As noted, reflection and reflexivity are terms often used interchangingly within the social work literature. To assist in differentiating these concepts I have found the work of Cunliffe (2004) useful. Drawing on the work of Argyris (1991) and Argyris and Schön (1974) Cunliffe discusses ‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning. Discussing similar processes, Taylor and White (2000: 191) highlight how human interactions draw on an individual’s ‘knowing-in-action’ where their sense-making entails reflective analysis in the form of a ‘spontaneous, skilful performance’. With this kind of knowing-in-action sense-making is considered to occur habitually (Cunliffe, 2004). It does so when practitioners draw on their practice wisdom and/or their taken-for-granted knowledge of a situation, event or phenomenon.
Discussing the two-way relationship between human interaction and reflective analyses, Cunliffe (2004: 413) states this involves what Argyris (1991) describes as single-loop learning. With single-loop learning sense-making is accomplished when individuals draw on what they think they know to assign meaning to experience. Schön (1987: 56) describes this analytical process as ‘reflection-in-action’. With reflection-in-action our understanding of a situation is constructed moment-by- moment. Sense-making therefore principally occurs heuristically because of intuitive
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understanding of a previously experienced event and/or situation. Schön (1987) suggests our heuristic ‘in-the-moment’ understanding of experience based on spontaneous, routinised responses can be disrupted where the need to reflect in a reflexive way presents. Disruption can occur when we are presented with an experience, event or situation that does not ‘fit’ with our existing way of knowing. Fook (2012: 113) describes this occurrence as a ‘critical incident’. Critical incidents occur where a situation, event of happening leads to a (re)valuation of our taken-for- granted way(s) of knowing.
Drawing on Wittgenstein (1980), Cunliffe (2004: 409) describes this reflexive process as experiential learning which occurs due to being ‘struck’. Cunliffe suggests, on being struck by a critical incident our reflexive deliberations can lead to new meaning. Eruat (1994) suggests it is through reflection-in-and/or-on-action (re)interpretations of taken-for-granted assumptions can lead to self-knowledge. It does so through what Argyris and Schön (1974) describe as double-loop learning. In Figure 8 highlighted is how double-loop learning can occur through critically-reflexive questioning of taken-for-granted experiences and/or normative assumptions:
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Where double-loop learning occurs, new meanings arise from experience. In double- loop learning, Argyris and Schön (1974) argue, a critically conscious acknowledgement of the incongruence between our espoused theory and our theory- in-use takes place through reflexive deliberation. It does so where, for example, our taken-for-granted assumptions, values and beliefs are called into question. Argyris and Schön (1974) propose double-loop learning is concerned with a critically- reflexive self-questioning and willingness to challenge what we think we know as we learn from experience. Acknowledging the complexities of applying the idea of double-loop learning to inform a critically-reflexive approach to practice, and considering how this might differ from a more orthodox approach to reflective practice, Taylor and White (2000: 197) state:
Reflexivity...problematises issues reflection takes for granted. Reflection takes propositional knowledge at face value. Through reflection we can become more adept at applying child development and attachment theory…[practising] reflexivity suggests we interrogate these [theories and their] taken-for-granted assumptions
Drawing on the ideas of Argyris and Schön (1974), Cunliffe (2004) and Taylor and White (2000), where social workers have developed a critically-reflexive approach to practice, the taken-for-granted assumptions informing their sense-making will be called into question. Meanwhile, where prescriptive policy and practice frameworks continue to be followed, albeit without critically-reflexive questioning, at best D’Cruz (2004a: viii) argues practitioners risk continuing to operate as ‘techno-rational representatives of state power and authority’. Some of the insights drawn from Argyris and Schön (1974), Cunliffe (2004) and Taylor and White (2000) challenge the theorising of Archer (2003). For example, Archer claims that individuals will practice a dominant mode of reflexive that will remain exclusive to them, and where presented with challenging social circumstances will risk developing a fractured
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reflexivity. However, Argyris and Schön (1974), Cunliffe (2004) and Taylor and White (2000) suggest a meta-reflexive mode will be inherently encouraged where individuals encounter new experience(s) and/or critical incident(s).
Summary and evaluation
I began with a review of the concept of reflexivity as discussed by Lynch (2000), Sayer (2010) and Archer (2003). Drawing on the work of Lynch (2000) and Sayer (2010) I highlighted different ‘kinds’ of reflexivity discussed in the literature including ‘habitual’ and ‘epistemic’ reflexivity. How these ‘reflexivities’ can be equated to a low habitual and high epistemic level was discussed. I reviewed the work of Archer (1995) and her ideas about social transformation through morphogenetic cycles. Archer’s (2003) theory of reflexivity was also discussed. Applying Archer’s (1995) theory of social transformation I considered how with the notion of a morphogenetic cycle it is possible to theorise about the possible containing or enabling consequences of practitioners’ encounters with children and families.
