[119] It has been argued in previous sections of this article, that even with respect to dependent and independent civil actions (Article 31 and Article 33 covered actions), the principle of res judicata (bar by prior judgment) and litis pendentia (which is premised on res judicata bar by prior judgment) uncompromisably require that a single cause of action cannot under any circumstance simultaneously pend in more than one forum. It is only with respect to res judicata (conclusiveness of judgment) that the rules on independent civil actions may constitute exceptions (certainly with respect to Article 31 covered actions, but unsettled with respect to Article 33 covered actions).
[120] Since our rules on independent and dependent civil actions, and our concepts on res
judicata, litis pendentia and forum shopping are anchored on the concept of a cause of
281
(GR L-37474, 18 Nov 1991) 3rd div Davide Jr J. 282
See Section 1 Rule 31. 283
See Cojuangco Jr vs CA (GR L-37474, 18 Nov 1991) Davide Jr J, where ‘consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject matter … becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even if filed with the different branches of the same court of first instance’. 284
Cojuangco Jr vs CA (GR L-37474, 18 Nov 1991) Davide Jr J highlighted the exception in libel cases due to the special provision of the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which says that - ‘The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter,
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. . . . Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice-versa provided, furthermore, That he court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts’. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code practically forces the criminal and separate civil action for
action,285 a change in approach on how we view a cause of action or claim may have profound consequences on these reliant rules and concepts. There are several Supreme Court decisions involving civil cases stating that if the same evidence sustains both civil cases, then the causes of action are identical no matter how the complaint is framed.286 This is contrasted to the rules on dependent and independent civil actions that strictly align with the approach that a cause of action is equivalent to a single theory of recovery based upon a provision of substantive law — thus, an independent civil action for quasi-delict, being anchored on the substantive provision of law under Article 2176 of the Civil Code that creates it, is a separate and distinct cause of action from a dependent civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto anchored on criminal negligence under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, even if arguably the same evidence may be used to sustain both cases.
[121] The view that a cause of action or claim is defined by the sameness of evidence used to sustain it, is found somewhere across the spectrum of two approaches in defining what constitutes a claim — at one end of the spectrum is the definition of a claim based on a single theory of recovery, while at the opposite end is the theory that a claim is defined by the transaction that gives rise to it. The American Law Institute, in its
Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) describes these two approaches:
"Claim," in the context of res judicata, has never been broader than the transaction to which it related. But in the days when civil procedure still bore the imprint of the forms of action and the division between law and equity, the courts were prone to associate claim with a single theory of recovery, so that, with respect to one transaction, a plaintiff might have as many claims as there were theories of the substantive law upon which he could seek relief against the defendant. Thus, defeated in an action based on one theory, the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action based on a different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the defendant's identical act or connected acts forming a single life-situation. In those earlier days there was also some adherence to a view that associated claim with the assertion of a single primary right as accorded by the substantive law, so that, if it appeared that the defendant had invaded a number of primary rights conceived to be held by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had the same number of claims, even though they all sprang from a unitary occurrence. There was difficulty in knowing which rights were primary and what was their extent, but a primary right and the corresponding claim might turn out to be narrow. … Still another view of claim looked to sameness of evidence; a second action was precluded where the evidence to support it was the same as that needed to support the first. Sometimes this was made the sole test
285
Section 3 Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure itself defines a cause of action as ‘the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another’
286
See eg, Sangalang vs Caparas (G.R. No. L-49749 June 18, 1987) Gancayco J; Garcia vs CA (G.R. No. L-19783 July 30, 1965) Reyes JBL J; and Peñalosa vs. Tuason (G.R. No. 6809. March 22, 1912) Carson J.
of identity of claim; sometimes it figured as a positive but not as a negative test; that is, in certain situations a second action might be precluded although the evidence material to it varied from that in the first action. Even so, claim was not coterminous with the transaction itself. The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded; and regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split.287
[122] A change in the remedial definition of a claim as constituting a ‘transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories’288 would, in the context of dependent and independent civil actions, dictate that actions based on provisions of law other than ex
delicto (eg, quasi-delict) and actions for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto, that arise
out of the same transaction and forming one claim, must be litigated in one forum, otherwise splitting them would be violative of litis pendentia. Likewise, the failure to allege recovery based on quasi-delict in the court litigating the action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto, would bar the former in the event the court issues a judgment, on the basis of res judicata (bar by prior judgment).289 Thus, a change in approach does not affect the uncompromisability of res judicata (bar by prior judgment); rather the change of approach has repercussions because of a change of the unit of litigation from a single theory of recovery as constituting the unit, to the transaction itself where all theories of recovery are lumped into.
