After the abolition of the monarchy in Sikkim in 1975, two prominent figures have shaped the trajectory of development and institutionalised few remnants of the monarchy- authoritarian rule and the investment of power in the individual. Between 1979- 2012 there
have been only two, full-term Chief Ministers in the state,172 both of whom have enjoyed absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly during their terms. Whilst promoting a sense of political stability (strikes and lockdowns are unheard of in Sikkim unlike neighbouring Darjeeling or Nepal), it has led to the concentration of power – economic and political- in the hands of a single person and a particular political party. While there is very little political contestation on the basis of political ideology, the 1994 General Elections marks the official endorsement of ethnic politics in Sikkim. However, this is not to assume that ethnicity had not been a factor in elections prior to 1994 and the consolidation of power by the Sikkim Democratic Front, the main challenger to the government led by Nar Bahadur Bhandari.
As discussed in Chapter One, ethnicity has played an important role in the socio- political history of Sikkim where traditionally, the local population had been divided into the land owning and the agriculturist classes which also corresponded to ethnic distinctions. Revenue collection in the kingdom of Sikkim was divided into 104 estates out of which sixty- one were leased out to the Kazis and thikadars who were assigned to pay a fixed sum to the state. These Kazis and thikadars leased out these lands to peasants under different terms. The landlords enjoyed enormous magisterial power relating to civil and criminal matters. The amount of rent to be levied was fixed on ethnic lines and the Nepalis had to pay higher rent than the Lepchas and Bhutias. This system was abolished in 1956 by the Chogyal Tashi Namgyal (Chakrabarti, 2012:92,93). Socio-economic stratification of the society was expressed categorically through land and revenue laws. Nepalis were considered as non- hereditary subjects in comparison to the Bhutias and Lepchas. This resulted from the Revenue Order no.1 of 1897 which is still enforced in Sikkim and prohibits the alienation/transfer of Bhutia-Lepcha land to other communities and gives the Bhutias access over Lepcha land (ibid: 94).
The Sikkim Subjects Regulation Act of 1961 was promulgated to define the criteria for recognition of the subjects of bonafide residents of Sikkim. This was also used to express distinction between the Lepcha-Bhutia and the Nepali communities (the Tsongs/Limboos were initially treated at par with the Bhutia-Lepcha subjects but were later coupled with the Nepalis in 1974). According to Gurung (2011:171), the Regulation was significant not only because it
172 Nar Bahadur Bhandari (1979-1994) and P.K.Chamling (1994-present). However, there were two other
caretaker governments also. B.B Gurung was the Chief Minister for thirteen days in 1984 and Sanchaman Limboo was Chief Minister for six months in 1995 after the downfall of Bhandari.
categorically recognized the Lepchas, Bhutias and the Tsongs as the original inhabitants of Sikkim but this also confirmed the ‘outsider’ status of other groups. Ethnicity has therefore been a crucial (albeit detrimental) in determining the social, economic and political status of the Nepalis in Sikkim.
As discussed in earlier chapters, the Nepali category was composed of not only the different ethnic groups which had migrated to work as agriculturists but also the Limboo/Tsongs and the Magar ethnic groups, whose indigeniety to Sikkim is either obliterated from or at least not often highlighted in the history of Sikkim (Dorjee, 2012: 65).173 In the early
1990s this socio-political dichotomy was complicated further by the gradual splintering of the Nepali group as the Limboos174 and Tamangs became eligible for reservation as Other Backward Classes (OBC) under the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1994. The then government, led by N.B. Bhandari was apprehensive about the recognition of Limboo and Tamang groups as it heralded the disintegration of the Nepali group (Gurung, 2012:77). The denial of this reservation became one of the important bones of contention that helped swing the votes in the 1994 General Elections in favour of his opponent, P.K.Chamling.
