The Political and Social Context of Innovation in ETA’s Evolutionary Cycle
On December 20th, 1973 Luis Carrero Blanco, President of the Spanish Government at the time,
was murdered by the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and
Freedom). Before analysing the preconditions, causes and preparatory behaviours of this terrorist
attack I will provide a brief outline of ETA’s background in order to offer a framework for the analysis of a very relevant innovation attack in ETA’s history. Thus the following paragraphs will provide the political and social context in which ETA’s innovation took place.
The ETA had been formed in 1958 and claimed its first killing in 1960. The ETA emerged in the context of General’s Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. This was a regime that prolonged itself from 1939 until 1975 and characterised by a democratic deficit that led some Basque nationalists to demand a violent response against the Spanish authorities. Up until the late 1950s nationalist grievances in the Basque Country had been mainly channelled by the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), a party set up in 1895. However, in 1959 a group of
nationalist youngsters, critical of PNV’s approach towards Franco’s dictatorship, set up a new organisation named ETA with the aim of increasing nationalist opposition against the regime. It was not until 1968 that ETA deliberately took the decision to carry out assassination attacks as part of its terrorist campaign. In 1959, a year after ETA’s formation, the terrorist group started planting small bombs in public places and symbolic places such as Vitoria, Bilbao and Santander as part of a campaign that could well be described as “armed propaganda”. ETA’s campaign was then restricted to small attacks complemented by defiant acts such as planting Basque flags (Ikurriñas) in lampposts and painting ETA’s initials in the streets of the Basque country.
Although at that time ETA did not intend to cause any casualties, Begoña Urroz, a two year old girl, was killed on June 27th 1960 after an incendiary device that had been planted by ETA in San
Sebastian’s main train station went off that day. This first killing was not followed by a systematic assassination campaign by ETA, but a terrorist campaign limited to low level attacks against symbolic targets such as train stations.
ETA’s decision to step up its campaign in 1968 was a result of the combination of several factors, mainly, a nationalist extremist ideology; external references of violent struggles; and Franco’s
repression together with the cycle of action-repression that triggered. These factors may be regarded as accelerants to escalating ETA’s campaign, but not directly an accelerant to terrorist innovation like the murder of the President of the Spanish Government, which was more a result of certain conjectural factors and dynamics that will be analysed below.
A nationalist extremist ideology:
The historic tradition of the extremist ideology embraced by Basque nationalists became the basis on which the terrorist group would justify its evolution towards an intense campaign of killings.
Influenced by leftist ideals and the international context at a time of global unrest and protest movements throughout the world, ETA constituted, above all, a radicalized expression of Basque
ethnic nationalism.1 The nationalist ideology espoused by ETA, facilitated mobilization by enabling
individuals to join together around a set of beliefs that contributed to consolidating violent ideas and attitudes.
Basque nationalism bears a tradition of violence, which operated as a societal and cultural facilitator for terrorism. The myths, legends, customs and habits related to this nationalist ideology sanctioned the use of violence against political adversaries as represented not only by the Spanish government but also by Basque citizens not considered nationalists. Consequently Basque nationalism generated a sub-culture of violence that introduced and reaffirmed absolutist convictions and the fanaticism around them, also providing moral and political justification for terrorist acts.
The escalation of violence was achieved by portraying its population of reference as a bellicose people who fiercely resisted any of the attempts made throughout centuries and even millennia to invade or conquer the territories they inhabited. Basque separatist terrorists thus tended to see themselves as contemporary gudaris or, translated from the Basque language, indigenous warriors, carrying on the same rebellious and non-compromising disposition of their ancestors.2
The fact that ETA had emerged from a more moderate formation like the PNV and ETA’s need to differentiate itself from the PNV’s more peaceful type of resistance carried until then, also
encouraged ETA’s activists to step up their violent tactics.
