Objetivos específicos

As noted in Chapter 2, strong advocates of the Commonwealth often subscribed to a British Commonwealth-as-family discourse in the first half of the twentieth century when it was an exclusive white club. While descriptions of the Empire as a ‘community’ or ‘family of countries’ had made appearances in the 1860s and 1870s, the word ‘Commonwealth’ is usually traced to Lord Rosebery’s usage of the word in 1884 when he attempted to assure an

Australian audience of its separate identity within the Empire4. For admirers of the British

Commonwealth like Duncan Hall, who felt passionately about the ‘Britishness’ and Crown connection of this club, their mutual relationship went beyond legalities and drew real

strength from “kinship”5. In the continuing absence of precise definitions of the British

Commonwealth, the recorder of the 1945 UCRC couched its description in the usual phrases: of unifying bonds being more “enduring” and “intangible” than those of mere mutual advantage, of “fundamental moral purposes and appreciation of spiritual values”, of a connection with each other “by forces which were absent from their relationships with other

states”6. Writing in the mid-1940s, Duncan Hall beamed that “[this] phenomenon was unique

since this family is the sole example of its kind on the planet”. While “the basic factors of kinship, psychological bonds and common interests have remained relatively constant”, several legal and constitutional changes had transformed the Empire from “from a single state into a family group of states”7.

After WWII, within the political Commonwealth, behind the façade of unity, disagreements abounded on inclusion of newer members, smaller states, the rapidly-changing nature of the Commonwealth and disputes between Commonwealth members. Nevertheless, the familiar rhetoric of ‘family ties’ was maintained during the mid-twentieth century as demonstrated by confident proclamations about the ability of the Empire–Commonwealth to

4 _{Anita Inder Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49’, Journal}

of Contemporary History, Vol 20.3 (July 1985), p. 469; David McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall? Palgrave Macmillan (1998), pp. 16-18; S.R. Mehrotra, ‘On the use of the term ‘commonwealth’’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol 2.1 (1963), p. 3.

5 _{H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23 (1944-45), p. 599.} 6 _{David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs…’, p. 605. Or what Andrew Ladley described as the form vs fluff debate. See}

Professor Andrew Ladley, review of The Britannic Vision – Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48 by David McIntyre (review no. 1059). Available at:

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1059 (last accessed: 16/09/2013).

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evolve to absorb and accept new non-white members as equals. Philip Murphy traced the considerable anxiety provoked within British official circles by the need to ensure a united front of the Commonwealth in the event of the death of the British monarch (who was also Head of the Commonwealth), both out of the need for utmost respect to the institution that lay “[a]t the heart of the British state” and sensitivity towards views of Commonwealth

members on the issue8. Anna Boking-Welch’s research on the Royal Commonwealth Society

showed that while central committees of the Royal Commonwealth Society presented a unanimous front in their celebration of the ‘People’s Commonwealth’ (more in Chapter 6), there was quite a bit of disagreement within the Society, in particular bemoaning of what was seen as excessive Britain-blaming and general ingratitude of new states. Notwithstanding the lachrymose elements, the RCS was anxious to present itself as a progressive society

espousing the ideals of the modern Commonwealth ‘family’9.

Ruth Craggs observed that postcolonial perspectives have been critical of the ‘modern’ Commonwealth both “as an idea and practice” for propagating “a positive narrative of a family of nations, and in doing so, masking historical violence and continuing

inequalities”10. Following Craggs, Anna Boking-Welch argued that such a familial discourse

accompanied by the linguistic shift from ‘Empire’ to ‘Commonwealth’ “did not necessarily represent a parallel shift in discourses, practices or ideas about the association of countries

that came under the imperial/commonwealth [sic] umbrella”11.

The discourse surrounding cricket proceeded in the same vein. In an article endorsing a tour of Australia and New Zealand in 1948 by then British MP and future Prime Minister Anthony Eden, The Times reminded its readers of the large part “family traditions” had played in the British Commonwealth. Likening the Commonwealth to a family, the article explained that just as families were linked by “blood and birth and inclination” as opposed to “legal ties”, the Commonwealth was held together by “common wish” rather than “any

8 _{Philip Murphy, ‘Breaking the Bad News: Plans for the Announcement to the Empire of the Death of Elizabeth}

II and the Proclamation of Her Successor, 1952–67’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 34.1 (2006), pp. 139–154 (quote on p. 140).

