OBSERVACIONES

Are these approaches enough to judge the “change” of animals by breeding or biotechnology?

I do not think so.

What we could call the flourishing-approach simply takes place between the blueprint and the full realization of all the capacities that can be thought of within a given genetic setting. (In this line of thinking, many practices of modern battery farming need serious reconsideration.)

But what can we do, when the blueprint in itself is changed? Then, of course, the animal should be given different opportunities to realize different capabilities. If it were possible to breed birds without a nesting drive (Rollin 1995a, b), it simply would not be a breach of their dignity not to let them nest. If it is no longer part of their range of capabilities, would it be a good thing for them? Blind laying hens13 would not feel the need to pick their neighbours’ feathers.

12_{For her an animal is “eine komplexe Lebensform mit einem intrinsischen Wert, deren Achtung}

sich in der Ermöglichung zur Verwirklichung seiner spezifischen Merkmale bzw. seiner freien Entfaltung (flourishing) ausdrückt”. (Ferrari 2008, p. 159).

13 _{Rippe (2002, p. 240): “Es wird eine Hühnerrasse gezüchtet, in der alle Tiere blind geboren}

werden. Durch die Erblindung reduzieren sich Federpicken und Kannibalismus. Die Hühnerrasse zeichnet sich Umständen der gegenüber anderen extensiv genutzten Hühnerrassen also durch ein gesteigertes Wohlbefinden aus. Pathozentriker werden hier mindestens zugestehen müssen, dass im Vergleich zu anderen extensiv genutzten Hühnerrassen eine Verbesserung eingetreten ist”.

Even in the bizarre case Douglas Adams imagined, namely a pig specially bred for being happy to be slaughtered – “a casserole of me perhaps?” – the principle would lead to accepting this strange behaviour as part of its nature.

This flatly contradicts our moral intuitions. We have to think of something else. One way out was the introduction of genetic integrity. There are, however, serious concerns that make it inadvisable to follow that track. One is that integrity makes sense if and only if the “parts, the organs, the structures of an animal end up at what can really be called an ‘integrum’, a ‘wholeness’ and ‘completeness’”.14In the case of the genome, I cannot see this kind of wholeness and completeness.

The second objection is an ethical one. It makes sense to take care of animals because they know better and worse states, and they seek for themselves to reach the better ones or to persevere in them. All this gives rise to moral considerations. None of this can be said about genomes. In other words: talking about genomes does not generate a moral perspective. Genomes are apparently simply biochemi- cal structures. Whatever they are, however, it is clear that they are nothing that in themselves can be the source of moral considerations.

They can, however, provide a cautionary tale. Changing single properties within an organism may collide with many other properties. These are extraordinarily com- plex entities. The integrity approach captures this nuance by accounting for the various stages of interference with animals and the various impacts it may have on the overall fitness and welfare of animals. The idea to breed blind laying hens for example must take into consideration that it is not the only function of the hen’s body to be switched off; it is taking away a central organ of apprehension for a bird. Yet, one can still say that this has to be qualified from case to case. It is nonetheless plausible to think that extreme results in the breeding of farm animals may have considerable side-effects on their overall constitution.

Something else to be considered is “aesthetics”. Whether we are considering battery farming or biotechnological concerns, many objections arise for aesthetic reasons. Think of caged laying hens or of broilers packed together. Think of naked cats. Think of gigantic salmon. Of course they make a strong impression. But is this all not only a question of getting accustomed to it? Think of common carp without scales – nobody is bothered, although it is quite natural (Kunzmann 2007, p. 125). Think of the enormous range of dogs – imagine, this variety would have been created by biotechnology and you can assume that fierce resistence would have followed.

Maybe.

Even here animal dignity offers some advice. The EKAH stated in 2000 that respecting the dignity of animals would exclude the following15:

Interference with the appearance of animals

14_{Cf. Hauskeller (2005): “Now, for Aristotle, because every part of an organism’s body is what}

it is in virtue of the whole whose part it is and for the sake of which it exists, it loses its identity when separated from that whole”.

15_{“– Eingriff ins Erscheinungsbild – Erniedrigung – übermässige Instrumentalisierung”. (See also}

Submission humiliation

Reducing animals to mere instruments

Now we know that since the Balzer/Rippe/Schaber Report (1998, p. 28), the humiliation of a human person is the core idea of breaching human dignity which includes “das Recht, nicht erniedrigt zu werden”. This in turn, makes no sense with animals that have no estimation of their own worth that could be offended. Why should it be morally wrong to change the appearance of animals, aesthetic considerations left aside? What does it mean to reduce animals to mere instru- ments (übermäßige Instrumentalisierung) and why should this be morally wrong? Philosophers know the conception in connection to Kant’s formula of human dig- nity (and its long record in legal history) – but how can this be transformed to fit to animals?

The answer is that referring to animal dignity there are two different aspects which I earlier referred to as “actions and attitudes” (Handlung und Haltung) (Kunzmann 2007). What we have discussed so far has taken into consideration that treating animals with dignity is an aspect of actions. The three prohibitions of the EKAH mention actions of course, but their real interest is attitudes. To reduce ani- mals to their mere function does not really qualify certain types of action, but is a statement about human motives or intentions. Complete humiliation of an animal does not necessarily harm it – but exposing animals to bizarre situations for example tells you something about the humans that enjoy it.

This explains why the phrase has become so widespread: It pinpoints a certain attitude towards animals that troubles many people. To produce blind hens because they may fit better into modern systems of husbandry is submitting the bird com- pletely to human interests. To create mice that develop automatically the desired form of cancer reduces them to mere instruments.

This kind of attitude has possibly stimulated the successful introduction of our conception. The question above regarding the opposition to freely modifying ani- mals to suit our needs is not so much a question of animal welfare; it is rather a question of attitudes and intentions. It is almost a symbolic act of “taking care” not to extend human domination over all and everything. To ascribe dignity to animals is a very humane performance because it means that humans are capable of denying or at least of limiting their own interests. Some 25 years ago, R. Spaemann argued that it is a performance of which only human beings are capable, and which is at the basis of their own dignity. It belongs to the gifts and to the obligations of humans to let “the things be”. Humans can limit their own will to dominate anything else and simply let other things have their own way. According to Spaemann, it is a true sign of human dignity to care for the nature of all the creatures of our local environment.16

16_{In Spaemann’s (1984) words, it is the “Fähigkeit, der naturwüchsigen Expansion des eigenen}

Machtwillens Grenzen zu setzen, einen nicht auf eigene Bedürfnisse bezogenen Wert anzuerken- nen, in der Fähigkeit, anderes in Freiheit ‘sein zu lassen’. . . Es [macht] gerade die Menschenwürde aus, im Umgang mit der Wirklichkeit deren eigenen Wesen Rechnung zu tragen”.

This final meaning of animal dignity addresses all our problematic cases and it is finally the reason why dignity is the more demanding concept. It includes not only animal welfare but also the human capacity for taking care. As with human dignity, it is not at all easy to give a positive description, but we can name those situations where people breach this dignity: In those cases when their own inter- ests seem to override any consideration of the animals with the result that animals become instruments for production units, for sports equipment, for clowns, for mea- suring instruments, for lacking family members. . . For all these cases, the term dignity of animals could apply because we should treat animals in any circumstance adequately. This means that we should treat animals essentially and principally as animals.

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