Vehemently against the recommendations of the Mandal Commission, Bhandari gained a reputation for evoking communal sentiments. In one of his infamous and therefore memorable speeches, he proclaimed, ‘when a fox is diseased he becomes mad and when a matwali is diseased, he becomes an OBC’ (Chaaya, 1998:13). Seeds of ethnic differentiation were thus sown by Bhandari himself whose public diatribes against different ethnic groups alienated the electorate. Bhandari lost the vote of confidence in the State Assembly in 1994 and the new government comprised all those who had defected to the new party headed by
173 Dorjee (2012:63) points that oral tradition and the inconsistent tradition of recording history has led to the
complete reliance on colonial records for authentic, unbiased sources of history. He suggests a fresh enquiry of the accounts because ‘incomplete and unexplained perceptions of how things continue to influence decisions that impact the social life of communities to this day….While some communities might not have received universal recognition as ‘Sikkimese’, others have begun to believe the stereotypical colonial depictions painted about them.’ This critical stance and interrogation of common identities is especially important especially now when colonial stereotypes regarding race and ethnicity have found more political favour.
174 The Limbus of Nepal call themselves Adivasi/Janajatis and claim indigenous rights over eastern Nepal, in
Sikkim the same ethnic group is spelt as Limboo, considered as one of the indigenous groups of Sikkim and recognised as one of its STs.
Sanchaman Limboo. Immediately in June, 1994 the new government recommended the recognition of seven communities from among the ‘Sikkimese of Nepali origin’ for recognition as OBCs. Consequently Bhujel, Gurung, Limbu Magar, Rai, Sunwar and Tamang were declared as OBCs in Sikkim (Sinha et al, 2005:22). Those groups who were to constitute the OBCs of Sikkim represent the largest electoral population (forty percent) and thus by voting for a member of their ethnic community, they benefitted from being recognized as the OBCs at the state level (see Chakraborty, 2000). After SDF’s victory in the 1994 election, which was so precariously dependent on the votes of those ethnic groups who now belong to the OBC and MBC category, reservation politics was inevitable in Sikkim. This change in political support from Bhandari to Chamling highlights the potency of ethnicity when used as a political resource. However, the potency of this resource was only realized when there was a chance for structural changes (in the form of a new government) and only when there was a real, material benefits attached to it which would then enable the formation of new patronage ties, leading to those material benefits.
However, ethnic politics in Sikkim is neither simple nor straightforward and P.K.Chamling, although the architect of ethnic politics (among other things like hazardous hydroelectric dams and religious tourism) institutionalised ethnicity as a valid political resource, cannot be fully credited for ethnic revivalism and the concomitant politics around it. Although his government has been the catalyst as well as the medium through which ethnic politics has been legitimised, the lure of socio-economic categories and reservations like MBC or OBC also lies in the security that these identities provide to those groups who were either late entrants into Sikkim or their historic presence in Sikkim has not been acknowledged in the state sponsored construction of history.
The pro-democracy movement of 1975 has been framed in Sikkimese political history as the rise of the Nepalis against the minority Bhutia-Lepcha nobility. Not only does this framing ignore other socio-economic causes of the movement (extractive state, exploitation of the agriculturists) as well as political opportunism on the part of other Bhutia-Lepcha elites (see Datta-Ray, 1984) but shifts the blame and the burden entirely on the Nepalis of Sikkim. While there may be many ways of portraying a certain historical event, the social impact of this ‘ethnic rising’ framework has led to a permanent scarring of the Nepali community. It has resulted in them always being on the defensive, fearful and apologetic for the downfall of the monarchy, thereby leading to a perennial sense of insecurity. Also, because migration (most specifically of the non-Mongoloid, caste groups like Bahuns and Chettris into Sikkim took
place much later than compared to other areas (starting in the middle of 19th century), the fear of being labelled as ‘outsiders’ and ‘migrants’ is still a pressing fear heightened by the instances of expulsion of Nepalis living elsewhere. In this situation socio-economic categories like ST, MBC or OBC provides recognition and an alternate identity as Sikkimese, these categories become a praman (proof) of being Sikkimese especially at a time when anti-Sikkimese sentiments are running high, as will be discussed later in the chapter. Thus, while instrumental motives might be the primary driving force behind ethnic politics, transcendental benefits can also play a decisive role in the choice of a particular identity over another.
