,^ coupled with the unified position within Hizb'allah rejecting any US-Iranian rapproachementthis was not the case.

Apart from a single abduction of a French citizen in January 1987 by the

Revolutionary Justice Organisation, Hizb'allah's shift towards using the nom

de guerre Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine reflected not only solidarity with imprisoned Hizb'allah and Shi'ite Palestinians held by Israel but also the movement's political and military orientation in the struggle for the "liberation of Jerusalem" through armed confrontation in southern Lebanon." This also signified Hizb'allah's co-operation with Fatah elements

" See: Washington Post, February 1, 1984; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz. April 1, 1985; and al-Dustur, March 31, 1985.

" See: New York Times, November 13, 1986; Davar, January 11, 1987; New York Times. December 18, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987.

" For Hizb'allah's opposition, see: al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd. November 21, 1986.

" For the use of the name: Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, see* Ma'aretz, November 3, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.

instituted in 1987 for the escalation of the armed confrontation with Israel." While a number of other cover names were subsequently used by Hizb'allah, the common feature of these names signified the release of impri­ soned Hizb'allah members, as evident by the use of the names The Organisation

for the Defense of Free People or Holy Strugglers for Freedom, and, more

importantly, symbolized the fate of the Shi'a as a deprived and humiliated community, as evident by the use of the title Organization of the Oppressed

on E a r t h This is evidently apparent by the choice of name of Hizb'allah's

own radio station, Voice of the Oppressed

While the employment of these cover names by Hizb'allah reflected the concerns and direction of the movement in Lebanon, the fact that many hos­ tages were held with other hostages taken by different groups is evidence that the names have not necessarily represented separate and different groups, either within or outside the organisational structure of the Hizb'allah." In fact, as demonstrated by the testimony of many former hos­ tages, the core group of kidnappers of Western hostages seemed only involved a dozen men from various Hizb'allah clans, most notably the Mugniyya and Hamadi clans." The fact that these two clans have been continuously pin­

" See; Ma'ariv, November 3, 1987; Richochets, Israel Defence Forces Spokesman, July 1990; al-Divar, December 4, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 5, 1989; and International Herald Tribune, January 1, 1990.

28 _{See: International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988.}

" Hizb'allah's radio station. Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed, is broadcasted from the Biq'a valley and was first monitored on January 14, 1986. Another radio station, Voice of Faith, idiich appeared in November 1987, is supportive of Hizb'allah, see:

BBC/SWB/ME/0024, December 12, 1987. For information on Hizb'allali's TV-station al-Manar (the Beacon), see: Sunday Times, July 19, 1992.

" See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.; pp. 11-2. Also see: Washington Post, September 21, 1984; and Washington Post, August 1, 1985.

" See: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1989; Independent, January 28, 1987; Israeli TV (NER), February 16, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Independent, October 9, 1991; and Le Figaro, December 4, 1989. For difficulty in exactly pin-pointing the identity of hostage-takers, see: Independent, December 1, 1991.

pointed by authorities for alledged involvement in the kidnappings of fo - reigners underlines not only the importance of the Lebanese clan system as a basis for Hizb'allah's organizational structure and activity but also the personal and ideological loyalty within the Hizb'allah to higher religious authority. This has led to an extremely close-knit structure capable of en­ gaging in successful covert operations." While clan loyalty" and indi­ vidual clerical relationships have provided the basis for the movement and the framework for its hostage-taking activity," it functions under the jurisdiction of a centralized and well organized leadership structure." Although leading Hizb'allah clergy deny the movement has a clearly defined organisational structure, the Hizb'allah is secretly governed on the national and local level by a supreme political-religious board of authority, composed of a small and select group of Lebanese uiu/na." Due to the absolute nature of the supreme religious authority of the Hizb'allah's command leadership, all decisions or activities relating to hostage-taking by regional or clan

" For IDF Military Intelligence (AMAN), Hizb'allah has been adraittingly difficult to infiltrate as the #ole organisation is based on religious or family bonds. Apart from its "compartmentalized ultrasecretive cells and cryptic coommications", full-fledged membership meant being bom into the organisation, see; Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press,, 1992): p.319; and Newsweek, February 27, 1989: p.27. Also see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

See: Nouveau Magazine, July 23, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 15, 1988; and Hurriyet. November 17, 1986.

" See: Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; and Le Point. June 1, 1987. For recruitment procedure as a non-operational Hizb'allah member, see: Ha'aretz. May 31.

" See: Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

" For Hizb'allah leadem denial of an organisational structure, see: al-Harakat al- Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beimt, 1984); Monday Morning, January 14, 1985; and al-Naliar al-Arabi, June 10, 1986.

leaders had to be approved at the highest level." As a result, the idea that Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity were pursued independently by individual Hizb'allah clans, either without the knowledge of leading clergy or not through a chain of command, ignores not only the nature of religious autho­ rity exercized over every aspect of the movement's activity but also the institutionalized cooperation and coordination with both Iran and Syria in some of these operations," Although a number of abductions of foreigners were initiated in alignment with individual interests of certain Hizb'allah clans, all acts of hostage-taking also coincided with the collective interest of the organisation as a whole. As a consequence, it is necessary to analyse the nature of Hizb’allah’s command leadership, its decision-making structure as well as policy with specific reference to the movement's hostage-taking activity. It is also necessary fo examine the nature of the involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions at work in Lebanon as well as Syrian military and intelligence services in terms of their influence within and over Hizb'allah activity.

