O BTENCIÓN DE MIOTUBOS DE TRUCHA ARCOÍRIS

On the 31st of August 1957, independence was declared in British Malaya and the new country of Malaysia was born. For the present day reader the history of Malaysia often appears centred on one man, Dr Mahathir. Opinion of Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister varies from ego-maniacal dictator to impassioned father of ideals but that his influence can be felt throughout the nation is without question.

From emerging independence to Dr Mahathir

The quest for nationhood in Malaysia was fraught with difficulty and arguably the struggle for genuine independence is still unresolved. From the signing of the Pangkor Treaty in 1874 which brought the Malay states under British protection there were ‘sporadic, unorganised and uncoordinated’ armed resistances to colonial rule.38

These uprisings were generally led by Malay Chiefs ‘disgruntled by their loss of power, prestige and privileges’ but also represented local population resistance.39

Yet it was British rule that acted as a catalyst for the evolution of Malay nationalism. Prior to World War II, British Malaya was ‘more of a geographical than a political entity’ with society traditionally revolving around ‘the Sultan, the state and, more narrowly, the clan.’40

It was the transformation of the economy under the British with

38

There had been resistance to both the Portuguese and Dutch but previous Europeans had been pre-colonial merchants. Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya (Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, Selangor, 2007) p.p.11-36

39

Ahmad, Zakaria Haji (ed.) Government and Politics [1940-2006] (Archipelagio Press, Singapore, 2006) p.14

40

the huge inflows of Chinese and Indian immigrants41 and the mass education system raising the consciousness of problems affecting the community as a whole for Malays (who the British attempted to confine to padi planting.42) that saw the development of early nationalism which can be viewed as the search for a solution to Malay society’s economic short-comings.43

The 1929 depression in the West saw the value of tin and rubber plummet, thousands lost their jobs and many were repatriated back to China and India. However, some Chinese ‘applied for land to grow padi during this period and it was out of political considerations that the British turned down their request. The British opinion was that padi was a Malay preserve and allowing non-Malays into this area would alienate Malay support for the British.’ Arguably, had the Chinese been permitted to grow padi, Malaysia would have ‘a multi-racial peasantry sector’ now.44

The Chinese instead prospered through playing a variety of other economic roles. The British were interested in large-scale capital investment that could produce profits for their shareholders back home and in developing markets for their manufactured goods. This left a host of economic activities that the Malays were either unwilling or unable to undertake. Small-scale enterprises, such as trucking firms, ice factories, coastal shipping, buses, food processing, pawn shops, entertainment centres and rice milling, were taken over and eventually dominated by Chinese immigrants.

The Malays were also subject to a variety of economic limitations such as not being permitted to cultivate rubber. Such limitations were largely out of British fear for shortages of food crops but also supported the “Lazy Malay” myth.45 The Selangor

Annual Report of 1902 includes the following statement from the British resident, ‘It

is a matter of history that it is a superhuman task to persuade a Malay to take up with interest work to which his personal inclination does not take him’. Baker states that

41 _{‘The Indian immigrant labourers were recruited by the British to clear the jungles and build roads.} The Chinese worked in and opened tin mines.’ Later Indian labourers were recruited to work the British rubber estates.Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.p.74 and 75

42

Ibid, p.p.79-82 43

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.16 44

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.p.84 and 90-92

45 _{Husin Ali argues that race is a myth and ‘constructed and manipulated by human beings} themselves, often by small minorities greedy for wealth and power’ Husin Ali, Ethnic Relations in

Malaysia – Harmony and Conflict, p.156 Arguably this was the case for the British colonists as they

‘once the Chinese gained control of a particular service, skill or market, they were not about to give up easily’ and cites some of Winstedt’s examples. For instance, ‘A Malay once tried to deal in rice in a state that was predominantly Malay, but the only motor transport system was owned by a Chinese firm, which gave the Chinese rice dealers cheap rates until the Malay interloper was driven out.’46