9 _{Anna Boking-Welch, ‘The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire,}

1960-1970’, PhD Dissertation, University of York (September 2012), pp. 56-57. Available at: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3667/ (last accessed: 28/05/2013).

10 _{Ruth Craggs, ‘Commonwealth histories and geographies’ in ‘London Debates 2010: How does Europe in the}

21st century address the legacy of colonialism?’, p. 1 (Pamphlet published by School of Advanced Study in 2011 following a ‘London Debates’ workshop on the same held on May 13-15, 2010).

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constitutional links”. A “sense of community” was generated by “a friendly intercourse,

whether between cricket teams or actors or statesmen”12. A few years later, in 1956, in an

article entitled “Strengthening the Tie”, The Times once again observed of Australia and New Zealand that “The Commonwealth association—and it is nowhere more consciously prized than in those two countries, the farthest from the centre—has been strengthened in the past by

royal tours (and, of course, by the more regular exchange of cricket teams).” [sic]13 Similarly,

H.S. Altham of the MCC informed the ICC gathering in 1953 that the inauguration of the Imperial Memorial Gallery had been attended by all High Commissioners to Britain or their representatives. He added that the Gallery would be a lesson to all visitors on the history and traditions of cricket and would also “prove a convincing token of the unity which binds those [Commonwealth] countries together and of which, in the field of cricket, this Imperial

Cricket Conference was itself an expression”14. In 1959, Chairman Altham reminded the ICC

members that “this was a memorable occasion, being the 50th anniversary of the first meeting of the Conference. He felt that these meetings of the Conference had helped to strengthen the

fellowship of the Commonwealth, and to promote the welfare of cricket.”15 Brochures

promoting matches of Commonwealth XIs in the 1940s and 1950s in India used similar language: “whatever might be the outcome of the matches, there is no doubt that the tour will result in fostering goodwill and cementing the friendly ties between India and the Commonwealth countries”. A Bangalore weekly described cricket as “the invisible cord

which binds together the Commonwealth countries”16.

Cricket was evidently recognised as an important informal link between members of the Empire–Commonwealth. Like the political Commonwealth, the Imperial Cricket Conference was often described in and in turn, used, familial and filial metaphors to describe relations in cricket between Commonwealth members. If the Commonwealth was a family, cricket was firmly a family jewel.

During the stand-off between the MCC and the BCCP over the latter’s admission to the ICC, John Biggs-Davison in a letter to The Times made an entreaty to the MCC to ensure a speedy resolution to the cricket problem for fear of its impact on political relations in the

12 _{The Times, Saturday, December 18, 1948, p. 5.} 13 _{The Times, Thursday, May 17, 1956, p. 11.} 14 _{ICC Minutes: July 21, 1953.}

15 _{ICC Minutes: July 15, 1959.}

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Commonwealth by noting that “[t]hree members of the Commonwealth are involved, and there is no need to add to the misunderstandings between the Republic of India and the

Dominion of Pakistan”17. Expressing his anger, the Vice-President of the BCCP stated, “We

get the impression that we are not wanted in the world family of cricket”18. All of these

statements are couched in a language that suggests estrangement of younger offspring from a parent/family rather than a question of fairness and prestige among equals in a truly international-level professional sports body. In 1954, Pakistan was described as “the latest

addition to the family of the Imperial Cricket Conference”19. At the end of the 1954 tour of

England by Pakistan, The Times fondly observed that the “Indian sub-continent now gives us two friendly foes, each worthy of our best. Having learnt in India to greet one of them with

“Jai Hind”, we are happy to greet the victors of yesterday with “Pakistan Zindabad.””20 In

1960, writing about an imminent ICC meeting, Christopher Brasher wrote in The Observer, “This week a more domestic parliament, the Imperial Cricket Conference, meets at

Lord’s.”21, confirming the common perception of cricket (and hence the ICC) as a British and

Commonwealth institution. On the South Africa issue, the advice of The Observer to the MCC in 1960 could have just as well been given to Britain and the political Commonwealth: “the M.C.C. should not arrange any future tours. either [sic] in South Africa or in this country, until the whole subject has been discussed with other members of the Commonwealth at the next meeting of the Imperial Cricket Conference in July.”22 (Emphasis added)