[123] The concepts of res judicata (conclusiveness of judgment), doctrine of election of remedies, prohibition against double recovery, and rule on consolidation of cases, are Philippine law’s means of compensating for the shortcomings caused by our present definition of a cause of action (equivalent to a single theory of recovery) in achieving the objectives of placing an end to litigation, avoiding multiplicity of suits and declogging court dockets.290 A change to a transactional approach will arguably cause
287
American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982), § 24 cmt a. 288 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982), § 24 cmt a. 289
See American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982), § 18, where ‘[w]hen a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff … (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof, although he may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment.’ In the context of different facets of a cause of action, see Mallion vs Alcantara (GR 141528, Oct 31, 2006) 2nd Div, where the subsequent institution of a declaration of nullity case due to psychological incapacity is barred by res judicata (bar by prior judgment) when that ground was not pleaded in an earlier decided but dismissed case for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of a marriage license. 290
For instance, in relation to res judicata (conclusiveness of judgment), also called the rule on issue preclusion, it has been stated in American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982), Introductory Note to Title E (Issue Preclusion), Topic 2, Chapter 3, that — ‘There is a close relationship
less reliance on these concepts, since the expansion of the litigable unit will cause all theories of recovery arising out of the same transaction to be litigated in one forum. [124] It will be up to the Supreme Court which has, under the 1987 Constitution the sole
constitutional discretion to entirely repeal or amend rules of procedure, to consider changes in rules of procedure, including rules concerning dependent and independent civil actions. It is respectfully submitted that any changes to the rules on dependent and independent civil actions must consider its relationship with res judicata and litis
pendentia, and the ultimate objectives of placing an end to litigation, avoiding
multiplicity of suits and declogging court dockets.
narrow view of the dimensions of a claim may on occasion have expanded concepts of issue preclusion in order to avoid relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute. Under a transaction approach to the concept of a claim, on the other hand, there is less need to rely on issue preclusion to put an end to the litigation of a particular controversy.’
FUNDS
Atty. Karissa Faye Tolentino Law Lecturer, Silliman University
December 2014
Under the separation of powers, the executive branch of government is understood to have more information about the necessities of projects and programs compared to the legislative branch. The executive branch usually devises and implements such projects and programs. The legislative branch is expected to check the executive’s plans as an agent of the voters.
With this demarcation, do congressmen have any business in identifying what projects the people need? The constitutionality of pork barrel funds had been challenged before the Supreme Court on four occasions and on the first three occasions it favored for the continuance of the pork barrel. A year later, the Supreme Court reversed these three separate rulings.1
Pork Barrel, Defined.
The term "pork barrel" is derived from a practice during pre-Civil War days in the United States when masters would give their black slaves salted pork in barrels. 2
Traditionally, its usage may be traced to the demeaning ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well- fed master.3
The advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel archaic but it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
1
Belgica, et. Al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Ochoa, et. Al., G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013.
2
EARL PARREÑO, The Perils of Pork, http://pcij.org/stories/1998/pork.html, visited October 31 2014. 3
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p. 786.
constituents.4 In the Philippines, the use of the term is common in politics, legally known as "Priority Development Assistance Fund" or PDAF.
Pork Barrel was initially called Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) in the early 1990s before it was renamed Congressional Initiative Allocations (CIA), and finally, PDAF in the early 2000s.
The Supreme Court defines the Pork Barrel System as “the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.”5
Congressional Pork Barrel is defined as “a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power.”6
The Supreme Court's Decisions for the Constitutionality of Pork Barrel.
On four occasions, the constitutionality of pork barrel funds earmarked for local projects of legislators had been challenged before the Supreme Court. On the first three occasions, the Supreme Court had affirmed the role and power of Congress on the use of pork-barrel funds.
In Philconsa vs. Enriques, et. al.,7 the Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa) filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to declare the power given to lawmakers to propose and identify projects to be funded by the P2.98-billion Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) in the 1994 budget as unconstitutional. The Court ruled for the constitutionality of the CDF and said:
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
4
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Philippines,
"Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" p. 2. <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/14th/pork_barrel.pdf> (visited October 31, 2014) 5 Supra, note 1. 6 Id. 7 G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. (Emphasis supplied)
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
In the same vein, the court held that:
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It
is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. (Emphasis supplied)
In Andres Sarmiento et al. vs. the Treasurer of the Philippines et al.,8 seven years after
Philconsa v. Enriquez, petitioners once again assailed the constitutionality of the CDF in the
1996 GAA. The high court reaffirmed its ruling in Philconsa and declared that it found no compelling reason to reverse its previous ruling on the constitutionality of the fund, to wit:
We observe that petitioners merely reiterate their arguments in Philconsa. We thus find no compelling justification to review, much less reverse, this Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the CDF.
Eleven years after, the use of pork was challenged for the third time, by a petition made by the Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) in LAMP et. al. vs. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, et.al. 9 This time, LAMP assailed the legality of the implementation of the PDAF in the 2004 budget. The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of PDAF and dismissed LAMP’s petition due to the lack of convincing proof showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. The court further held that:
8
G.R. No. 125680 & 126313.September 4, 2001. 9
xxx [T]he petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
The Supreme Court's Decision against the Constitutionality of Pork Barrel.
Finally on November 19, 2013, in Belgica, et. al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Ochoa, et.
Al.,10 the Supreme Court en banc reversed the three separate rulings that it had itself issued in 1994, 2001, and 2012, and declared as unconstitutional the use of pork barrel. The court declared all past and present legal provisions on pork as unconstitutional.
The Court resolved, among others, the issue on whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of constitutional provisions on: