In the 1950s, linguistic nationalism became the basis for political mobilization, affecting both Sinhala and Tamil communities. Also, the other policies and associated discontent placed pressures on the state leading to the further increase of nationalism. As a result, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike formed the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) and secured a comprehensive victory in the 1956 general elections.121 Prime Minister
Bandaranaike promoted the concept of neutralism, staying away from the Cold War power blocs. Accordingly, it cancelled the Defense Agreement with the British in 1957
119 Disfranchisement reduced the Indian Tamils’ seats in the House from seven to none and Sinhalese representatives secured those seven seats since the 1952 elections. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 35; De Silva notes that Citizenship acts reduced the fear of Kandyn Sinhalese on electoral power of left-wing. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 155, 223.
120 Bandarage notes that Ponnambalam, the leader of the CTC, accused Chelvanayakam of attempting to foist on Tamil people and mislead the people because Arasu means an entity with absolute attributes of sovereignty. Also notes that ITAK’s demand for federal political structure and regional autonomy for Tamils is a quest for Tamil separatism. Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), 38, 39.
121 The MEP was a coalition of the SLFP, Marxist LSSP, and pro-Sinhalese Bhasa Peramuna. Marxist LSSP also changed its stance from language parity to Sinhala only. Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 42.
and took over the control of military bases in Sri Lanka; this changed the focus of the military from external roles and missions to internal security concerns. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake posits that politicization and ethnicization of the military occurred after the taking over of the bases.122
Meanwhile, the MEP enacted the Official Language Act in June 1956, making Sinhalese the official language; implementation of the Act, however, stretched over a period of five years until December 1960. In response, the FP organized Satyagraha (work stoppage) to oppose the Language Act, creating ethnic tensions that led to the Sinhalese and Tamil conflicts. The ethnic clashes affected civil and political society and rule of law, setting the background for the FP to promote its federalist ideology.
The FP’s quest for federal provisions shaped the competition between the UNP and the SLFP. In August 1956, the FP held a convention and set out a list of Tamil demands, including a federal constitution giving autonomy to the Northern and Eastern Provinces.123 Prime Minister Bandaranaike entered a pact with the FP that provided for
the devolution of power down to the district council. The pact also had the provision to allow both Sinhala and Tamil language administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The UNP and Sinhalese nationalist groups opposed the Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact, compelling the government to abandon it after violent riots in May and June 1958. The GoSL deployed the military to curb violence in addition to the police. Federalism versus the unitary structure of the state became the basis for conflict between the UNP and the SLFP, and the FP.
The nationalist and federalist ideologies continued to shape the power politics in the 1960s. The new government under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike continued the policies of the nationalization program and Sinhalization of the state. In 1961, the government enacted the “Sinhala Only Act” of 1956. The FP protested the Act through large-scale civil disobedience; in response, the government imposed a state of emergency in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in April 1961 and deployed the military to curb the
122 Senanayake, “Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence,” 300. 123 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,181–82.
protests. The deployment of the military to counter civil disobedience affected the rule of law, and civil and political societies. The military was displeased at its frequent deployment to solve internal political problems. It resulted in the abortive military coup in 1962, which will be discussed later in the chapter. In response, the government reduced the development of the military and commenced to increase the Sinhalese composition in the military.124 Despite the SLFP’s favor to the majority constituency of
the country, the UNP won the 1965 general elections.125 The competition between the
UNP and the SLFP, and the FP’s quest for federalism through electoral institutions, was a sign of political plurality.
The FP’s federalist ideology and nationalism continued to shape politics. Amidst rising nationalism, the UNP government faced severe constraints in maintaining power. In 1965, the government also faced the threat of a suspected military coup; this led the government to reduce defense budget. The divisions within the government and pressure created by the opposition parties and Buddhist activists compelled Senanayake to abandon the Regional Council Bill.126 In 1968, the SLFP and its Marxist allies, the LSSP
and CP, formed a Samagi Peramuna (UF) to compete with the UNP and won the 1970 general elections.127 The UF’s Common Program undermined the Tamil minority’s
demands, though it did address the grievances of the majority of the people through electoral institutions, which was important for democratic consolidation. The UF’s Common Program resulted in negative and positive effects toward democratization.
124 The ethnic composition of the Ceylon Light Infantry in 1960 was Sinhalese 44 percent, Tamil 32 percent, Burgher 8 percent, Muslim 12 percent, and unknown 4 percent. Donald L. Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 69.
125 Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 134.
126 The SLFP-LSSP coalition in 1964 had promised the FP to implement the district councils; together with its Marxist allies, however it formed the opposition to the bill when proposed by the UNP. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 190, 192.
127 The Common Program included the nationalization of private enterprise, restoration of the rice subsidy, provision of 750,000 jobs inclusive of 15,000 graduates, according Buddhism its “right place” while assuring other religions their “due rights,” non-alignment, and most importantly the establishment of a republic. Wilson states that the SLFP had moved further left from left-of-center with the common program. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 147, 148.
The Common Program was politically successful but economically unsuccessful. As per the Common Program, the UF government initiated the mechanism to become a republic, which was a significant step toward democratic consolidation.128 On the
economic side, the failure to nationalize the foreign commercial banks compelled the government to impose additional levies on some social services.129 Also, the government
introduced a standardization system to deflect the charges of Tamil favoritism and provide a politically acceptable ratio of Sinhala and Tamil students’ entry into medicine, engineering and science faculties. Tamil politicians opposed the standardization mechanism because it reduced the benefits enjoyed by the Tamils during the colonial rule. Meanwhile, growing tensions among the Sinhalese youth on the state’s slow progress in addressing such social and economic issues provided the opportunity to the JVP for mobilizing educated Sinhala Buddhist youth for an insurrection in 1971.130