External references:
This legacy, in addition to the perception of other national liberation struggles that had been successfully fought around the world, provided a firm basis for the motivations some young people drew upon when deciding to join ETA. In the early sixties, the resort to terrorism was becoming a more attractive option for Basque nationalists who had learned how other groups’ use of violence had proved useful. As a way of example, Irgun was seen by some ETA leaders as a reference, since attacks like the one against Jerusalem’s King David Hotel in 1948 provided inspiration for a more symbolic target selection than the one carried until then. Irgun was depicted by ETA leaders as a small movement that only consisted of twenty or forty members that confronted a well armed and disciplined British Army. In the same line, another of ETA’s leaders in its early days encouraged members to “take the head out of the sand and look around” so they could see how a “Free Ireland” had been achieved using violent means. 3
1 On the history of ETA, see Florencio Domínguez (1998) a, De la negociación a la tregua: El final de ETA? Madrid:
Taurus; Florencio Domínguez (1998) b, ETA: Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones 1978-1992. Bilbao:
Universidad del País Vasco; Antonio Elorza et al (2006), La historia de ETA. Madrid: Temas de Hoy; José María Garmendia (1979), Historia de ETA. Volume I. San Sebastián: Aramburu; José María Garmendia (1980), Historia
de ETA. Volume II. San Sebastián: Aramburu; Patxo Unzueta (1988), Los nietos de la ira. Nacionalismo y violencia en el País Vasco. Madrid: El País-Aguilar.
2 “Political violence in a democratic state: Basque terrorism”, Goldie Shabad and Francisco Llera, pp. 419-423, in
Martha Crenshaw (ed.) (1995), Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 410-469.
3 “ETA: Nacimiento, desarrollo y crisis (1959-1978)”, José María Garmendia, pp. 99-100, in Antonio Elorza et al
Franco’s repression and the cycle of action-repression:
At the same time, the repression applied by Franco’s dictatorship both in the Basque region and in other areas of the country, helped Basque nationalism to be seen by a sector of the population as an ideology under attack.4 The experience and perception of injustice and alienation by the citizens of
this region enhanced the appeal of Basque nationalism and the need to protect and strengthen it. In the early 1960s the violent cycle of action-repression set the ground for an escalation like the one that would soon arrive. The police repression applied at the time did manage to considerably weaken the feeble infrastructure that ETA was trying to build. As a result of this repression, ETA’s militancy diminished, but became a more radicalised one. It was in this context that ETA’s leaders attempted to push their “revolutionary war” doctrine, as summarized by one of them:
Let’s assume that an organised minority carries psychological and material strikes against the State forcing the State to respond and violently repress the aggression. Let’s assume that the organized minority manages to avoid the repression which falls instead upon the popular masses. Let’s assume that the minority manages to provoke in the population a rebellious mood rather than fear so the population aids and support the minority against the State. This scenario would allow the action- repression cycle to repeat itself with even more intensity.5
However, ETA was very aware of the group’s serious limitations, and continued restricting its campaign to two types of actions: attacks with explosives against symbols of Franco’s military victory in the Civil War; and robberies aiming at obtaining much needed funds. Nonetheless, ETA’s activists were increasingly receiving more sympathy by a Basque population that saw with a
considerable degree of understanding the violence perpetrated against Franco’s regime. This gradual shift encouraged ETA to go another step forward in the group’s cycle of action-repression
undertaking ETA’s first deliberate assassinations.
The profile of the first casualties caused by ETA before the assassination of Carrero Blanco sheds light on the group’s targeting selection before a major killing like the one of the President of the Spanish Government. As it can be seen below, the killings took place after ETA had set upon an assassination campaign but in the majority of these killings the targets were chosen as a result of a set of conjectural factors.
• José Antonio Pardines Arcay (June 7th, 1968). He was a member of the Spanish Civil Guard killed in Villabona (Basque Country) by two ETA members who were on their way to San Sebastian to prepare the murder of a prominent police officer –Melitón Manzanas-. José Antonio Pardines stopped the car driven by two ETA activists when he was managing the traffic. One of the ETA members shot Pardines dead when the terrorists realized that their movements had arisen the Civil Guard’s suspicions.
4 “Political violence in a democratic state: Basque terrorism”, Goldie Shabad and Francisco Llera, pp. 419-423, in
Martha Crenshaw (ed.) (1995), Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 410-469.
