Criticisms of interpretive research centre on two main areas namely, that research results and findings are based on ‘subjective’ accounts and interpretations and secondly, that findings cannot be replicated or generalised. To answer these criticisms Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed alternative criteria for assessing the ‘value’ of qualitative studies that take account of the nature of the research conducted in this paradigm. In this section I use the criteria of trustworthiness and authenticity to address ‘the value’ of my study.
In the preceding sections I gave details of my methods of data collection and analysis. The purpose of providing such details was to establish trustworthiness in the data that I collected and analysed, and confidence in the findings and conclusions that I drew as a result. I did this by a variety of means, embedded to a large extent in the traditions of a naturalistic inquiry. In addressing the trustworthiness of my research I refer also to the notions of credibility, dependability, confirmability and transfer (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
I kept detailed records of my data collection, in manual and electronic format, which are accessible for inspection, for example, in order to ‘verify’ quotations that I have used to support interpretations. For reporting on my data analysis I recalled my methods and procedures based on the principles of a grounded approach, and the use of theory as an analytical tool in furthering analysis. I reported on working closely with my supervisor and the lecturer of linear algebra. This included sharing ideas and interpretations with the lecturer as they emerged in research and making all records available to the lecturer. I reported on some of the issues that arose in data collection and analysis, including ethical issues and issues arising in interpretations. By providing such details in my thesis I aim to increase confidence in the methods and procedures that I used, and ultimately credibility in the findings and conclusions that I present in later chapters.
I used triangulation to increase confidence in the interpretations that I have made. I drew on the description by Denzin (1978) who listed four different modes of triangulation
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(Denzin, 1978, cited in Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 305) all of which applied in my study and for which I give details: triangulation of sources, of methods, of investigators and of theories.
In the analysis chapters that follow I report on (and quote from) the different sources that I used for making interpretations. These include the research data such as the meetings data, lecture observations and the student interview data, as well as the linear algebra course notes and (other) published linear algebra textbooks, for example. I report on how I related comments made in one format to data held in an alternative format, all aimed at justifying interpretations. I combined the methods of grounded theory analysis with applying the theoretical constructs of an established theoretical framework (Activity Theory) to code, categorise and model, what I refer to as the ‘teaching process’. The aim of these methods was to increase confidence in the interpretations that I made, and ultimately credibility in the findings and conclusions.
Throughout the research process I provided the lecturer with ongoing feedback in respect of my analysis and interpretations. The lecturer took part in seminar presentations and co-authored papers. In addition, towards the end of the research, I approached three lecturers of mathematics, colleagues of the lecturer who participated in the research, to check sections of the thesis (parts of the second analysis chapter) for mathematical accuracy. This related to the mathematical formulations (of a definition or theorem in linear algebra) that I either reproduced or created, and to the mathematical discussion of the topics that I offered in that chapter. This chapter was made available also to the lecturer in my study. Thus I deliberately involved the lecturer and members of the de- partment to which the lecturer belonged in my analysis and interpretation. It provided the lecturer as well as individuals not connected with the research with an opportunity to comment, to highlight inaccuracies and to offer alternative interpretations. Proceed- ing in this way and providing the lecturer with ongoing feedback as mentioned above represented a case of member checking (Bryman (2004) refers to respondent or member validation) aimed at confirming the interpretations and results that I offer and at increasing credibility in findings and conclusions.
One criticism that is frequently raised in connection with a case study in particular, and a qualitative study in general, centres on the question of how results can be generalised or replicated. In general, within an interpretive paradigm, a case study cannot be replicated since the context of the study is implicated in the outcomes of the study. Repeating the study would inevitably involve different contexts and lead to different outcomes. This is not to say that findings from case studies cannot be transferred to other situations or contexts. But transferability depends on the individual case to which it is to be applied. The possibility for transferability is increased by providing a rich and detailed
description of the research which could allow others to make a judgement as to whether a transfer is possible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Thus transferability has to be addressed, and assessed uniquely in each case, and by the person who seeks to make the transfer.
The criteria of confidence in the methods and procedures, the criteria of confidence in the interpretations made as well as their confirmability through the method of mem- ber checking, and the criteria of transferability of findings were all aimed at increasing credibility in the findings and conclusions that I offer in Chapter 8.
In summary, in this chapter I discussed the methodological perspectives underpinning my study and gave details of my methods of data collection and data analysis. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, I discuss my theoretical perspectives in activity theory. In Chapter 5 I report on my analysis of the interviews with the lecturer (the meetings data). I draw on my theoretical framework and give concrete meaning to activity theoretical concepts and terminology in terms of an educational setting.
Chapter 4
Theoretical perspectives
In the last chapter I gave details of how my research developed and how my method- ological and theoretical perspectives became intertwined in data analysis. Working in an interpretive paradigm carried with it certain assumptions in respect of the origin and nature of knowledge. These assumptions are shared also in the theoretical framework that frames my study.
Activity theory presupposes that knowledge is social in origin and produced in social interactions. This echoes the assumptions of my methodological choice within an in- terpretive paradigm. Hence activity theory, as one of the socio-cultural theories of the mind, is an appropriate theoretical perspective for my study and fits well with the aims, methods and nature of my research.
