Oferta de cupos de Carrera

JOSE DE OCA MPO v s. SERA FINA FLORENCIA NO G.R. No. L-1 3 5 5 3 Febr u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 6 0

FA CTS:

In 1 938, Jose and Serafina were married and lived together as husband a n d w ife. Th ey w er e blessed of several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on sev eral occasions that Serafina was maintaining illicit relation s w ith Jose A r ca la s. For th is r eason, Jose sent his wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty cultu r e, w h er e sh e stayed for a year. However, Jose discovered that his wife, while in Manila wa s g oin g ou t w ith sev eral other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study in 1952, she and her h usband lived separately. On June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of h a v in g illicit

r elations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which Serafina agreed provided she is will not be char g ed w ith a dultery. On July 5, 1 955, a petition for legal separation was filed by Jose in conformity with th e con dition r equ ested by Ser a fin a .

Th e Court of Appeals found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discov ering the illicit happening has expressed his wish to file a petition for legal sepa r a tion a n d defen da n t r eadily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by th e Fisca l u pon or der s of th e court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she adm itted h a v in g h a d sexual relations with one Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of ju dgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, leg a l sepa r a tion cou ld n ot be decr eed.

ISSUE: W h eth er or n ot th e a ppella te cou r t com m itted a r ev er sible er r or . RULING:

Yes. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or con fession m ade by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of sepa r a tion u pon a con fession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the pla in tiff's dem a n d.

Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of ju dgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statem en t, th e decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on h er con fession , bu t u pon ev idence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclu siv ely or m ainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, a n y defen da n t w ho opposes the separation will immediately confess ju dg m en t, pu r posely to pr ev en t it.

Th e mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated fr om her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to a n swer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not or der th e dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which im plies m or e th a n con sen t or la ck of opposition to th e a g r eem en t.

WILLIA M H. BROWN v s. JUA NIT A YA MBA O G.R. No. L-1 06 9 9 October 1 8 , 1 9 5 7 FA CTS:

W illiam H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain leg a l sepa r a tion fr om his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese inv aders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tom as internment camp, his wife engag ed in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown lea r n ed of h is wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internmen t; th a t th er ea fter th e spou se lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and a ssigning certain properties to the er r in g w ife a s h er sh a r e. Th e com pla in t pr a y ed for con firmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the m a r r ia g e;

that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; a n d for th eir r em edy a s m ight be just and equitable. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently decla r ed th e w ife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and dir ected th e City Fiscal or his representatives to—investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, w hether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of h is inv estigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fisca l or h is r epr esen ta tiv e is a lso dir ected to in ter v en e in th e ca se in beh a lf of th e Sta te.

A s ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined pla in tiff Br own. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fa ct th a t a fter liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten childr en by h er . Th ereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, w hile the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar natu r e th a t ba r r ed h is r ig h t of a ction u n de r A r ticle 1 00 of th e n ew Civ il Code.

ISSUE:

W h ether or not the court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to a ct a s cou n sel for th e defen da n t, w h o defa u lted.

RULING:

NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the defa u ltin g w ife,

"w hen the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding ou t w h eth er or n ot th er e is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to in ter v en e for th e state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Ju anita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far fr om b ein g th e sta te.

Th e court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was alrea dy ba r r ed, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he lea r n ed of h is wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of th e new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1 ) y ea r fr om a n d after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years fr om a n d a fter th e da te when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctn ess of su ch fin din g s a n d con clu sion .

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts ca n ta ke cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or ann u lm en t of m arriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decr ee be issu ed if a n y leg a l obsta cles th er eto a ppea r u pon th e r ecor d.

T EODORO E. LERMA v s.COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d CONCEPCION DIA Z G.R. No. L-3 3 3 5 2 Decem ber 2 0, 1 9 7 4

FA CTS:

Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. Petitioner filed a com pla in t for a dultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against th e petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children a n d su pport, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for h er a n d th eir y ou n g est son , Gr egory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's com pla in t for l eg a l separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.Th e petition er filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pen den te lite, settin g u p a s defense te adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.Judg e Lu cia n o of CFI of Riza l g ranted the respondent's application for support pendente lite to the followin g effect: (1 ) th e r espondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from th e da te of th e filin g of th e com plaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly suppor t w a s r edu ced fr om P2 ,2 5 0.00 to P1 ,8 2 0.00.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and requested for proh ibition a n d pr elim in a r y in junction to annul the aforementioned orders. Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition a n d issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcin g sa id or der s.

Mor eover, on opposition of the respondent , the Court of Appeals dismissed such petition of th e petition er .

ISSUE:

W h ether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pen den te lite.

