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In this section, I defend the second premise of my argument: (2) If rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C- evidence, then faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence and (ii) rational.

The idea behind (2) is that there is rational parity between faith and belief; if belief can be more sensitive to some kinds of evidence than others and nonetheless rational, then it seems as though rational faith can be similarly sensitive to some kinds of evidence more than others.

To further defend and explain (2), I will give four cases of faith that are structurally similar to the lottery, statistical, and non-normic cases in section 6.2. If rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence in these cases, then structurally similar cases of faith can be rational as well. Or so I will argue.

Case 1: Sally knows (let’s say) that 90% of philosophers keep secrets. Sally is considering telling Rebecca, her new philosopher friend, a secret, but since Sally just met her, Sally doesn’t have faith that she is trustworthy. Sally doesn't have faith that Rebecca will keep the secret just based on the statistic about philosophers. Case 1 is structurally similar to the case of naked statistical evidence case. I cannot believe that the Blue Bus Company is guilty simply because they operate 90% of the buses in town, and Sally cannot have faith that Rebecca is trustworthy just because 90% of philosophers keep secrets. However, consider a version of the case on which Sally receives B-evidence that Rebecca is trustworthy, e.g. Sally receives testimony from some of Rebecca’s friends that Rebecca is honest and dependable, or Sally gets to know Rebecca and perceives these virtues in her. Then, Sally can rationally have faith Rebecca will keep the secret. This second version of the case parallels the case where I have testimonial evidence rather than merely statistical evidence that the Blue Bus Company is guilty. The testimony (B-evidence), but not the mere statistic (C-evidence), justifies rational belief and rational faith.

Case 2: John does not have faith that God exists. He reads online about the fine-tuning argument, which purports to show that facts about the physical conditions required for life make theism much more probable than atheism. John finds the argument convincing, and raises his credence that God exists; however, the evidence from the fine-tuning argument does not produce in John faith that God exists.

As in Case 1, Case 2 parallels the cases above in which C-evidence generates a high credence that p but not belief that p. The mere fact that the fine-tuning argument makes theism probable does not justify John’s having faith that God exists. However, suppose John hears his friend Sarah’s testimony. Sarah describes her personal

relationship with God and ways that God has helped her and cared for her. After hearing Sarah’s story, John has faith that God exists. The B-evidence that God exists from Sarah justifies John’s faith that God exists.

Cases 1 and 2 directly parallel the cases of rational belief above, in which I have a high credence in p but do not believe p. However, the distinction between B-evidence and C-evidence also enables the generation of cases with the opposite structure: belief that p is rational, even though I get evidence that (even significantly) lowers my credence that p. For example, you might have an eyewitness testify that the Green Bus Company is guilty, and then learn that the Green Bus Company only operates 10% of the buses in town. Similarly, I might perceive the computer’s red background, and then learn that the background is determined by a random number generator which makes this extremely unlikely. In both cases, the C-evidence against the proposition requires me to lower my credence in p, but I can nonetheless still rationally believe p. These cases are especially interesting when applied to faith, because they are cases in which epistemically rational faith can remain steadfast in light of counterevidence. For example:

Case 3: Billy is happily engaged and will be married soon. He has good evidence that he and his spouse are uniquely sincere and serious. Based on their backgrounds and personalities, he has reason to think that their level of commitment is stronger than that of many other couples. Billy has faith that he and his future spouse will not get divorced. Then, Billy learns that half of all marriages end in divorce. Learning this statistic does not affect his faith that they will not get divorced.

In Case 3, Billy has good B-evidence that he and his spouse won’t get divorced. The statistic (C-evidence) that Billy learns ought to count against this to some degree, and Billy should lower his credence. Nonetheless, it still seems rational for Billy to continue to have faith that he and his spouse will remain committed. Thus, Billy’s faith is rational, even upon his receiving the statistical counterevidence.

Consider a final case:

Case 4: Susan, a Christian, has had many personal experiences of God through prayer and liturgy. She has faith that an all-good God exists (call this proposition G). She reads an article that presents the evidential problem of evil; it uses examples of evil in the world to (purportedly) lower the probability of G. Susan continues to have faith that G despite her new evidence that lowers the probability of G.278

In Case 4, assume that Susan’s religious experiences are evidentially

significant.279 _{Then, Susan has good B-evidence for G. Susan then gets evidence that} lowers the probability of G. Getting this evidence might require Susan to lower her credence in G, but in virtue of the fact that it is C-evidence, it does not flat out establish that the existence of an all-good God is impossible. Since Susan’s religious experiences

278 _{Thanks to an anonymous referee.}

279 _{For a defense of the claim that religious experience can be evidentially significant, see Alston}

are quite evidentially significant, Susan can nonetheless rationally continue to have faith that G.

It is worth noting, however, that while rational faith that p is consistent with C- evidence against p, it isn’t consistent with any amount of C-evidence against p. Presumably, if the C-evidence were significant enough to substantially lower Susan’s credence (say, well below 0.5), continuing to have faith may no longer be rational.280 Uncontroversially, rational faith’s steadfastness will depend on the weight of the

evidence for and against the proposition of faith. However, the point here is that the type

of evidence also matters; rational faith is not a mere matter of probabilistic support.

Rational faith, like rational belief, can remain steadfast in cases where it otherwise would not, if it is supported by good B-evidence and has merely or mainly C-evidence going against it.

Thus, I maintain that if rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C- evidence, then rational faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence as well. The cases that support this thesis about belief can be extended to cases of faith. In the same way that rational belief is not merely a matter of probabilistic support, rational faith is also not merely about probabilistic support.

Another way of putting this point is that the Lockean view of rational belief and rational faith is false. The Lockean Thesis, usually stated as a thesis about belief, claims that S’s belief that p is rational iff it is rational for S to have a sufficiently high credence

280 _{At least, continuing to have propositional faith may no longer be rational. There may be other}

that p.281 _{One could also hold a Lockean view of rational faith, i.e., S’s faith that p is} rational iff it is rational for S to have a sufficiently high credence that p. I have argued that both of these versions of the Lockean Thesis are false. One can have a high credence in p but not have rational faith that p, and rational faith that p is consistent with a rational low credence in p.

We now have a defense of premises (1) and (2), and therefore our first conclusion:

(3) Faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence and (ii) rational.

We can fill out this account as we did with rational belief, with a similar understanding of sensitivity. That is:

(3.1) It is usually irrational to have (or lose) faith that p on the basis of mere C-evidence for p,

and

(3.2) It is usually rational to have faith that p on the basis of (good) B-evidence for p.