One cannot help but wonder whether the lazy Malay myth was borne from the British restrictions and Chinese monopolies and these made it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Japanese occupation (1940-1945) arguably increased animosity between Chinese and Malay ethnic groups through discrimination against the Chinese who ultimately started viewing the Malays as ‘instruments of the Japanese occupiers’ since they ‘dominated the bureaucracy and served in the defence forces that attacked the Chinese-dominated resistance movement.’ It is interesting to note that it was the Second World War that saw migrant workers move from a position of transience to organizing themselves and seeking political representation. Prior to this the migrant workers experienced limited patriotism for Malaya. British re-occupation (the British Military Administration or BMA) came 25 days after Japanese surrender during which time groups such as the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) made bids for power.47 Musimgrafik alleges that the MPAJA (many of whom were Malayan Communist Party or MCP cadres) had been represented by all three races and their guerrilla tactics against the Japanese had gained British approval with members being decorated after the war. And that the MCP did not oppose British reoccupation and discontinued the armed struggle in favour of open organizations. Musimgrafik explains the failure of the BMA as being due to its dictatorial and corrupt nature, nicknamed the ‘Black Market Administration.’ In 1945 the MPAJA was disbanded and new leaderships emerged as a reaction to the BMA.48 Whether or not the British faced opposing bids for power, for now at least, they were back in charge.

The Malayan Union replaced the BMA within a few months and merged the nine federated and unfederated Malay states together, effectively abolishing state

46

Baker, Crossroads, p.p.173, 168, 184-185 and 190 47

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.p. 24, 18, 28 48

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.p.111, 114-116, 119 and

sovereignty. As the implications of this were realized, the scheme began to be condemned and ‘many Malays were jolted into political activity and ethnic awareness and began to feel a heightened sense of nationalism.’ Sir Edward Gent, governor of the Malayan Union elected to work with the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) whose priority was for the British to ‘consider their views and revise the constitutional structure.’ UMNO was considered a safer option than the MCP or Parti Kebangsaan Melayu (Malay Nationalist Party) which wanted an end to British rule. The Malayan Union was replaced with ‘a working committee representing UMNO, the Malay Rulers and the colonial administration’ which set to work on creating a new federal structure.49 What Ahmad et al. describe as a working committee, Musimgrafik labels a conspiracy.50

The exclusion of other organizations during the drafting encouraged fears for the perpetuation of colonialism and the first draft (approved in December 1946) confirmed doubts. The All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA), a coalition of the non-Malay opposition parties was formed and later joined the Malay Nationalist Party to form the PUTERA-AMCJA. The PUTERA-AMCJA drafted an alternative constitution (‘The People’s Constitutional Proposals’) and when the British showed no interest in accommodating their views, the initial protest meetings, demonstrations and mass rallies escalated into a nationwide hartal (the complete stoppage of economic activity) on the 20th of October 1947. The hartal ultimately worked against the PUTERA-AMCJA since membership suggested to the British that it was under communist influence and therefore ‘a subversive act and a challenge to its power and authority, rather than a legitimate demonstration of opposition to the federation.’ On the 1st

of February 1948 the Federation of Malaya was inaugurated.51 The development of what was labelled ‘The Emergency’ can be seen as the MCP taking advantage of the discontent with the Federation of Malaya which laid the foundations for their development from ‘peaceful agitators’ to perpetuators of the guerrilla warfare that broke out on 16 June 1948. A state of emergency was called and the MCP moved into the jungle where they found support amongst the Chinese

49

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.p.30-31 50

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.134

51

but not the Malays. The British viewed the situation yet again as being criminal rather than political and sought to eradicate the guerrillas.52 This suggests that it was the wish of the MCP to become violent. Musimgrafik suggests that ‘experience proved that Colonial rule cannot be shaken by peaceful and open political struggle. In fact the British colonialist had always used violence to crush popular resistance.’53

This development of what was arguably a civil war54 crossed many boundaries of acceptable behaviour. Ahmad et al defend British action as being due to a lack of local knowledge when the entire Chinese community came under suspicion and their killing and destruction of their homes ensued (action which drove many to support the MCP).55 However, Musimgrafik draws attention to Emergency regulations such as consorting with guerrillas being punishable by death.56 This in an environment where the law was instantly upheld! Such action is difficult to defend on the grounds of lack of knowledge and instead suggests a desire to maintain power at any cost. ‘New villages’ were set up where Chinese squatters living on the fringes of the jungle57 were relocated to and ‘given land and homes’ which ‘Home Guard brigades comprising locals and the police were set up to protect.’ These settlements were surrounded by barbed wire58 and Musimgrafik doesn’t mince his words when referring to them as ‘concentration camps.’59

