Objetivos

Although informal selection decisions can be made by individuals or by groups,

“[c]onsensus is a pervasive element of everyday social life” (Erb et al., 2006, p. 221). Erb et al. (2006, p. 221) states that “Consensus [decisions] determines what is expected, normal, and fashionable.” In the case of consensus decision making, information is shared amongst members in an effort to reach a decision (Hinsz et al., 1997; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). However, Kerr and Tindale (2004) note that research (citing Steiner, 1972; Tindale & Larson, 1992) indicates that a gap in knowledge exists concerning the effectiveness of teams during consensus decisions. Specifically, limited knowledge is available on how performance can be enhanced and improved when individuals are engaged in making consensus decisions.

In fact, the performance of workgroups is contingent upon clearly defined minimum objectives and the dedication towards high performance of its participants. Moreover, decision performance is also dependent upon information sharing (Hinsz et al., 1997 citing Stasser et al, 1989) which is subject to social influences (Erb et al., 2006). One such social influence is group stress as increased stress has been linked to decreased decision quality but a higher quantitative output (Kerr & Tindale, 2004 citing Kaplan et al., 1993).

Informal selection decision are influenced by several mechanisms, sometime leading to biased decision making and are there is a gap in understanding the processing of information by individuals as well of groups (Hinsz et al., 1997). In fact, Dewberry (2011, p 101) notes that there are “a variety of dysfunctional hidden processes” which he summarises in four groups: majority influence; weighting of information; inappropriate information and criteria; and influence of assessors. Additionally, non-intention decisions factor into these hiring mishaps (Reason, 1990). Each is subsequently discussed.

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Within group decision processes, the influences of majorities and minorities can impact decision outcomes (Martin et al., 2008; Sager & Gastil, 2006). Whilst this thesis focuses on individuals making informal decisions, it is important to recognise that the informal decisions reached by individuals may be influenced by the groups they belong to (e.g. social groups, demographic groups or workplace groups). According to Martin et al (2008, citing Mascovici, 1980), individuals feel compelled to be associated with the majority and some individuals will take the majority’s position in order to fit into this popular group.

This confirmation to the majority is known as majority influence (Dewberry, 2011). Moreover, group decisions are reached not only by the combined individual experience of members, but also the inferences of individual members of the group. In essence, the majority directs attention towards information and key factors that ultimately impact decisions (Martin et al., 2008): The “…majority status might act as a heuristic cue…” (p. 19).

However, the majority influence does not always prevail depending on the circumstances; sometimes, the minority influence dominants whilst sometimes no influence is present (Martin et al., 2008). Minority influences “…often act as the main instigators of social change…” (Papastamou, 1986 citing Moscovici, 1976) as the minority alternatives can trigger a systematic review from the majority (Martin et al., 2002). During this review, Shuper and Sorrenting, (2004) suggest that the strongest position will prevail in influencing the decision outcome.

Consequently, how groups utilise cognitive processes in arriving at decisions and how groups (i.e., majority and minority) influences those decisions are fully not understood (Martin & Hewstone, 2003; Shuper & Sorrenting, 2004). Moreover, the key to understanding these influences appears to rely on how groups process messages and information.

Although organisations may have formalised policies, regulations, and rules, it is the informal rules of individuals and groups (especially of newly formed groups) that can impact consensus decisions (Sager & Gastil, 2006). In fact, organisations normally allow assessors to make individual decisions after managers and senior assessors have oriented and allied newcomer assessors towards the organisational policies and expectations. It is these policies and expectations that are the basis of shared workplace knowledge (and actions).

To summarise, a majority and minority influence are products developed from social interactions of a group making consensus decisions (Papastamou, 1986). Each group considers information in arriving at decisions. Sometimes, individuals neglect alternative

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choices and fail to consider most information (Erb et al., 2006). In the next section, the weighting of information is discussed.

2.3.2 Weighting of Information

Most classification decisions revolve around information provided by the applicant (Mercer, 1993), information acquired or produced by the organisation (Hanson, 1993), and third-party information (Hacker, 1999). In fact, the processing of this information and the subsequent weighting of information is critically important in assessing individuals (Dewberry, 2011). The variances in weighting information are essential for filtering decisions (Burke, 1997; Guion & Gottier, 1966; Ployhart et al., 2003). In weighting information, certain heuristics such as representativeness (Bar-Hillel, 1991; Cook, 1991), availability of instances or scenarios and anchoring (Chapman & Johnson, 2002) are used to interpret and process information; and, as such, weighting of information is subject to deviations through assumptions and errors in judgement (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991d).