The presence of the Bhutia-Lepcha community, the history of occupying a lower social position and the strength of a numerical majority have given shape to the Nepali identity in Sikkim thereby highlighting the socially constructed nature of this group. Political change has been one of the biggest precursors of the alteration in the internal dynamics of the Nepalis in Sikkim, owing to which the identity of this group can now be said to be in a flux. Whilst asserting the identity of a Sikkimese-Nepali vis-a-vis the Gorkha identity which is prevalent in neighbouring Darjeeling, the Nepalis in Sikkim are now facing the challenge of defining themselves within Sikkim. This identity flux amongst the Nepalis has also been brought about because of internal pressures that the Nepali ethnic groups in Sikkim were undergoing. A Nepali monthly magazine Chaaya (1998: 12-14) questions the rise of ethnic associations and points at the dominating role of Nepali culture-
‘the Nepali jati in Sikkim has made no effort to preserve and develop the language, culture and tradition of the groups which come under the Nepali group. The circumstances so highlight the fact that the upliftment of the language, culture and tradition of other groups would have a positive impact on the Nepali group as a whole but this has been completely neglected. No effort has been made to promote and preserve ethnic culture of the different communities. Thus, these ethnic groups have been forced (badhya) to take the initiative and form associations. Therefore it is out of necessity that has led the deviation away from a mool/ main group and the assertion of exclusive rights.’ Thus internal, cultural factors can also be seen as a contributing factor that has made different ethnic groups claim (rather re-claim) their culture.
While the hegemony of the Nepali language and Hindu traditions might be one of the factors that have resulted in ethnic politics, it is the policies of affirmative action and the material benefits provided by the state, which is the most important driving force in
determining the political identity of the people as well as electoral outcomes. For example, a comparison of the manifestoes of the SDF and Sikkim Pradesh Congress Committee prior to the 1999 General Elections shows that the primary agenda of the leading parties were reservation of seats for Nepalis, Tsongs and Sherpas in the State Assembly, inclusion of Chettri, Bahuns and Newar in the OBC category, inclusion of various MBC groups in the ST list and protection of Revenue Order No.1.175 This is a clear example of how ethnicity is viewed as a political resource not only by the political parties but also the people themselves because these issues would not have arisen had it not been raised by the people themselves. Thus ethnic politics in Sikkim is a dynamic, two-way process where the people are not mere recipients of the policies and ideologies put forward by the political elites. They are, in effect, active creators of their own ethnic as well as political identity.
However, a purely instrumental approach on the part of the state or of the ethnic groups themselves would be an insufficient justification for identity politics in Sikkim. The state engages in ethnic politics as it leads to a convenient creation of vote banks and is also a method for the equitable distribution of resources. On the other hand, reasons for accepting and supporting ethnic politics by the Sikkimese-Nepali can also range from gaining benefits through reservations to reviving and reliving their ethnic heritage. Thus, a more balanced approach to ethnic politics is required in order to understand it in its entirety.
(ii) Socio-economic grievances, ethnic solutions-factors that necessitate the ethnic approach Highlighting the achievements of ‘Sikkim: Small Wonder’ (India Today, 2009), the article read:
‘The metaphor for change in Sikkim couldn’t have a more telling example than the main street, the Mahatma Gandhi Marg Road in Gangtok. Once a thoroughfare chocked with vehicles and commercial activity, it is today a splendid, tiled promenade where tourists walk around listening to channelled music...Sikkim is being helped by the Government of Singapore on town development and a Swiss University on rural projects. Singapore’s urban nuances and Switzerland’s rustic impetus- these form the core of Sikkim’s vision’ (emphasis mine).
This excerpt not only reflects the truth of the developmental thrust in Sikkim but is also representative of how infrastructural growth in Gangtok and its conversion into a hybrid between Singapore and Switzerland obstructs a critical engagement with the socio-political situation of the state. This description of Sikkim (or rather Gangtok) shields the fact that in Sikkim more than 19.33 percent of the population live below the poverty line176 and 40.91
percent of the population have a monthly income of less than Rs. 5000 (State Socio Economic Census [SSEC], 2006: 18, 20). Given that poverty in Sikkim is highly regionalised (highest in the western district followed by by north, south and finally east) 177 this has a negative impact
on the rural poor. According to the Census of 2001, there are a total of 128, 843 households out of which 109, 955 or 85.3 percent are in rural areas. However it is the capital and other district towns that are the beneficiaries of most of the development as visible through the affluent lifestyle of the residents of Gangtok.