This no doubt an extreme view since the new villages provided clean water, schools, community centres and basic medical care60 which created jealousy in the Malays living without those services and created mistrustful resentment about the money being spent on potential enemies.61 The situation reached a stalemate as MCP attacks could not be sustained and the government could not eradicate them. The Briggs Plan aimed at a ‘hearts and minds’ approach aimed at isolating the guerrillas from their support network as the

52

Ibid, p.p. 36-37 53

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.140

54

Baker and Musimgrafik both attribute the naming of the war as The Emergency as being economic in order for businessmen to collect on insurance for property damage. Baker, Crossroads, p.240 and Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.144

55

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.p. 36-37 56

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.146 57

It is worth noting that these subsistence farmers living on the fringes of the jungle were forced there when the Great Depression saw demand for rubber and tin fall. Had the British not depended on only two commodities then this group of people would not have been living there. Baker, Crossroads, p.183

58

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.39 59

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.152 60

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006], p.39 61

grievances of Malayans were finally addressed. It was an extreme and harsh approach that has two different interpreted endings. For Ahmad et al, the plan coincided with the MCPs decision to downgrade their offensive activity and as legitimate political parties began to grow, the MCP became increasingly irrelevant. The MCP sought to leave the jungle and become a legitimate party but its demands were not met and the Baling talks broke down. The MCP was totally isolated by the time independence was announced and by 1960 the Emergency officially ended.62 For Musimgrafik, ‘the British had to admit that “Police and barbed-wire cannot hold back communism” and that it would be suicidal to retain direct rule over Malaya’ thus the British eased into a new political strategy that he labels neo-colonialism where ‘75% of all rubber plantation acreage were owned by Europeans (mostly British), along with 61% of all tin production and 75% of all services and trade.’63

As late as 1970, 60.7 percent of the shares of limited companies were still owned by foreigners.64

As stated above the Malayan Union was replaced with a working committee representing UMNO, the Malay Rulers and the colonial administration. This committee developed the Federation of Malaya which was inaugurated in February 1948. UMNO was now the dominant political force and was led by Dato’ Onn bin Jafaar. Onn’s downfall has been attributed to his liberal attitude to racial matters.65

Onn was replaced by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj who led UMNO into Malaysia’s first elections.

The holding of municipal elections before national-level elections was fortuitous. Since the majority of Malaya’s urban residents were Chinese and Indians, UMNO was forced to seek cooperation with other groups in order to win. Equally fortuitously, at the time of the first local government elections, these new allies faced no other race-based parties. Their main rivals were ideologically based non-communal parties such as the Radical Party and the Labour Party of Penang (both of which contested the George Town Municipal Council in December 1951) and the Independence of Malaya Party, which

62

Ahmad, Government and Politics [1940-2006] p.p.38-39

63

Musimgrafik, Where Monsoons Meet – A People’s History of Malaya, p.p.161, 172 and 171 64

Tan Teong Jin, Ho Wah Foon and Tan Joo Lan, The Chinese Malaysian Contribution (Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 2005) p.57

65

was the UMNO-MCA’s main rival in the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council elections in February 1952. The absence of other ethnically based parties contesting these elections was crucial to the decision by UMNO and MCA leaders to cooperate instead of competing with each other.’

This informal electoral pact was institutionalised with the formation of the Alliance coalition in 1953. Puthucheary explains that ‘controversial issues that could have split the coalition were put aside’ because ‘the focus was upon gaining freedom from colonial rule.’66 _{Shamshul acknowledges that ‘in the longitudinal historic sense,}

Mahathir definitely occupies a special position in Malaysia's post-colonial history’ but points out that ‘he is far from being the only one to fit that revered position in Malaysia's history’ and that ‘there are a number of such personalities, each contributing to the layering of the country's foundation as well as the shaping of Malaysia into what it is today.’67

Tunku was Malaysia’s first Prime Minister (1957-1970). Ye says of him that he was ‘the leader the Malays needed at that particular juncture of Malaysian history.’68