Activity theory is rooted in the work of Vygotsky. I cannot adequately describe activity theory without acknowledging the founding contribution that Vygotsky made to the development of activity theory. Hence, before I discuss activity theory I elaborate on those elements of Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory of the mind that contributed to the development of activity theory.
Since Leontiev’s formulation of activity theory there has been an ‘explosion’ of (third generation) activity theoretical points of view. While acknowledging that these exist, I propose to go back to the roots of both a socio-cultural theory of the mind (Vygotsky’s founding contribution to activity theory) and Leontiev’s (second generation) work on activity theory as theoretical foundation for my study.
4.1
Vygotskian perspectives as a foundation for activity
theory
Wertsch (1991) points to three themes that run through Vygotsky’s writing and that provided the basis for Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory of the mind. (1) Vygotsky em- phasised a genetic, or developmental analysis of the mind. He claimed that (2) all higher mental functioning is social in origin, and that (3) all human actions are mediated by tools and signs (see also Daniels, 2008; Wertsch and Stone, 1985). I discuss each aspect in turn but note that none of the three themes is more important than the other two and that all three are in fact interlinked and presuppose each other.
Vygotsky focussed on an analysis of the development (or genesis) of the human mind. That is, Vygotsky shifted his attention from studying the mind as an object to studying the processes through which the human mind developed, that is how the individual came to acquire knowledge of the world. Second, Vygotsky proposed that the origin of all human mental functioning lay in the social life of the individual. This is most clearly expressed in Vygotsky’s “general genetic law of cultural development” which states:
Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of volition . . . [I]t goes without saying that internalization transforms the process itself and changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations among people genetically underlie all higher functions and their relationships. (Vygotsky, 1981a, p. 163)
The developmental aspect is related to the origin of cultural development and the for- mation of higher mental functions. The social origin of higher mental functioning is related to the expression “first appearing on the social plane” and “between people”, and the notion of mediation to “between people as an interpsychological category”.
Vygotsky studied mental development as the result of an individual’s (deliberate or conscious) interactions in the social domain. He defined mental development that was the result of conscious interaction as cultural development. Cultural development referred to more than the kind of development that occurred naturally or spontaneously in an individual’s everyday lived-in experience. Vygotsky also related cultural development
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to higher mental functions and the acquisition of scientific concepts. In contrast, the lower or elementary functions were related to the acquisition of spontaneous or everyday concepts. Cole (1978) explained the difference in terms of a Vygoskian perspective and Kozulin (1986) in terms of an activity theory perspective as follows.
Cole wrote that Vygotsky made the distinction between “elementary functions, involun- tarily applied, and higher functions that incorporate planning elements in a deliberate manner” (Cole, 1978, p. xvii). In terms of activity theory, everyday concepts are the result of the individual engaged in spontaneous activity while scientific concepts are the result of an individual engaged in more structured and deliberate activity (Kozulin, 1986). This led Kozulin to refer to purposeful activity (Kozulin, 1986), and Wertsch, in interpreting Vygotsky, to goal-directed action in place of purposeful activity (see Wertsch, 1991).
The notion of cultural development on the inter psychological plane places emphasis on the social element of development and on mediation. Mediation is a key concept in Vygosky’s socio-cultural theory. Vygotsky proposed mediational means as the inter- mediate link between subject and object expressed in Vygotsky’s (famous) mediational triangle. Mediation includes the use of tools. For Vygotsky, sign systems and language, in particular, were the main mediational means. He listed as examples of sign systems,
language; various systems for counting; mnemonic techniques; algebraic sym- bol systems; works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams maps and mechanical drawings; all sorts of conventional signs; etc. (Vygotsky, 1981b, p. 137).
Vygostky referred to these as psychological tools. Psychological tools are part of cultural heritage. They are artificial and designed in order to affect a change in mental states. As Wertsch wrote, “mediational means were created with the express intent of shaping individual action” (Wertsch, 1991, p. 33). While language, signs and symbols are psychological tools, material tools, on the other hand, have physical form and are designed to affect a (physical) change in the object. As an example from my own research, computers and textbooks are material tools. Language as a psychological tool has a special status. Language “serves not only as a means of social interaction but also as a carrier of the socially elaborated meanings that are embedded therein” (Leontiev, 1981, p. 56). Vygotsky himself referred to language as “the tool of tools”. As an example from my own research, mathematical notation, and the formulation of a mathematical problem are psychological tools.
Mediation of elementary functions through the use of psychological tools leads to the development of the higher mental functions. The higher mental functions develop out of
mediated actions on the social plane. Wertsch (1991) wrote that “a defining property of higher mental functioning, . . . is the fact that it is mediated by tools and by sign systems such as natural language” (ibid, p. 21). Internalisation refers to the (gradual) transfor- mation of the interpersonal processes into intrapersonal processes, from the social plane to the individual, internal plane (Vygotsky, 1978).
While Vygotsky focussed on the role of interaction in the development of individual mental processes, in activity theory, the individual is included in activity and an integral part of it. Minick (1997) referred to “socially organized goal-oriented actions” (Minick, 1997, p. 117). In activity theory, activity mediates cultural development. Human activity presupposes the existence of tools in activity. Thus activity includes the use of both material and psychological tools in social interactions. As Kozulin (1998) noted, psychological tools “transform the unmediated interaction of the human being with the world into mediated interaction” (ibid, p. 4).