3,3. Hizb'allah's Command Leadership"

On the first anniversary of the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, on February 16, 1985, Hizb'allah publicly announced for the first time not only its ideological progamme and strategy in a manifesto" but also appeared as

" Uhattributable interview with senior Israeli official in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel, August 1991. Also see; al-Sharg al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and al- Shira, March 17, 1986.

" According to Salah Khalaf (Abu lyad), all the different names adopted by Hizb'allah are merely covers for its operational wing, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Kevhan. February 12, 1987. For Islamic Jihad operations, see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

" For a chart of the organizational structure of the Hizb'allah, see: Appendix I.

** For a full text of the manifesto, see: Mass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad Afin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World), reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.),

(1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87.

a unified organisation with the assembly of the entire Hizb'allah command leadership.*’ Although the Hizb'allah revealed only the position of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin as its official spokesman, the movement was secretly governed by a supreme religious body, which had been instituted by Iran's Fazlollah Mahallati in 1983, fashioned after the upper echelons of Iran's clerical leadership." The composition of the highest authority within this supreme religious body in Lebanon reflected the core group of individual Shi'ite clergy who assisted in the foundation of the Hizb'allah in July 1982.** Apart from the position of Husayn al-Musawi, as the only non-clerical member of the religious leadership, the composition of Hizb'allah's leadership council was also reflective of the religious authority of these clergymen in terms of their command of a substantial number of followers in each of the three main Shi'ite regions in Lebanon: the Biq'a; Beirut; and southern Lebanon.**

In the Biq'a area, the Hizb'allah is headed by Sheikh Subhi al- Tufayli," who was considered the highest religious authority in Ba'albek as evident by his nomination of "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek in 1984,** and Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. Along with Husayn al-Musawi and his

*’ Hizb'allah's cxxnmand leadership attended a meeting in Shyah in the southern suburbs of Beirut, where Hizb'allah's official spokesman read the "Open Letter Addressed by the HizbAllah to the Oppressed/Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World", see: Gilles Delafon, Beyrouth: Les Soldats de l'Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.90.

** See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125. Also see: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit..

** See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.114-30; and al-Dustur, November 6, 1989.

** See: Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and Davar, January 11, 1987.

** Sheikh Sublii al-Tufayli was bom in 1948 in the village of Brital in the Bi'qa area, see: Davar, Novmber 25, 1983; al-Nashra, December 5, 1984; Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984; al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987.

Islamic Amal/’’ these two religious figures occupied not only the most senior positions as spiritual leaders of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a but also played an instrumental role as liaison with the Iranian Pasdaran and Iran while maintaining overall control over Hizb'allah's irregular and semi-regular military units." While Sheikh al-Tufayli acted as the head of the Hizb'allah headquarters in Ba'albek and was the movement’s main.liason with Teheran," Sheikh al-Musawi was operational head of the Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus and the movement's military wing, the Islamic Resistances^ Another main leader of Hizb'allah military activity in the Biq'a was Sheikh Husayn al-Khalil, who maintained a senior position within Hizb'allah's command leadership." Al-Khalil acted as operational co-ordinator of Hizb'allah's military units in co-operation with Islamic Amal, which was subordinated organisationally within Hizb'allah from 1984 onwards under the personal

*’ See: Ma'aretz, October 24, 1983; Ma'aretz, November 6, 1983; al-Nahar al-Arabi. June 10, 1985; Washington Post, February 14, 1986; Nouveau Magazine, November 15, 1986; al-Nahar, November 14, 1986; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Safir, August 17, 1987; al-Shira, August 8, 1988; and Independent, August 30, 1989. Husayn al-Misawi is related to Abbas al-Musawi, see: Davar, Noveniber 25, 1983.

** See: al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; al-Ittihad, December 4, 1986; International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; Ha'aretz, Novmber 29, 1987; La Revue du Liban, January 30, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988; Independent. August 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

" See: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988. Slieikh Tufayli is also responsible for Hizb'allah's financial assets, see: Ha'aretz, August 21, 1991.

" See: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; Davar, October 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, October 2, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, Decmber 17, 1989; and Independent, March 7, 1990. Al-Musawi was head of internal security within Hizb'allah SSA frccn 1983-85. In late 1985 until April 1988, al-Musam was the head of the Islamic Resistance. For Hizb'allah-Pasdaran military march in Ba'albek, see: Radio Monte Carlo, December 14, 1987. In June 1987, Abbas al-Musam was transferred from Biq'a area to Tyre to set up hideouts to which hostages could be transferred from Beirut and to weaken Amal's position in the area, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987.

" See: Independent, August, 30, 1989; al-Hayat, Noveniber 27, 1989; Ha'aretz. December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989. Sheikli Husayn al-Klialil became also the head of the Politbureau in 1989/90, see: Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).

authority of Husayn al-Musawi." A lesser Hizb'allah figure in the Biq'a with an important function was Mustafa Mahmud Madhi, who is responsible for the arms shipments received from Iran at the Sheikh Abdallah barracks."