RULING:

Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is n ot an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of Fir st In sta n ce. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on a ppea l in th e Cou r t of A ppea ls, bu t th e sa m e u ndoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by th e a for esa id Ru le. If leg a l separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact tha t a n a ction for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obta in su ppor t pen dente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of th e decision s of th is Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defen se w ou ld be to file a su it for leg a l sepa r a tion n o m a tter h ow g r ou n dless.

Th e right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partn er sh ip pr oper ty , pr esupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spou se cla im in g su ch r ig h t to liv e separately. This is im plicit in Article 1 04 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from ea ch oth er . A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of a n a ct w h ich con stitutes a ground for legal separation a t th e in sta n ce of th e oth er spou se, ca n n ot be con sidered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Ar ticle 3 03 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when th e r ecipien t, be h e a for ced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 9 21 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given ca u se for leg a l separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with a n y cla im for su ppor t pen den te lite.

BENJA MIN BUGA YONG v s. LEONILA GINEZ G.R. No. L-1 003 3 Decem ber 2 8 , 1 9 5 6 FA CTS:

Ben jamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on leave. Im m edia tely a fter th eir m arriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. A fter som e tim e, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and infor m ed h er h usband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pa n g a sin a n , fr om w h ich pla ce sh e la ter m ov ed to Da g u pa n City to stu dy in a loca l colleg e th er e.

A s early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco a n d som e from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did n ot even care to mention. In August, 1 952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for h is wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's g odm oth er . Sh e ca m e a long with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of th e pla in tiff-h usband, wtiff-here ttiff-hey stayed and lived for 2 nigtiff-hts and 1 day as tiff-husband an d w ife. Ttiff-h en ttiff-h ey r epaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On th e second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of th e in for m a tion h e r eceived that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his quer y , m er ely pa cked up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After

that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Ba ca r r a , Ilocos Nor te, "to sooth e h is w ou n ded feelin g s".

On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasina n a com plaint for legal separation against his wife. The motion to dismiss was answered by plain tiff a n d the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, or der ed th e dism issa l of th e a ction .

ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the part of the husband with respect to the lega l sepa r a tion ca se on a ccou n t of a du lter y of th e w ife.

RULING:

Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's lin e of con du ct under the assum ption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1 9 5 2 , h e w ent to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her they lived together as husba n d a n d wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from her th e tr u th of th e news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instea d of a n swering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to su ch h u m ilia tion . A n d y et h e tr ied to loca te h er , th ou g h in v a in .

A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husban d, especia lly th ose por tion s qu oted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of th e h u sba n d for th e su pposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to a du lter y " com m itted by defen da n t-w ife.

A dm itting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were comm itted by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husba n d a n d wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept tog ether in their house likewise as husband and wife — a ll these facts have no other meanin g in th e opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten month s a fter h e ca m e to kn ow of th e a cts of in fidelity a m ou n tin g to a du lter y .

Th ere is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower cou r t er r ed in en ter ta in in g con donation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the a n sw er or in a m otion to dism iss, beca u se in th e secon d g r ou n d of th e m otion to dism iss.

ELISEA LA PERA L v s. REPUBLIC OF T HE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L- 1 8 008 . October 3 0, 1 9 6 2

FA CTS:

A fter several years of marriage with Enrique Sta. Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by the court. On the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also cea sed to liv e w ith h im . A specia l pr ocedure for change of name and /or permission to r esu m e th e m a id en n a m e of h er ein petitioner Elisea Laperal, was filed. The petition was opposed on th e g r ou n d th a t th e sa m e v iolates the provisions of Art. 372 of the New Civil Code. The court however granted the petition on the ground that her continued use of her married name will giv e r ise to con fu sion in h er a ffairs and in the even tu a l liqu ida tion of th eir con ju g a l a ssets. Th e Sta te a ppea led.

That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria a n d h a s likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to cha n g e h er name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name to ELISEA LA PERA L. In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of th e Civ il Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from h er h u sba n d, to con tinue u sin g th e n a m e a n d su r n a m e sh e em ploy ed befor e th e leg a l sepa r a tion .

ISSUE:

W h eth er or n ot th e petition for th e ch a n g e of n a m e sh ou ld be g r a n ted.

RULING:

No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a language that is mandatory, tha t th e w ife, ev en a fter the legal separation has been decreed should continue u sin g h er n a m e a n d su r n a m e em ployed before legal separation. This is so because her married statu s is u n a ffected by th e separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the w ife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for th e ben efit of a ll con cer n ed.

Th e Supreme Court decided that from the petition quoted in fu ll a t th e beg in n in g of th ese opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is leg a lly separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live w ith h im for m a n y y ea r s. It is dou btful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of na m e in g en er a l, m a y pr evail ov er the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to mar r ied

Th e Supreme Court decided that from the petition quoted in fu ll a t th e beg in n in g of th ese opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is leg a lly separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live w ith h im for m a n y y ea r s. It is dou btful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of na m e in g en er a l, m a y pr evail ov er the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to mar r ied