OBRA NUEVA OBRA SIN PERMISO

CAPÍTULO XIII JEFATURA DE POLICÍA

Indeed, even in the most homogeneous societies in terms of ethnicity, religion and social culture, boundaries of national identity are hardly settled. Communities and societies

can be understood as engaging in a continuous debate over their collective identity.94 In the

words of Edward Said, society ―is the locale in which a continuous contest between adherents

of different ideas about what constitutes the national identity is taking place‘.95 In other

words, no state‘s identity is entirely secure or stable as identities are always open to contestation. Nevertheless, the identities of some states at certain times can be less secure

than others. Pluralistic societies and the so-called ‗torn‘96 societies whose elites seek to

redefine their country‘s collective identity are more likely to suffer from insecure identities. In these societies, state identity is highly contested between diverse social groups who have different and often conflicting understandings of national interests.

Eventually, the definition of national identity (and consequently the state‘s identity) will be dominated by the most powerful groups or individuals. These groups or individuals during the state-building process will attempt to impose their own identities and

institutionalize them in legal, political, and social structures at both internal and international levels. Internally, they will develop myths and institutions to safeguard and secure their identity. Nevertheless, alternative social identities can survive even when they are not represented in the state and endure to shape perceptions and affect political debates in a country. Perceptions of such actors can be socially strong particularly when there is a tension between the state and large segments of the society. As Doğu Ergil noted ‗when national identity is not a construct negotiated by the citizens of that nation, it creates problems for neglected and excluded groups that can escalate into perceived security threats by the

hypersensitive state‘.97

In order to secure their identity, dominant actors will seek to embed it in interstate normative structures, notably regimes and security communities. The acceptance of a state to a society of states can further confirm its identity. This often involves

Barnett, M. (1996) ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of

National Security (New York: Colombia University Press), p. 411.

Said, E., ‘The Phony Islamic Threat’, New York Times Magazine, November, 21 November 1993

See Huntington, S. P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York, Simon & Schuster)

Ergil, D. (2000), ‘Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.1, p.47

44 membership in an international organization and represents an additional source of the state‘s identity.

The confirmed identity can stay relatively stable and secure for a long period of time until a critical juncture occurs. Critical junctures refers to ‗perceived crisis situations

occurring from complete policy failures, but also triggered by external events‘.98

Domestic developments such as changes in political economy, demography or territorial boundaries can trigger debates on identity and prevents a state to maintain a stable identity. In this context, a state‘s corporate identity can be changed through different mechanisms such as revolutions, domestic institutional arrangements or elections. A change in the state‘s corporate identity will also bring a change in its social identity since foreign policy can be dominated by entirely new organizations or individuals with different identity conceptions that may

understand the national interest in a different way.99

The interaction between corporate and social identities of a state can also takes place in the opposite direction. External development such as a change in systemic patterns can also pave the way to wide-scale domestic change and revive or intensify debates about the collective identity and the state‘s relationship with the larger community. Under new historical conditions, the state‘s collective identity or the debate about that identity can be

conflicting with the demands and defining characteristics of the broader community.100 Such

a situation can mean rejection by others who are thought to hold similar identities and undermines the state‘s membership in the community. This significantly undermines the security of a state‘s social identity and can influence its corporate identity as well. Lack of a clearly defined role in the international level will change the range of legitimate identity options for political actors in a country. As a result, dominant actors can modify their ideas about political order and about nation state identity since the old concepts are usually

Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Joachim Knopf, H. And Roscher, K. (1999), ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British, and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of European Public

Policy, Vol.6, No.4, p.616

Bozdağlıoğlu, Y. (2003), Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach, (London: Routledge)

100

Barnett, M. (1996) ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of

regarded as irrelevant or as having failed.101 On the other hand, excluded groups can take

advantage of the situation to weaken the dominant group‘s political position and to present their identity as the alternative. These developments will intensify the debates over corporate identity and can pave the way to an ‗identity crisis‘ which in turn further influences the role identities of contesting actors.

