when studying primitive peoples' religion as systems of beliefs, erroneous and illusory
as some may consider them (1952b: 153). He argues that we are to deal with 'the social
functions of religion', that is, as these contribute to '...the formation and maintenance of
a social order' (1952b: 154). He is also intent on studying religion from the point of view
that its social function '...is independent of its truth or falsity' (1952b: 154).Therefore,
rather than considering beliefs, the understanding of religion should begin with the ritual
actions, which are '...symbolic expressions of sentiments' (1952b: 155). In support of
this view Radcliffe-Brown invokes Robertson-Smith who saw that the key to the study
formulae (1952b: 156). Rites are represented by Radcliffe-Brown as having a ’...specific social function when, and to the extent that, they have for their effect to regulate, maintain and transmit from one generation to another sentiments on which the constitution of the society depends' (1952b: 157). These views resemble aspects of Durkheim's theory, but Radcliffe-Brown promotes a more physical appraisal of social reality. Dürkheim also, through his notion of morality, is very much aware o f the need to consider the nature of the relationship between individuals and collective representations. Rites may have the power to transmit tradition, but it is not an automatic, ex operato, function.
Evans-Pritchard is not altogether just in his dismissal of Radcliffe-Brown's views on religion and totemism in particular, for being utilitarian, since the latter does acknowledge dependence on a spiritual power (1952b: 157). That there is a degree of ambiguity about his perspective in that respect emerges when we consider Durkheim's ideas about the place of ritual in religion. Dürkheim argues th a t'.. .which makes a man is the totality of the intellectual property which constitutes civilisation, and civilisation is the work o f society' (1915:418). In this he sees the explanation for '...th e preponderating role of the cult in all religions, whichever they may be' (1915:418). The reason for this runs along very similar lines to the view put forward by Radcliffe-Brown, namely
'...because society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common. It is by common action that it takes consciousness of itself and realises its position; it is before all else an active co-operation' (1915:418).
The difference on this point between Dürkheim and Radcliffe-Brown is that the former strongly emphasises the notion of consciousness on the part of individuals and society. Radcliffe-Brown does not give it the same weighting. Dürkheim concludes th a t'. . .it is in action which dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is society which is its source' (1915:418). Underlying Evans-Pritchard's exploration of the Islamic belief and practice is an unease with this position. Dürkheim does not really pursue the nature of the action involved, nor in the end succeed in doing any more than postulating society as its source.
Dürkheim considers the question of the real and the ideal society. Real society has many im perfections, injustice, and justice, evil and good, among many related
supreme, is the goal towards which all religions strive (1915:420). Dürkheim argues that this society 'is not an empirical fact', but is an idea which expresses human aspirations for the 'good, the beautiful and the ideal' (1915:420). Nonetheless, the ideal may be explained only in terms of the real, so that it is '...n o t an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life' (1915:422). Dürkheim asserts on this basis that
'A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal' (1915:422).
In this way the ideal is part of the real society, because society is made up primarily of the '...id e a which it forms of itself, and secondarily of the '...m ass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things which they use and the movements which they perform ...' (1915:422.).
D urkheim 's argum ent contains two other elem ents which have bearing on Evans-Pritchard's analysis. First of all, he states that conflicts take place between ideals, and not between the ideal and the reality (1915:423), between that '...w hich has the authority of tradition and that which has the hope of the future' (1915:423). This is the perennial tension between institutional authority and prophetic freedom. The second point returns to an earlier part of the discussion :
'But facts and rites.. .the cult, are not the whole religion. This is not merely a system of practices, but also a system of ideas whose object is to explain the world; we have seen that the hum blest have their cosm ology' (1915:428).
There are tensions between Durkheim's view of the relationship of symbols to collective representations, real and ideal perspectives o f society, and that of rituals to a religious world-view which arise from the uncertainty caused by his shifting ground in his argument. Evans-Pritchard exploits the ambiguity implicit in these ideas in much the same way as was noted in the discussion of his use of The Rules o f Sociological Method.
The concept of religion as a system of ideas, a belief system comprising many collective representations, is applied to Islam in a number of ways by Evans-Pritchard. For example, an Islamic Order is known as a tariqa in Arabic, a road, a path, a way (1949a:3). There are various paths counselled, differing according to whether reason or