1. INTRODUCCIÓN
1.5 Objetivos
Various scholars offer different explanations of the nature of the research paradigm in social science research. For instance, Bassey (1990) regards the research paradigm as the broad framework which connects theorists having common ideas about the nature of the social world. The paradigm is also linked to a belief and values which are shared by members within the paradigm (Schwandt, 1997). Additionally, Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe paradigm as a mode of theorizing which dictates the investigation techniques. The current study adopted the Burrell and Morgan (1979) sociological framework, as it appreciates the uniqueness of each paradigm in terms of the theory generated, the concepts and the analytical tools used. A detailed discussion of the framework is provided in the following section.
4.3.1 Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Framework
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four different philosophical assumptions about the nature of social science. These were ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. Ontological assumptions constitute assumptions about the nature of reality: whether the reality is something objective and whether it is external to the individual, or subjective and the product of one’s mind. Nominalism and realism are equated to subjective and objective positions respectively. Epistemological assumptions are connected to the ontological position and elaborate the source of knowledge and how to communicate to others. These assumptions raise questions as to whether the knowledge is hard, real and can easily be transferred, or whether it is soft and subjective, cannot easily be transferred in a tangible form, and is the function of personal experience. Positivism, which seeks the causal relationship of the
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phenomena as in natural science, subscribes to the former, while non-positivism, with the emphasis on the subjective nature of social science, subscribes to the latter. Human nature assumptions deal with the relationship between human beings and their environment. At one extreme, human beings are regarded as determinist, in the sense that their behaviour and activities are completely determined by their situation and environment. Voluntarist constitutes the other extreme, which views human beings as completely autonomous and with free will.
A methodological assumption is the function of the ontological, epistemological and human nature positions. It seeks to establish general ways of investigating or approaching social phenomenon. Methodologies which seek to establish the causal relationship of items (nomothetic) assume that reality is objective and independent (ontology), that knowledge is hard and real (epistemology) and that human beings respond automatically to situations (human nature). Therefore, the task of the social scientist is to investigate the universal laws which explain established reality. On the other hand, ideographic methodology regards reality as subjective (ontology), soft knowledge (epistemology), and that human beings are independent (human nature). Combining all four assumptions about nature of the social science, Burrell and Morgan (1979) located objective and subjective dimension of the social science research.
Also, based on the study done by Dahrendorf (1959), Burrell and Morgan (1979) categorized two assumptions about the nature of society; the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change. The sociology of regulation represents the writings of the social theorists who are reluctant to change. The status quo is favoured, with the emphasis placed on unity and cohesiveness. In contrast, the sociology of radical change represents theorists who criticize the status quo. The sociologies of regulation and radical change constitute another dimension of the framework. Combining the two dimensions, objective-subjective and the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change, Burrell and Morgan (1979) located four research paradigms within social science, as shown in the following figure.
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Figure 9: Research Paradigms in Social Science
Sociology of Radical change
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist
Subjective Objective
Interpretive Functionalist
Sociology of Regulation
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979)
Theorists under the functionalist paradigm view social science objectively and assume that society is in order. This is a paradigm which applies a deductive approach to social science research and focuses on establishing causal relationships for the sake of generalization. It is the paradigm which is shared with the interpretive paradigm, on the assumption that the status quo is favoured at the expense of change. It is also similar to the radical structuralist paradigm, with an objective assumption of social science. The functionalist paradigm is related to the deductive/scientific approaches to social science research, which entails the researcher developing prior theories before approaching the researched phenomenon. The functionalist paradigm and its emphasis on scientific approaches is highly criticized by supporters of naturalistic approaches (Chua, 1986; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hopper & Powell, 1985; Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). For example, Hopper and Powell (1985) criticised the application of scientific or positivistic methods to social science research. They claimed that the scientific approach limited the understanding of the researchers on how, for instance, accounting is applied in practice. Also, Ryan, Scapens, et al. (2002) argued against the application of a causal approach to explain human behaviour. They were of the opinion that social science research deals with human actions which are mainly derived from shared meanings
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and interpretations, which are difficult to model and capture in a scientific mode of investigation. The criticisms of the functionalist paradigm have led to the emergence of other views about approaching social science research, such as the interpretive approach.