As about one-third of applications contain false information (Mercer, 1993), screeners validate (e.g. pre-employment testing, skills assessment and fact finding services) or trust information presented within applications (Hanson, 1993; Robertson & Smith, 2001).

However, Cook (1991) notes sometimes information that is general, vague, or not too negative is accepted as truth. Therefore, guidance in how information is weighted may be outlined by an organisation; but still, information may be erroneously weighted.

Errors can be a result of miscommunications as, according to Keysar (2007), miscommunications are random errors. Sometimes miscommunications are incorrect interpretations of words and actions that lead to wrong assessments of information and evidence. It is the listeners that interpret information based upon his/her experiences and knowledge which may not consider the mental conditions and knowledge of others.

Interpretations and information processing deviations are contingent upon the meaning of language which can be highly subjective.

Miscommunications can be linked to misapplications of selection policies as these too can affect decisions concerning how to weight information. According to Geerlings and Van Veen (2006), problems with selection policies could result in a poorly selected workforce that may take up to forty years to correct. In fact, Geerlings and Van Veen (2006, p. 1257) note that selection policies are not normally followed for entry level positions even though the directives indicate that information must be processed and weighted according to such policies. This represents an intentional action (Reason, 1990) concerning how information is

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weighted; and therefore, organisations must consider the long-term consequences of any selection policy before being implemented.

Part of this consideration extends to how screeners weight information and of the errors to which screeners would be subject. In fact, some organisations may use tests (e.g.

background check, aptitude test, skills test, or reference checks) to provide supporting information in weighting information for informal decisions (Porterfield, 2001). The additional information reduces assumed facts and uncertainty and helps properly guide screeners according to guidelines and personnel specifications (Gatewood & Feild, 1987; Kasten &

Weintraub, 1999; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006; Yates et al., 2002). However, Burke (1997) suggests that different testing environments and stimuli can cause variations in applicant test scores that increase the probability that inappropriate information and criteria will be injected into test results.

Because organisations grow and increase in complexity, different organisational environments require various stages of multiple decisions to predict an applicant’s performance (Anderson et al., 2004; Bar-Hillel & Neter, 2002; Gatewood & Feild, 1987).

Normally, informal filtering decisions are sequential with multiple decision stages being typical (Kenney, 1982; Litecky et al., 2004); however, Gilliland (1993) suggest decisions are actually a continuum based on multiple variables and differently weighted information in reaching a conclusion. Herriot and Wingrove (1984) and Wingrove et al. (1984) suggest that within filtering processes, too many variables and too much information exist for screeners to comprehend; therefore, screeners may reduce information to basic levels and rely on inferential and summarising reasoning to weight information. The weighting of information does influence decisions (Herriot & Wingrove, 1984; Wingrove et al., 1984) and when assessors’ judgements are flawed, it can corrupt assessment (Anderson & Shackleton, 1990).

Information processing deviations occur and we must periodically evaluate our selection processes to help mitigate these deviations (Bobko et al., 2008) and to assist decision-makers in comprehending subjective information appropriately (Moy & Lam, 2004).

Inappropriate information and criteria, as presented in the next section, can significantly alter informal decisions.

2.3.3 Inappropriate Information and Criteria

Screeners use personnel specifications to make decisions, based on judgments and experiences, concerning applicant classification (Fritzsche & Brannick, 2002; Robertson &

Smith, 2001). Research has shown that individuals do not always make rational decisions

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(Robertson & Smith, 2001); and too much information can burden decision makers whilst not enough information can cause poor decisions (Herriot & Wingrove, 1984; Wingrove et al., 1984). Even with personnel specifications, guidelines, and methods of applicant classification, inappropriate information and criteria can enter into decisions (Dewberry, 2011).

Organisations may operate selection processes with the objective to minimise risk (Wolf and Jenkins, 2006). To reduce risk, organisations establish guidelines that identify potential undesirable behaviours (e.g. theft, absenteeism, and poor attitudes) in which screeners can consider when removing those individuals deemed a potential threat.

Consequently, several authors (see Dolfin, 2006; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006) suggest that some organisations desire a simple, quick, and cheap method to select employees. Cook (1991) agrees that costs can impact selection processes and in some instances practicality and validity are sacrificed. Organisations can influence informal decisions through emphasis of inappropriate information and criteria mostly by providing contradictory guidelines to screeners (Dolfin, 2006; Thierry, 2007).