5 “ETA: Nacimiento, desarrollo y crisis (1959-1978)”, José María Garmendia, pp. 114-115, in Antonio Elorza et
• Melitón Manzanas González (August 2nd, 1968). He was a member of the Spanish Police who had been accused of being involved in torture and maltreatment of prisoners. His murder in Irun (Basque Country) was followed by the Government’s introduction of the state of exception.
• Fermín Monasterio Pérez (April 9th, 1969), taxi driver. His killer was a member of ETA who was running away after being injured by the Police in a shoot out. The taxi driver refused to accept his killer’s orders to drive him away after the shoot out with the Police and was shot dead in Arrigorriaga (Basque Country).
• Eloy García Cambra (August 29th, 1972), local police officer. He was patrolling a bus station in Galdacano (Basque Country) when a suspect caught his attention. The policeman was not aware of the fact that the suspect was a terrorist. Other terrorists also present at the scene, fearing that the policeman would discover them, decided to kill him.
• José Humberto Fouz Escudero, Jorge Juan García Carneiro and Fernando Quiroga Veiga (March 24th, 1973). The three youngsters were kidnapped in the French border town of San
Juan de Luz and murdered by members of ETA who thought they were policemen. In the aftermath of ETA’s first killings, the authority’s repression toughened rooting out most of ETA’s leadership that would have to face a War Trial in December 1970. The “Consejo de Burgos”, as this trial became known, provoked widespread solidarity among the Basque population helping ETA to increase its militancy. Such a response by the State would also provide increased legitimacy for the violence that ETA was perpetrating.
At the same time, 1971 saw an intensification of ETA’s violence motivated by ETA’s new and more militant leadership as represented by Eustakio Mendizabal (Txixia). Txixia, who died in April 1973 in a shoot out with the Police, was the name adopted by the cell in charge of killing Carrero Blanco in 1973. The organization wanted to refer to a prominent operation like this one with the name of one of its more militant and violent figures in order to honor him and to provide inspiration for new militants.
Internal and External Factors as Catalysts for Innovation
As will be elaborated in the following section, terrorist innovation like the one which is being analyzed here its better framed if Carrero is seen as a target of opportunity by the terrorist organization. When ETA first identified Admiral Carrero Blanco as a target, it did not intend to resort to a tactical and strategic innovation in the form of the assassination of such a prominent figure. The final outcome came about as a result of external factors that led the terrorist organization to change the tactic initially planned: the kidnapping of Carrero Blanco, the then Vice President of the Spanish Government. Both the plan to kidnap him and the later decision to kill him were
determined by an important external factor: Carrero Blanco only became a target of the organization when an unidentified character that did not belong to ETA provided very useful information about his daily routines and his vulnerability.
At that time, Carrero was Vice President of the Spanish Government. However, on June 1973, soon after that information was revealed to ETA, he became President and saw his personal protection
increased. The strengthening of his personal protection added more difficulties to ETA’s initial plans to kidnap him thus discouraging the terrorists. Previously, the attempt to kidnap him had also encountered some difficulties. ETA members had been preparing the kidnapping for several months and the organization had acquired a shop close to Real Madrid’s football stadium where they
planned to dig a hole where they would hide Carrero. However, one night there a robbery took place in the premises and the terrorists abandoned the shop fearing that the police would come to
investigate the robbery and would also find them.
It was as a result of these factors that led ETA to kill Carrero Blanco instead of kidnapping him. Therefore, ETA’s innovation in the form of the assassination of such a symbolic target was a direct result of several external factors and some coincidences.
At the end of 1972 an unidentified character met two ETA leaders -José Miguel Beñarán (Argala) and Ignacio Pérez Beogeguri (Wilson)- at Hotel Mindanao in the centre of Madrid. A man in a suit handed them in an envelope with information about Carrero’s every day habit of going to Mass in the church of San Francisco the Borja, also in the centre of Madrid and only around one hundred meters away from the U.S. Embassy. Following this development, Wilson, Argala and another ETA member, Ignacio Múgica Arregui (Ezkerra), checked the information received and found out that Admiral Carrero Blanco did indeed follow a daily routine: he used to attend Mass every day at the same time accompanied with his bodyguard. While checking this routine, Ezkerra was able to confirm the Admirals vulnerability, since the terrorist operative managed to walk down the aisle close to Carrero Blanco when both went to receive Holy Communion. As a result of this situation, the leaders of ETA decided to plan the kidnapping of Carrero Blanco in order to demand the release of ETA prisoners held in Spanish prisons and the publication in the media of a statement produced by ETA praising the fight of the Basque people as well as its objectives.
