Notas definitorias de Comunicación para el Desarrollo

Despite their claim that electoral systems influence candidate selection procedures, Hazan and Voerman (2006) acknowledged the limitation on the explanatory power of a country-level characteristic, like electoral system, on selection processes. Since candidate selection processes are a party-level factor and are mainly extra-legal, one

often observes intra-country cross-party variation31. In this subsection, I examine

empirically the extent to which intra-country cross-party variation in candidate se- lection processes exists. If electoral systems determine candidate selection processes, one should not observe a great degree of intra-country variability.

Langston (2008) examines how parties in Mexico select their legislative candi- dates. She concludes that despite the fact that all parties operate under the same institutional environment and the same electoral system, the three most important parties use different mechanisms to select their legislative candidates. Similarly, an- alyzing the myriad selection processes in Australia led Jaensch, Brent and Bowden (2004) to conclude that although all Australian parties operate under the same elec- toral system, a wide range of selection mechanisms exists (see also: Johns (2000)).

Figure 2.8 presents the intra-country variation at the party level in candidate selection processes for a small subset of my data set. Figure 2.9 presents the pro- portion of legislators in each country selected by each the selection processes I use

in this dissertation (See Figure 2.1)32. As can be seen from both figures, these coun-

31_{Of course, if a country’s law regulates candidate selection procedures, one will not observe}

intra-country variation. This is the case in Finland, for example.

32_{All countries but Slovakia include several sessions. All sessions within a country used the same}

Figure 2.8: Proportion of Selection Procedures by Country (Party Level)

AUS ISR CAN BEL IRL TWN SVK

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

*Selection via local party leadership does not exist in these countries national party leadership up to 10 selectors

national party delegates

local party delegates, subject to approval of the national party local party delegates

primaries subject to approval of national party primaries

tries exhibit a relatively high degree of divergence in how their parties select their candidates and how their legislators are selected. There are slight, non-meaningful, differences between the party and individual level figures. For example, in Taiwan before its electoral reform, parties used four different types of selection procedures while Slovakian parties used five different types of selection processes ranging from the most restrictive manner used by Direction - Social Democracy (SMER) to the

most permissive procedure used by Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDK ´U).

Figure 2.9: Proportion of Selection Procedures by Country (Individual Level)

AUS ISR CAN BEL IRL TWN SVK

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

*Selection via local party leadership does not exist in these countries national party leadership up to 10 selectors

national party delegates

local party leadership up to 10 selectors, subject to approval of the national party local party leadership up to 10 selectors (at the local level)

local party delegates, subject to approval of the national party local party delegates

primaries subject to approval of national party primaries

Not only does one observe cross-sectional variation across parties within a country that did not change its electoral systems, but frequently, this cross-party variation

exists within the same country-session33_{. For example, Bille (2001) classified Austrian}

33_{Country-session refers to a certain period of years that usually mirrors the legislative sessions.} Thus, Israel 1996-1999 is a country-session, as is Switzerland 1999-2003. Using this unit of analysis

candidate selection procedures in 1989 according to the data provided in Katz and Mair (1992). According to his classification scheme which differs slightly from the

one I introduced in Figure 2.1 the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SP ¨O) used

a fairly restrictive process where the sub-national party organization proposed the candidates, but the final decision was left to the hands of the national party organs.

On the other hand, the Christian Democratic Austrian People’s Party ( ¨OVP) and

the Freedom Party (FP ¨O) used more inclusive and decentralized selection procedures

where the sub-national party organization made the decision subject to the approval of the national party. In 1989, the Green Party selection processes were even more permissive as the sub-national organs of the party solely controlled the selection (Bille, 2001).

Before the 1997 elections in Chile, most parties but the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) used national-level selection to select their candidates (Field and Siavelis, N.d.). The Party for Democracy (PPD) used its national board to select the candi- dates (Navia, 2008) and the National Renewal (RN) party used the national council. The Independent Democratic Union (UDI) used an even more restrictive selection process where party leadership negotiated and determined the candidates (Field and Siavelis, N.d.; Navia, 2008). On the other hand, the PDC used in 1997 closed pri- maries to select their candidates. By 2001 it opened its selection procedures even further by adopting open primaries (Navia, 2008).

gets rid of intra-country same-party cross-time variation in selection processes discussed in subsection 2.5. Moreover, by definition, the electoral system context within which all parties in a country-session operate is the same.

Selection processes in the Czech Republic before the 1996 elections varied as well. The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) altered its relatively restrictive selection pro- cess from 1992 to a permissive selection procedure where party members in regional caucuses selected the party’s candidate lists. The national organization maintained a degree of control, as it had the right to change the list and to adjust it (Deegan- Krause, 2006). The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), as well as the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) adopted a similar process to the one used by the ODA. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic Union-Czech’s People’s Patry (KDU-CSL) and Union for Republic- Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-ESC) “avoid the tendency towards member caucuses”(Deegan-Krause, 2006, 86).

Like those in the Czech Republic, French parties used divergent selection methods to choose their candidates before the 1962 elections. As in many countries, candidate selection processes in France are extra-legal as no law regulates how parties select their candidates (Thiebaut, 1988). The Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) party used a fairly restrictive selection procedure where a nomination commission, after receiving suggestions from the local departmental organizations, presented a list of candidates to the Central Committee. On the other hand, selection processes in the Popular Republican party (MRP) were fairly permissive and decentralized. The can- didates were selected through a secret ballot procedure at the federation level, an intermediate layer between the national and local levels of the party. The national Executive Committee then approved the candidates (Janda, 1980). The Radical So- cialist party’s processes were less permissive than the MRP’s but more permissive than the PRP’s. A local committee selected candidates without an approval stage at the national level (Janda, 1980).

One can see cross-party variation in selection procedures in Israel before the 1999 elections. Before the elections for the 15th Knesset, Labour selected its parliamentary

candidates in party primaries34(Hazan, 2002). The Likud party, on the other hand,

selected its candidates in the party’s central committee (Rahat, 2002). Meretz used a two-stage process where the party’s council screened the candidates and its conven- tion, roughly 2000 members, ranked the list (Hazan, 2006a; Rahat, 2002; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007). The National Religious Party chose the list in the party’s central com- mittee, and so did Shinui Party. The Center Party used a more restrictive procedure where party leaders negotiated the candidates under the party’s banner (Rahat, 2002).

Similar cross-party intra-country-session variation in how parties select their can- didates shows in Ghana. Before the 2000 elections, the National Democratic Congress used a restrictive centralized process where national party leadership had the control, and constituency influences were marginal. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) used delegate conventions at the constituency level, and its national party organs could not change the decision made at the constituency level (Ohman, 2004).

One can see variations in selection procedures within a country-session in many other cases, such as Italy before the 1983 elections (Wertman, 1988), Nicaragua before the 1996 elections (Santiuste, Salvador. {[email protected]} 2009, March.19. Infor- mation concerning Selection Processes in Nicaragua [Personal email]. (2009, March 19)), Portugal 1985 (Montabes and Ortega, N.d.) and in Slovakia before the 2002 elections (Meseznikov and Gyarfasova, 2006). If electoral systems exhibited a strong influence on the type of selection procedures parties use, one should not have ob-

served such a vast cross-party intra-country-session variation in selection procedures. Parties within the same country-session operate within the same electoral context. They should have had, therefore, similar processes to determine who gets to represent them on election day. The data supports the contrary. It seems candidate selection procedures and electoral systems exhibit no meaningful association. Given these re- sults, amalgamating elections and selection seems unreasonable.