In fact, the economics of hiring may subject decisions of screeners to consider inappropriate information and criteria. Robertson and Makin (1986) suggest that organisations may estimate economic benefits of hiring using utility theory: Estimating value against costs. The value of a hire must exceed all costs attributed to the selection process associated with the respective hire. Additionally, game theory might be applicable to selection decisions as both rely on decisions from other individuals (Keysar & Barr, 2002). In social settings, game theory focuses on how economic incentives can affect decisions and behaviours based on anticipated responses and decisions from other individuals (Dixit, 2006;

Coleman, 2005; Myerson, 2008). Some decisions and aspects of game theory result when the perceptual gains exceed an individual threshold known as a hedonic limen (see Moorewedge et al., 2007). Hedonic Limens are critical standards in decision processes that help justify the acceptance of an offer. For example: When an offer of employment is extended to an individual, that individual is motivated to accept or decline employment based upon his/her perceptions of rewards (i.e. salary, benefits and fringes, reputation and prestige, and other rewards that indicate the value of an individual/position).

Whilst research in work and organisational psychology has specific applications within subclasses of general psychology, decision theory in general psychology can facilitate understanding informal decision with respect to inappropriate information and criteria (see Choo, 1998; Hill et al., 1988; Patterson, 2001; Saha et al., 2008; Schmidt & Hunter, 1974).

For example: Screeners may evaluate applicant criteria by representativeness, how similar applicants are to personnel specifications using reference points, for informal decisions

(Bar--40-

Hillel, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1991). Application representativeness is equally comparable under the transitivity principle, so no one individual has a greater preference without being subject to assessment and evaluating processes, assuming non-erroneous and unbiased comparisons amongst individuals are not made (Bell & Raiffa, 1988; Cohen et al., 1991).

However, according to Aguinis & Smith (2007, p. 165), bias can influences informal decisions by “...lead[ing] to unethical decision making.” Biases are associated with the perception of an applicant by a decision maker (Anderson & Shackleton, 1990); and as such, biases can direct screeners to inappropriate information and criteria. For example, biases are more likely to occur in informal decisions when an applicant has personal interaction with decision-makers (Porterfield, 2001): A positive interaction creates a positive image whilst a negative interaction creates a negative image. Common documented selection biases include the halo effect (Porterfield, 2001); similar-to-me effect, personal liking bias, prototype bias (Anderson & Shackleton, 1990); overqualified (Fine & Nevo, 2007); and order effects (Highhouse & Gallo, 1997). Each is briefly discussed within the glossary of this thesis. In most cases, screeners are not aware that decisions have been contaminated with bias (Litecky et al., 2004) hence biases are non-intentional errors (Reason, 1990). One method to reduce human error in organisations is the use of electronic applications (Bartram, 2004) and expert systems that evaluate applications (Shore, 1996).

According to Drucker (2001, p. 131), “…all of us have first impressions, prejudices, likes, and dislikes, we need to listen to what other people think.” However, assessors can influence decisions as presented in the next section.

2.3.4 Influence of Assessors

Since standardisation is a critical element of filtering decisions (Gatewood & Feild, 1987), organisational personnel specifications should be anchoring mechanisms that allow assessors to repeatedly make consistent decisions (Bobko et al., 2008; Epley & Gilovich, 2002). Consequently, many researchers (Heuer, 1999; Palmer & Loveland, 2008) note that assessors regularly modify organisational personnel specifications when making decisions.

Sometimes these decisions based on modified organisational personnel specifications are attributed to the different methodological approaches that organisations take towards selection (Bliesener, 1996; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). Occasionally, these decisions result from the influence of assessors (Dewberry, 2011). For example, a junior assessor may defer to more senior assessors during consensus decisions or when seeking advice about informal processes.

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Organisational social structures have an increased effect on employee values and beliefs (Baron & Pfeffer, 1994) and informal decisions can be affected by different cultures, values, and beliefs (Heuer, 1999; Ryan et al., 1999; Shackleton & Newell, 1991). An assessor’s characteristics such as age and gender can influence informal decisions (Lievens, 1998). Moreover, the career paths of individuals can shape and influence assessors’ informal decisions (Sagie & Magnezy, 1997; Todd et al., 2005) as well as their experience as an assessor (Davis, 1999). With all these variables, the difficulty arises when an assessor injects his/her influence into informal decisions thereby causing a deviation in consistency according to organisational policies and guidelines.

As recruiting methods vary according to organisational demographics (Bartram et al., 1995), so does hiring processes. As these hiring process are critically dependant on the information used in making informal decisions, and that informal decisions are subject to majority and minority influences, differential in weighting information, injection of inappropriate information and criteria, and the influence of assessors, it sometimes is necessary to provide guidance to screeners. Organisations provide screeners with guidelines and personnel specifications to refer when making informal decisions. This is presented in the subsequent section.