According to the 2006 State Socio-Economic Census conducted by the Department of Economics, Statistics, Monitoring and Evaluation, Government of Sikkim (2006:183) a large section of the population- 16.80 percent- are dependent on cultivation as a means of earning their livelihood.178 Of the total 211, 211 workers in the state, 46.26 per cent are farmers thereby making Sikkim predominantly an agricultural economy. Although the agricultural sector has seen a rise in the total food grain production, since 2000-01 a large proportion of the production of major crops has either fallen or stagnated owing to not only the lower productivity of the
176 The State Socio-Economic Census 2006 has based its definition of categories like poverty line and below
poverty line on a combination of methods like Income Perspective, Expenditure Perspective and Basic Needs Perspective. To measure the socio-economic status of a household, their assets, properties like land, income and household monthly expenditure were taken into account (SSEC, 2006:7).
177 According to the SSEC (2006:21) the highest number of BPL households are in the western district (26.54
percent), south (24.38 percent), north (18.65 percent) and east (13.45) percent.
178 Table 6. Distribution of workers by nature of activity
Activity Number of Persons
Farmer 97714
Agricultural wage labourer 8365
Non-agricultural wage labourer 16851
Regular Salaried State Government 29603
Salaried Private Sector 11459
Business 12538
Self Employed 14934
soil but because of diversification of land use from subsistence to commercial agriculture, horticulture etc (Chakrabarti, 2010: 24; Khawas, 2010: 161).
Thus, decline in the growth of agricultural production (both subsistence and commercial) has had a major impact on livelihoods as well as rural economy. Reminiscing the time when pork was Rs.7/kg, Yogesh Rai of Chumbung,179 west Sikkim immediately
associates inflation with the decline in the agricultural produce in his field. ‘I tell my children these things and they say that I am lying. There was a time when we used to grow so much maize that we could not even carry it but now no matter how much we try, no matter what new technologies we use, it is no good. The amount of maize we grow is only sufficient to feed the hens for a year. Production has decreased but the prices have reached the sky. We grow a little bit of ginger and oranges but if the madhesh ko chacha (uncle from the plains) does not send us food, we might face starvation.’ His father who is almost eighty years old adds in agreement, ‘the land was sufficient for our livelihood, we grew everything we needed on it. The only thing we had to purchase was salt and after eating maize rice for months, eating rice was like a luxury; it was ‘sarkari khana’. Look round us right now, we have nothing. No matter how hard we try the land does not produce half as much as it did before. It is almost as if by magic that we are able to live. All the villagers are going on about their life as if by some magic. When you see us we dress and eat well but only we know what the real situation is. Agriculture has decreased tremendously and if there is a strike in Siliguri then there will be mayhem here. The only respite being that we don’t have to pay our rent.’
Contrasting this situation of agricultural decline is another village in west Sikkim where the majority of the population have diversified their agricultural practice from subsistence to the commercial plantation of cardamom. Kamal Subba180 talks about the prosperity that
cardamom has brought to the village which has encouraged further diversification of land. However, this has increased the dependence on the government fair price shops for the provision of food and other supplies.
179 Agriculturist, interviewed by the author on 12th November, 2010, Chumbung, West Sikkim.
180 Government employee and resident of Hee Gaon, interviewed by the author on 14th November, 2010, West
BPL and APL rice at ‘madhesh ko chacha’s’ shop: price board at a local ration shop in West Sikkim
Bhim Kanchan181 is one of the farmers who has benefitted from the commercial
plantation of cardamom. When asked if he was financially secure, he answered indirectly, ‘I cannot say that there is no money in this village. In some places people are sitting on stacks of money because the price of cardamom has gone up. However even those who do not grow cardamom in this village are doing quite alright....either one or more than one of their family members are working in the public sector.’ This was also confirmed by Sancha Limboo182who says that the economic condition of the people in the village has improved- ‘everybody does play with money’-but he also attributes the expansion of cardamom farming as one of the most