The interpretive paradigm assumes that society is in state of order and that the social world is subjective. Unlike functionalists, interpretivists stress an inductive approach and seek to understand the explanations from individual consciousness. Assuming that there is no absolute truth, the researchers under this paradigm often investigate in depth meanings associated with the everyday lives of organisational actors (Parker, 2008). Therefore, researchers within the interpretive paradigm focus on understanding the interpretations and meanings which participants share in their everyday social settings (Ahrens & Mollona, 2007). In this sense, the interpretive is regarded as the paradigm which focuses on naturalistic research methods which allows “research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies” (Thomas, 2006, p. 238).
The radical humanist and the radical structuralist represent the last two paradigms in Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework. The radical humanist paradigm lies in the subjective dimension of the social world, with a view that society is in need of immediate change. It echoes the interpretive approach to the subjective nature of social science, which emphasizes human consciousness, but its view of the nature of society is different. Radical humanists criticize the status quo in favour of radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation and potentiality. It is the paradigm which is refuted by a number of social science researchers, due to differences of opinions between the Marxists and the Neo-Marxist. On the other hand, the radical structuralist paradigm advocates the sociology of radical change from an objectivist point of view. It is a paradigm which was highly influenced by later thinking by Marx and Weber after they shifted from the radical humanist paradigm. However, the separation of the radicals into radical humanist and radical structuralist, as shown in the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework, has been
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refuted by a number of social science researchers. This and other criticisms are discussed in the following section.
4.3.2 Criticisms of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Framework
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) sociological framework received criticism from various social science researchers (Chua, 1986; Hopper & Powell, 1985; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & Kuorikoski, 2008; Laughlin, 1995). Chua (1986) criticized the strict dichotomy and the mutual exclusivity of the paradigms. She was of the view that neither the objectivists nor the subjectivists supported the mutual exclusivity of the paradigms. Chua (1986) also criticised Burrell and Morgan (1979) by embracing a relative notion of scientific truth and reasoning and claimed that the choice of paradigm cannot be justified scientifically. Chua (1986) and Willmott (1990) also criticized Burrell and Morgan (1979) for separating the radical humanist and the radical structuralist. To them, separation between the radical humanist and the radical structuralist was not supported in the literature of sociology. However, to Burrell and Morgan (1979), there were major differences between earlier Marxists and Neo- Marxists which warranted the radical separation between the subjective (radical humanist) and the objective (radical structuralist).
Further criticisms of the framework were raised by Laughlin (1995). He criticized the strict dichotomy of the objective and the subjective ends of the continuum, and suggested a middle range approach. His middle-range argument is associated with the claim that there are inherent weaknesses associated with the objective and the subjective ends, which can only be remedied by adopting the middle position. More recent criticisms of the framework were offered by Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2008). They claimed that nominalism, which is associated with subjectivism, originated from the positivist philosophy of natural science. Therefore, they held the opinion that nominalism as presented in the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework contains an element of positivism, which led them to conclude that there is neither a pure objective nor subjective approach.
Despite these criticisms, the current study adopted Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework, as it provided an appropriate foundation for discussion of the research methodology in a deeper and wider context. Therefore, the interpretive approach used
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in this study fits within this framework. However, it should be clear that the framework was not adopted eclectically, but rather was regarded as “a map for negotiating the subject area, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basic similarities and differences between the work of various theorists and, in particular, the underlying frame of reference which they adopt” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 24). Thus, the purpose of using the framework was to locate the research within the wider research paradigm in social science. A discussion of accounting research paradigms is provided in the following section.