Mission 2020 – The Final Stretch, a publication by Limkokwing University of Creative

Technology argues that he ‘faced a daunting task of uniting a diverse population of multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious background’ but that ‘his personal charisma rallied a nation to join forces with him and build a nation that all Malaysians could be proud of’ and that ‘his tenure of 13 years laid a solid foundation of political stability that has lasted for half a century.’69

The most noteworthy event under Tunku’s leadership was the 1969 elections. In the mid-1960s a number of municipal and town council elections had brought opposition parties to local power. This challenged the credibility of the Alliance’s claim that non-Malay opposition parties could participate only through its unequal power-sharing formula. The government’s response was to suspend and then abolish local government elections in order to protect itself against the perceived threat to its survival. ‘This move further

66 _{Puthucheary, Mavis C, ‘Malaysia’s “Social Contract” – The Invention and Historical evolution of an} Idea’ in Othman, Norani, Puthucheary, Mavis C. And Kessler, Clive S., Sharing the Nation – Faith,

Difference, Power and the State 50 years after Merdeka (Strategic Information and Research

Development Centre, Petaling Jaya, 2008) p.p.6 and 7

67 _{Shamshul A.B., ’Foreword’ in Ooi, Kee Beng, Era of Transition – Malaysia after Mahathir} (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006) p.p.xii-xiii

68

Ye Lin-Sheng, The Chinese Dilemma (Kingsford, East West Publishing Pty Ltd, 2008) p.19 69

Limkokwing University of Creative Technology, Mission 2020 – The Final Stretch (Limkokwing

exacerbated tensions. Unable to compete in local government elections, opposition parties mobilised support for elections at the state and national levels.’ As a result, despite the Alliance returning to power in 1969, defeats had occurred in some states and heavy seat loss in others. After inter-ethnic rioting broke out in Kuala Lumpur, UMNO reviewed the situation and ‘a new “realism” was arrived at. The multi-ethnic coalition would continue to exist in form, but UNMO political dominance within it would be secured through a number of specific actions.’ The first action was that ‘the electoral process would be managed, even manipulated, to effectively reduce the number of Chinese-majority seats in the national and state legislatures.’

This was done by creating large constituencies in the urban (Chinese) areas, and smaller rural (Malay) constituencies. Seats were allocated among the component coalition parties according to ethnic composition of the individual constituencies (not on the basis of the ethnic composition of the electorate as a whole). So UMNO, the only Malay-based party in the coalition (except for the short time when PAS was a member), was assured by far the largest number of seats, in some elections contesting more seats than all its other Barisan Nasional partners combined.

The second action was that ‘legislation was passed to restrict public discussion on important issues affecting the lives of ordinary people.’ The third action was that ‘radical policies were introduced aimed at restoring UMNO’s popularity among the Malay’s.’70

This established a major trend in Malaysian politics.

With regard to foreign relations, Jeshuran says Tunku ‘favoured overseas diplomatic representation along preferential lines: first, selected Commonwealth capitals and the United States, and then second, Malaya's neighbours in the region.’ While some younger UMNO leaders were ‘quite critical’ of his decisions, for the most part his cabinet was unified. Critics within and outside official Government circles did exist however and at a seminar in Singapore in 1971, Mahathir likened his ‘British influenced foreign policy’ to an 'apron-string complex.'71

The 60s saw the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promote Malaysia's name in international circles became more and more and in 1966 Dean Rusk, then US Secretary of State, wrote in a memorandum

70

Puthucheary, ‘Malaysia’s “Social Contract” – The Invention and Historical evolution of an Idea’, p.p.10-12

71

Jeshuran, Chandran, Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007 (Singapore, Talisman Publishing Pte Ltd, 2007) p.p.29-30

to the President that ‘Malaysia has become something of an economic and political showpiece in Southeast Asia.’72

Western apron-strings or not, Malaysia was going global.

Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato’ Hussein was Malaysia’s second Prime Minister (1970- 1976). Baker argues that he played a key role in helping Malaysia recover from the trauma of the 1969 riots:

He understood the frustrations of the emerging generation of Malays who wanted more economic opportunities. By including younger voices from outside UMNO’s traditional pool of leadership in the decision making process, Abdul Razak was able to act as a moderating influence on their views and