Within the context o f the monde ancien com battant, the Stavisky scandal came after two years o f simmering discontent over the monetary sacrifices asked o f the veterans and demands for state reform. At the W agram meeting in October 1933, the UNC adopted a series o f demands and conditions that the association claimed would save France. According to Aubert, the time had come to restore order to France. He offered the collaboration o f the UNC to any group with the same interest.97 The Stavisky affair, the ‘scandal o f scandals’, only confirmed what the UNC
had long believed: France risked death if the decay within government was allowed to continue. The time had com e to ‘return order to the house’ and ‘sweep away the Republique des
camarades. ’98
In spite o f the association’s moralising, Rossignol, president o f the UNC since 1926, was embroiled in Stavisky’s shadowy dealing. Reproached by members o f the leadership for having had contact w ith m en o f questionable moral standing, Rossignol also faced the threatened resignation o f certain sections if he remained in office. 99 He resigned on 3 February. Humbert
Isaac, president o f honour, twice refused the presidency. He suggested that as first vice- president Lebecq should take over. Lebecq, president o f the GRP, agreed to become interim national president until the national congress in May. Under Lebecq, the UNC developed its political action. A fervent propagandist, he spoke at many section general assemblies and meetings. 100
Prost nam es Lebecq as chief instigator o f the U N C ’s 6 February march. Lebecq wanted
‘his’ protest and got his way, contrary to the wishes o f the rest o f the combatant world. 101 It is
true that within the UNC Lebecq represented a right-wing activist tendency. As we will see in chapter three, he favoured a political activism that often entailed collaboration with the extreme right. In a movem ent as large as the UNC, though, a variety o f political loyalties co-existed. Even in the executive committee unanimity was hard to come by. The vote that saw Lebecq
97 H. Aubert, ‘Et d ’abord. . L a Vdc, 7 October 1934.
98 H. Aubert, ‘A la recherche des responsables’, La Vdc, 6 January 1934; H. Aubert, ‘Toute la verite ?’, La Vdc, 20 January 1934.
99 UNC/EC, 3 February 1934.
100 Centre des archives contemporaines, Fonds Moscou (hereafter referred to as FM), 19 9490459: dossier Georges Lebecq.
elected to the presidency o f the association demonstrated the difference o f opinion in the movement and how this could swing between relative opposites.
The U N C ’s first choice o f president was Isaac, a man less inclined to political activism and who rejected co-operation with the extreme right. Isaac was closest to what one may identify as a conservative Republican trend in the movement. In the first round o f voting, he won thirty-three votes, Lebecq won two and three other candidates shared four. In the second vote, after Isaac’s withdrawal Lebecq came out on top with sixteen out o f thirty-nine votes. This meant that for twenty-three members o f the committee, Lebecq was not their first choice o f president. In the final round, Lebecq won twenty-six votes, eight went to other candidates and there were three abstentions. 102 One can see, therefore, that the U N C’s interim president did not
have the unanimous backing o f the executive committee. Furthermore, one wonders how much Lebecq owed his victory to Isaac’s endorsement. As we will see, Lebecq’s appointment as president had consequences for the UNC’s subsequent action.
Originally, the UNC had planned to demonstrate on Sunday 4 February, to demand punishment o f the ‘Stavisky majority’ in the Cham ber. 103 The planned itinerary o f the march
would see the veterans meet at the Clemenceau statue on the Champs Elysees and then move toward the Concorde. Unlike previous public displays, which usually saw the veterans march in the opposite direction to the Unknown Soldier, this demonstration would have a political terminus. 104 The UNC postponed these plans upon a government warning that troublemakers
would hijack the demonstration. On 2 February, Frot, Ducos, minister for pensions, and Chiappe met with Lebecq to persuade him to call o ff the march. 105 Lebecq and Roux-Desbreaux,
secretary general o f the GRP, alleged at the com mission o f enquiry into the riot that earlier that day Ducos attempted to bribe them into calling o ff the march with Legion o f honour rosettes. Ducos denied the allegations. At the later meeting, Chiappe threatened to resign if the march went ahead because he would not send the police against veterans. Lebecq yielded. He informed the national executive committee at a meeting on the morning o f 3 February. Given
102 UNC/EC, 3 February 1934.
103 Notice, ‘Dimanche prochain, 4 fevrier 1934’, La Vdc, 3 February 1934.
104 Le Clere, 6 fevrier, p. 95. During May 1932-January 1934, 20% (6/30) o f manifestations were directed towards the Chamber o f Deputies. See Daniella Tartakowsky, ‘La construction sociale de l ’espace politique: Les usages politiques de la place de la Concorde des annees 1880 a nos jours’, French Historical Studies, 27 (2004), pp. H S US.
105 GRP secretary general A. Roux-Desbreaux, UNC official Camon and directeur o f the municipal police Paul Guichard also attended this meeting.
that Lebecq did not mention the incident with the rosettes in this meeting, it seems unlikely that it was true. N ine o f the twelve members o f the G R P’s executive committee disagreed with the decision to call o ff the protest. 106
Despite the postponement, 150 UNC activists gathered in front o f the statue o f Clemenceau on 4 February at the scheduled meeting time o f 3pm. The crowd, after being informed o f the deal between Lebecq and Chiappe, criticised the leadership for this decision. Cries o f ‘Vive C hiappe!’, ‘A bas le M inistere de l ’lnterieur!’ and ‘Vive Hitler!’ were reportedly overheard by police. Joined by members o f several suburban sections, the group o f 300, under the orders o f Aubert, marched to the Arc de Triomphe, where security forces dispersed the troop. 107
After C hiappe’s removal, the UNC, angry and humiliated by the perceived dupery, condemned Frot’s ‘deception’, which had delivered the former prefect to the ‘vengeance o f the socialist party’. A t a meeting o f the GRP in Courbevoie, Lebecq revived the idea o f a demonstration at the time o f the inauguration o f the government. The veterans in attendance approved. UNC veterans at Chatenay-Malabry voted a similar motion. At 5pm the executive committee o f the GRP fixed the date o f the new demonstration for Tuesday evening. Lebecq
108
neither consulted with the authorities nor the national UNC leadership.
The U N C ’s call to demonstrate, Pourquoi nous manifesterons Mardi, asked all veterans, not just those o f the UNC, to join the march. 109 Goy was confident that the police would not act
against the veterans as they were former comrades themselves. 110 He declared that UNC
members would be ready for the government’s response and would use force if provoked. 111 As
for the other groups present on the night, the decision to convene their activists appears to have come after the U N C ’s decision. Newspapers, tracts and posters carried statements and calls to
112
protests from the AF, the JP, SF, ARAC and about fifteen Parisian municipal councillors.
,06UNC/EC, 3 February 1934.
107 APP, BA 1853: folder manifestations sous le ministere D aladier.
108 Chavardes, 6 fe v rier, p. 163.
109 Le Clere, 6 fevrier, p. 121.
110 Ibid., p. 121.
111 ‘Nous serons ce soir 50, 000 dans la rue declare M. Jean G oy’, L ’Ami dupeuple, 6 February 1934.