The viewing of cricket as belonging to the Commonwealth ‘family’, made clear in the membership rule in 1926, was never disputed until the question of junior/associate members prompted a revisit. In 1956, even when India, backed by the West Indies and Pakistan, tabled a resolution to change the name of the Imperial Cricket Conference, the proposal suggested “Commonwealth Cricket Conference” as the new name, as it “would better express the relationship between the countries”. In the same meeting, the BCCI, once again backed by the BCCP and the WICBOC, pressed the voting equality issue further by pointing out that “cricket is essentially a Commonwealth game” which meant that disparity in voting rights

17 _{The Times, Monday, July 10, 1950, p. 5.} 18 _{ICC Minutes: June 27-28, 1950.}

19 _{The Times, Monday, May 03, 1954, p. 10.} 20 _{The Times, Wednesday, August 18, 1954, p. 7.} 21 _{The Observer, July 10, 1960, p. 15.}

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“goes against the principle of equality and brotherhood [now enjoyed by most of these ICC

members in the political Commonwealth]”23. The wording of these proposals is significant as

the changes in status quo were demanded with a view to achieving a more accurate reflection of the purported equal status shared in the political Commonwealth by these ICC members. At no point did any of the ‘new’ Commonwealth members see the conjoint Commonwealth

association as a shackle around international cricket24, indicating perhaps that at least in

cricket, these members also viewed internationalism purely through a Commonwealth framework. Attempts to include new non-Commonwealth members in the ICC did not start until the mid-1960s and even then, no higher status than Associate membership was envisaged for them at that point. As seen in Chapter 3, even the change in the name of the organisation to ‘International’ cannot be attributed beyond reasonable doubt to a desire to make the game truly international.

Alongside the family trope, further Commonwealth traits were the search for ‘consensus’, a fondness for unwritten rules, informal personalised interaction and common interests (and attachment to the Crown until 1949), all of which constituted the sine qua non of the ‘British world’. According to Duncan Hall, “its unbroken historical continuity, the loyalty of its members to each other, their solidarity on vital matters of common concern, the fluidity of their machinery for dealing with such matters, and their abhorrence of constitutional contracts within the family of the Commonwealth” had provided the British

Commonwealth with its uniqueness and ability to function as a group25. The vitality of the

pre-1949 Commonwealth had “rested primarily on tradition, common interest, and a common

political morality”26. In the first UCRC in 1933, the British Commonwealth was defined as “a

loose confederation, whose members are mainly bound by ill-defined and elastic

conventional understandings, based on a common allegiance”27. Such a romanticised view of

unwritten conventions and informality continued for some time in the period under study.

23 _{All quotes from ICC minutes: July 20, 1956.}

24 _{My insinuation here is that whereas Commonwealth counterparts of the ICC studied here scrambled to}

adhere to the new progressive Commonwealth paradigm, the ICC used the Commonwealth rubric to prolong the old mind-set. While the former lot tried to make a seamless transition from old to new in the service of the modern Commonwealth experiment, in the ICC, the clash between old and new was exposed.

25 _{H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, paper presented at ‘The British Commonwealth: A}

Symposium’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 47.4 (December 1953), p. 997.

26 _{Hector Mackenzie, ‘An old dominion and the new commonwealth: Canadian policy on the question of India’s}

membership, 1947-49’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27.3 (1999), p. 87.

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Even after 1949, the RCS found that the “nexus of Commonwealth connections was . . .

strongest when these connections occurred organically and without formal instigation”28.

Once again, the ICC was part of this set-up. Russell Holden quoted from the work of the eminent Australian cricket-writer Gideon Haigh that “[f]or many years the ICC operated on the basis that unspoken codes of behaviour, rather than rules and statutes, were deemed [sic] sufficient in overseeing the game. Even as international cricket expanded . . . ‘its

management remained as simple as a post-box and filing cabinet at Lord’s’”29. An article in

The Times in 1960 opined on the ‘throwing’ issue that it was best to keep the matter simple. Agreeing with the advice of the Australia cricketer Keith Miller, the article was of the view that if there was any doubt at all about a bowling action, it ought to be declared as ‘throwing’. “[R]ather than wrangle with words and look for loopholes”, the article advised selectors and governing bodies to reduce decision-making to that one fundamental principle to simplify

matters and went on to declare: “corruptissima republica plurimae leges”30 [The more

corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws (Tacitus, Annals)]. The unstructured private club-like regime that governed cricket exchanges (see Chapter 3, footnote 56), and the existence of the notion of a ‘Spirit of Cricket’ (see Chapter 3, footnote 18)—an intangible, unwritten, organic code of ethical and moral conduct thought to be embedded in the game of cricket and expected of all cricketers in spite of its regular descent into hypocrisy—can be seen in the same light. Then and now in cricket, adherence to unwritten rules or codes rooted in an earlier era tends to be equated in many quarters to higher moral ground.