An important question arises at this point: How does contestation of state identity influence the foreign policy of the state in question? Considering the links between identities and preferences, we can assume that implementing a certain foreign policy would require consent and consensus among diverse groups that are involved in the formulation of foreign policy and that have different role identities. When such consensus does not exist, a state‘s interests arise out of a struggle between different domestic groups trying to influence the course of the state‘s foreign policy in accordance with their identity conceptions. The contesting definitions of state identity are usually attached to contradictory expectations. ‗Such expectations may call for incompatible performances; they may require that one hold two norms or values which can suggest conflicting behaviours; or they may require that one (identity) necessitates the expenditure of time and energy such that it is difficult or impossible

to carry out the obligations of another (identity)‘.102

Put differently, competing identity conceptions of diverse actors who take part in the formulation of foreign policy complicate the definition of national interests, suggest different foreign policy pathways and prevent development along any one path. This brings ambivalence to the foreign policy of the state in question. Growing ambivalence in a state‘s foreign policy causes confusion and brings a decline in the predictability of its behaviours and in this way complicates its relations with other states. For example if the state in question is a member of an alliance, its ambivalent foreign policy which stems from its contesting identity, will undermine the alliance‘s foundation or a state‘s membership in it.

101

Policy, Vol.6, No.4, p.617

102

Sheldon, S. (1980), Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Perspective, (Reading, Mass.:

Benjamin/Cummings) cited in Barnett, M. ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, Peter Katzenstein (ed.),

46 In recent years, this has been especially obvious, since many states began debating their national identity and its relationship to other international communities, most notably the ‗West‘. Turkey is a particularly good example to such a situation. External developments, notably the end of Cold War, globalization and European integration, as well as domestic developments such as economic liberalization since 1980s, massive internal migration from Eastern Anatolia to Western Turkey and EU-related political reforms triggered debates on Turkey‘s corporate and social identities. These developments changed the range of legitimate ideas on state identity for Turkish political actors. On one hand, secular elites who are

dominant in the Turkish military as well as the bureaucracy slightly modified their identity conceptions and began to emphasize Turkey‘s multi-civilizational and bridge identity between East and West. On the other hand, Islamist groups who first came to power in 1996 seriously challenged both the country‘s corporate (Kemalist) and role (Western) identities, and instead highlighted an Islamic identity.

In recent years, both groups have been transforming themselves according to changing internal and external normative contexts notably that of the EU which. Islamists became increasingly supportive of the EU membership while the secularists tolerated some EU-related reforms which reduced their political powers. These transformations temporarily relieved the tension between the two groups in early 2000s. Nevertheless, a consensus on the long-lasting issue of identity could not have been reached in the absence of the full EU membership signal in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, contestation over identity became more intense in the uncertain context of Turkey‘s future relations with the EU which is manifest with the rising polarization between the secularists and Islamists. Contesting identity definitions of the country‘s two key political camps call for diverse behaviours and as a result Turkey has been pursuing an ambivalent foreign policy in the past two decades. This ambivalence in Turkish foreign policy is most evident in the country‘s relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East. For example, shifts in Ankara‘s position in the Cyprus issue shows how different conceptions of identity brings contradictory foreign policy behaviour and hinders development along any one path. On the other hand, the transition of Turkey‘s relations with Israel from a very close alliance to a normal and eventually a problematic relationship shows how identity insecurity can undermine alliances. The case study chapters will focus on these issues in greater detail.

As the above discussion indicated state identities are not monolithic and static. On the contrary, they are highly contested especially in ‗torn‘ societies and are dynamically

47 various institutional contexts can intensify and complicate the debates over national identity by adding more elements such as norms and values. Such interactions can alter the normative understandings of actors and eventually transform their identities which will have important consequences for a state‘s foreign policy. Let us now turn our attention to the constitutive and transformative role of norms and institutions which is another important contribution of constructivism to IR theory.

In document LEY 3092 LEY IMPOSITIVA (página 77-82)