Carrero was regarded as a key person within the State’s apparatus, leading the ETA to believe that the regime would feel forced to negotiate the release of ETA’s prisoners in return for the Vice president’s freedom. Carrero was seen as a strong figure called to play a significant role during the Spanish transition after the recent death of the dictator, given his age and illness. At that stage, ETA only considered murdering Carrero if the regime did not consent to the release of the group’s prisoners.6
Although the identity of the person who facilitated the information about Carrero’s routine has not been revealed, it is widely believed that he was not a member of ETA, but a sympathizer who almost certainly belonged to left wing political groupings that shared with ETA their opposition to Franco’s regime. At the end of 1971 Argala met in Madrid two important individuals that would facilitate ETA useful contacts: Alfonso Sastre – a play writer and leading member of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE, Partido Comunista de España) – and his partner – Eva Forest. Both would be
instrumental in enhancing ETA’s network of contacts at a time when the terrorist group had very little means and resources. It is believed that Eva Forest took part in arranging the meeting between
Wilson and the person who provided ETA with Carrero’s information.7
6 Iker Casanova (2007), ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia. Tafalla: Txalaparta, p. 144.
7 “ETA reunió en Madrid a 30 militantes para matar a Carrero”, Manuel Cerdán in El Mundo, December 20,
The intervention of this external factor was a key variable that made the terrorist innovation possible since ETA regarded itself as a small group that did not have the capacity to carry terrorist attacks in the country’s capital away from the territory –the Basque Country- where they originated from. ETA had a limited presence in Madrid at the time and its operatives were very concerned about the possibility of being found. This concern constrained ETA’s activities considerably discouraging them from planning a terrorist attack like the one they would finally perpetrate once they saw a window of opportunity as a result of the information facilitated to them.
It is important to emphasize the sequence of events that preceded Carrero’s assassination since they allow countering the ad hoc interpretations, which years after some ETA members would use in order to justify and enhance Carrero’s killing, which was nicknamed as “Operation Ogre”. See for example how Eugenio Etxebeste (Antxon), who would not join ETA until time after the
assassination, tried to put down Carrero’s killing to a rational strategic and political calculus that never existed:
Operation Ogre was a result of the strategic aim of undermining the dictatorship in order to build a democratic process in the Spanish state. Operation Ogre
unequivocally represented and demonstrated the Basque Resistance firm willingness to contest with all the available means the genocidal regime.8
It has to be remembered that ETA’s initial plan did not contemplate the killing of Carrero but his kidnapping and further release, throwing into question Antxon’s “strategic” rationale. One of ETA’s leaders at the time of Carrero’s assassination also disagreed with Antxon’s interpretation:
Operation Ogre did not pretend to achieve anything of the things that were later said. ETA’s objective was to kidnap Carrero in order to exchange him for our prisoners, but the initial project was abandoned because of technical difficulties. Anyway, that had nothing to do with a strategy towards democracy.9
Although ETA would try to present Carrero’s assassination as an attack that triggered the demise of Franco’s regime,10 the truth is that the dictatorship was already in its latest hours as a result of other
factors.11 Similarly, the Head of the State’s Security between 1965 and 1974 denied rumors that ETA
had received assistance from external players interested in precipitating the end of Franco’s dictatorship, and stated that “there was no black hand by the Americans”, adding that security elements within the State’s apparatus “did not turn a blind eye”.12 Wilson himself denied that the CIA
had anything to do with the plot,13 a rumor spread by sections of the Spanish Communist Party.
8 Florencio Domínguez (1998) b, ETA: Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones 1978-1992. Bilbao: Universidad del
País Vasco, p. 230.
9 “Un cadáver en el jardín”, Jon Juaristi, p. 198, in J. Aranzadi, J. Juaristi and P. Unzueta (1994), Auto de