Such descriptions of informal proximity were accompanied by the need to demonstrate a consensual approach. Ritchie Ovendale noted the observation made by a British Cabinet paper in 1950 that “[t]he Commonwealth partnership relied on the principle of tolerance, and any attempt to secure complete identity of view between all its members

28 _{Boking-Welch, pp. 73-74. See also J.M. Lee, ‘Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960:}

Student Welfare and World Status’, Minerva, Vol. 44 (2006), p. 20 and Marc Frey, book review of The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth by Krishnan Srinivasan, published on H-Soz-u-Kult for H-Net Reviews (January 2007). Available at: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=21436 (last accessed: 27/07/2013).

29 _{Russell Holden, ‘International cricket – the hegemony of commerce, the decline of government interest and}

the end of morality?’ in Dominic Malcolm, Jon Gemmell and Nalin Mehta, eds., The Changing Face of Cricket: From Imperial to Global, Routledge (2010), p. 215.

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would ‘break up the association overnight’”31. Gwen Carter believed that the earlier British

Commonwealth had gained strength to survive internal disagreements from the huge area of common interest shared by the various members. Differences were settled privately. There was close consultation but no binding commitments which facilitated frank discussions but did not limit freedom of action. And yet, the nature of ties meant that members rushed to

support each other in times of need32. However, in the newly-styled ‘Commonwealth of

Nations’, consensus was rather elusive owing to increasingly open and vocal differences as seen in Chapter 2. ‘Informal’ and ‘private’ talks appear to have been a kind of euphemism for avoidance of direct confrontation and delaying of firm decisions on contentious matters, at least in the early years of the ‘new’ Commonwealth. The push for consensus was often a means to delay decisions. Potentially controversial issues were not discussed. Bilateral or informal talks between leaders or officials on the sidelines of summits and retreats were preferred to open discussions on contentious issues. The family trope was roped in to describe this approach as an intra-‘family’ method of problem-solving. It is possible to discern from Anthony Richmond’s work that this undeclared but almost visceral protocol followed at the earlier Imperial Conferences continued for a while in the post-London Declaration Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings. Potentially explosive issues were sometimes avoided or deferred rather than confronted when two or more members of the Commonwealth were in dispute with each other. India and Pakistan vociferously raised their disputes with each other and with South Africa at the United Nations rather than the Commonwealth initially. Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah tactfully avoided broaching the topic of South Africa’s likely opposition to independent Ghana’s equal status in the

Commonwealth33. Gwen Carter explained that “The Commonwealth functions by

disregarding the issues which divide its members”34. James Hamill also noted that pursuit of

consensus was cherished as a feature of foremost importance at Commonwealth meetings

particularly by British Prime Ministers35. This is also borne out by the various detailed

31 _{Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947-51’, International}

Affairs, Vol. 59.1 (Winter 1982-83), p. 54.

32 _{Gwendolen Carter, ‘Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 22.4 (1949), p. 367.} 33 _{Anthony Richmond, ‘The Significance of Multi-Racial Commonwealth’, Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 16.4 (4}th

Qtr., 1955), p. 386.

34 _{Gwen Carter, ‘The Expanding Commonwealth’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31 (1956-1957), p. 135. See also Trevor}

Reese, ‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’, International Affairs, Vol. 41.3 (July 1965), pp. 461-462.

35 _{James Hamill, ‘South Africa and the Commonwealth part one: the years of acrimony’, Contemporary Review}

(July 1995), p. 8. See also, David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs…’, p. 592: “A series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences (UCRC) were held between 1933 and 1959 in an endeavour to work out the practical implications of consensus as reached at the Imperial Conferences and later Prime Ministers’ Meetings”. In an indication of

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scholarly expositions of the 1947–1949 negotiations on India, and by accounts of later meetings. This arrangement masked deep differences between members of the ‘new’ Commonwealth in the interest of presenting a united Britain-led Commonwealth front, at least in the early years of the new multi-racial setting. For instance, as evident from the previous chapters, a ‘domestic jurisdiction’/laissez-faire doctrine prevailed in the case of South Africa in the political Commonwealth in the early years. The group of older members of the Commonwealth evidently closed ranks when one of them was caught in the international spotlight prompting India and the others to take their grievances to the United