NOTAS A LAS TABLAS DE RECONCILIACIÓN DE NIF A LAS NIIF

The level of competition for students between schools in Australia is higher than in any other OECD country, including those that have a reputation for high performance and high equity (Table 31).

Country Percentage of schools competing with two or more other schools

Australia 90

Canada 67

Finland 44

Iceland 36

Norway 22

Table 31: Relative competitiveness of school markets in comparable OECD countries

So, if Australian parents have some room for discretionary investment in their child’s education, they generally have more than one school to choose from in their general vicinity.

As a general proposition, competition should improve the quality and efficiency of education provision, as different providers seek to attract students to their respective institutions at the lowest efficient cost. More specifically, it’s expected that private institutions are effective in driving improvements in

profitability, workplace performance and labour productivity and hence their involvement in the education sector should improve the quality and efficiency of education provision. As we will see however, these two principles do not necessarily hold true in practice.

The influence of competition

In assessing whether these features are applicable to education and generate similar effects, Levin and Belfield find that “(a)lthough the evidence in favour of privatisation in education seems consistent with that of other sectors, the beneficial effects of privatisation are perhaps more modest in education.”130 This is consistent with other findings that the positive impact of choice on the quality of education has a negligible or minor effect, but nevertheless a positive one.131

130

Belfield, C. and Levin H. M. (2002), “Education Privatization: Causes, consequences and planning implications”, UNESCO: International Institute for Education Planning, Paris,, p.41.

131

Waslander, Pater and van der Weide “Markets in Education: an Analytical Review of Empirical Research on Market Mechanisms in Education” 92010) OECD Education Working Papers No. 52, OECD Publishing.

The reasons for the more subdued ‘privatisation effect’ in education probably relate to the fact that it is heavily regulated, and that there are clear social objectives rather than commercial objectives being pursued. 132 It is also the case that the main players in the education system do not behave in the way that classical economic theory predicts.

But the question still remains: why does Australia, with its highly competitive education market, not see clearer positive results (including among our top-performing schools) from its enviable range of

education options? The answer lies in the strategic reactions of those well-resourced non-government schools that are able to charge higher fees.

In the face of competition most non-government schools have kept their fees relatively high in part so they can invest in reducing class sizes to attract students (Figure 68 and Figure 69). 133

Figure 68: Non-government secondary school enrolment shares and real fees, 1972 to 2007134

133

Watson, L. and Ryan, C. (2009) Choice, vouchers and the consequences for public high schools: lessons from Australia,

http://w.ncspe.org/ accessed 30 March 2011 134

Watson, L. and Ryan, C. (2009) Choice, vouchers and the consequences for public high schools: lessons from Australia,

Figure 69: Non-government secondary school enrolment shares and student: teacher ratios relative to government schools135

From the perspective of the non-government schools, this has been an effective strategy. Where they have been able to do so - recognising that a lot of non-government schools do not levy high fees, and the Catholic sector generally charges lower fees – such schools have attracted a greater share of high SES students (important for continued high performance) whilst retaining revenue.

However, given that smaller class sizes have shown to have a negligible effect on student performance136 this is not necessarily an efficient use of resources.

This isn’t to say that competition in education can’t deliver greater efficiencies: we can point to schools that achieve great results at a smaller per-head cost, but it is not evident whether these outcomes stem from the schools responding to a competitive marketplace.

As Levin and Belfield observe from the international literature “educational economists cannot offer very precise advice about which characteristics schools should possess to make them more efficient, nor can they indicate unambiguously that private schools are more efficient than public schools”. 137

A related concern is whether competition delivers more effective schools. As we will have seen

elsewhere in this report, the desire to carve out a market ‘niche’ leads to greater selectivity and certainly greater selectivity lifts school performance. The point is that competition across the school system does not appear to ‘lift all boats’.

This does not square entirely with the findings of OECD analyses. One report showed that increased choice, along with school level autonomy and accountability contributes to high performance among both high and low SES students - more so for high SES, but the lift in performance of lower SES students was noticeable.138

135

Watson, L. and Ryan, C. (2009) Choice, vouchers and the consequences for public high schools: lessons from Australia,

http://w.ncspe.org/ accessed 30 March 2011. The y axis represents the difference in the average student: teacher ratio relative to the government sector

136

Hattie, J. (2009) Visible Learning: a synthesis of over 800 meta-analysis relating to achievement, Routledge, London 137

Watson, L. and Ryan, C. (2009) Choice, vouchers and the consequences for public high schools: lessons from Australia, http://w.ncspe.org/ accessed 30 March 2011., loc cit

138

Schutz, G, West, M and Wossman, L “School Accountability, Autonomy, Choice and the Equity of Student Achievement: international