Consequently, based on Archer’s idea of the morphogenetic cycle the influence of social workers’ contextual conditioning, and where this may be transformed or reproduced in the context of their encounters with children and families, has been illustrated. Identified was how practitioners’ interpretations of the nature of social work with children and families might be determined by their different modes of reflexivity. Where a social worker’s reflexive mode does not encourage a critical questioning of the taken-for-granted dimensions of their practice in child protection I
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demonstrated how positive outcomes for children and families might be discouraged. However, while I highlighted the need for the development of practice-depth in child protection through a high epistemic reflexivity, I discussed how Houston (2001) describes how a low habitual reflexive practice encouraged by techno-rationality and as NPM agenda is of limited use to children and families. This is because, as Houston (ibid: 853) states, ‘trauma, loss, broken attachment, suicidal intent, adolescent pathos, impoverished social networks and atrophying communities’ cannot be understood and addressed through applying techno-rationality as a scientific epistemology. Drawing on a contemporary social constructionist perspective, I have highlighted how the task of social work should therefore be to discover the social structures and/or causal mechanisms that can reproduce and/or transform the suffering and oppression of children and families.
By assisting families to identify constraining structures and consider why these exist, and how they can be ameliorated, their capacity for personal transformation can be enhanced (Houston, 2001). On practising epistemic reflexivity, this suggests the need for a double morphogenetic approach to practice as I have illustrated. With this approach, social workers could identify the causal influence of social structures operating as cultural constraints within their practice contexts and those experienced by children and families. Adopting a double morphogenetic approach social workers create potential to find answers to: (1) the reason(s) why they practice the way they do and (2) why some parents might experience a constraint, or restricted sense of personal agency and/or (3) choose to consider a non-prescriptive course of action.
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In child protection, Archer’s (2003) theory suggests different modes of reflexivity will inform practitioners’ sense-making, actions and agency. In my review of Archer’s theory these claims prove useful in relation to exploring my research questions. This is because Archer argues that all social work practitioners’ sense-making will be informed by the practice of reflexivity. However, prior to applying Archer’s theory of reflexivity to inform my study there is a need for some critical analysis. For example, as discussed with the idea of the habitus, Bourdieu (1990) does not share Archer’s view of reflexivity as the conscious means by which human agency and action is determined. Opposed to the idea of reflexivity as a conscious inner conversation guiding action, Bourdieu argues for an understanding of reflexivity as an implicit process informing human sense-making.
Contrastingly, while undervaluing Bourdieu’s theorising, Archer’s (2003) theory of reflexivity does not allow for what Caetano (2014: 3) describes as the ‘conceptualisation of individual interiority’. With the concept of individual interiority Caetano theorises reflexivity as a conscious deliberation and habitual subconscious processes which potentially combine to determine human sense-making, action and agency. Applying Caetano’s concept, in relation to sense-making and social transformation in child protection, individual interiority may be utilised to inform understanding of the morphogenetic cycle. For example, where a practitioner’s conscious-unconscious reflexivity combined is understood as causally influencing their interactions with children and families, sense-making would involve them acknowledging potential errors of culturally conditioned and/or personified thought.
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As Sayer (2010: 117) indicates, encouraging morphogenesis requires the potential for ‘becoming a different person with different embodied habits of thought’. Some of our innermost and embodied habits may have been shaped during our early years. Therefore, these may be difficult to transcend as they may be subconsciously shaping our dispositions and/or our mode of reflexivity as practised within the morphogenetic cycle. As Caetano (2014) argues, the concept of individual interiority makes it possible to understand the non-reflexive aspects of social work practice where a critically-reflexive practitioner’s deeply embedded personal perception(s) and interpretation(s) may continue to influence their sense-making, actions and agency.
Dependent on their personal experience of the constraints and enablements of the setting, a practitioner’s mode of reflexivity might change across time. This is a potential phenomenon under-theorised by Archer (2003). In relation to my research questions what emerges here is the question of: ‘How might practitioners
demonstrate a static, changing or hybrid mode of reflexivity?’ In the case of a hybrid
reflexivity, where reflexive modes may combine and/or change across time, how this happens remains under-investigated. Due to a focus on personal reflexivity, Archer’s (2003) theorising does not fully explain the causal influence the taken-for-granted cultural rules and practices of a professional norm circle will have on a social worker’s mode of reflexivity.
Although, the idea of practising critical-reflexivity challenges the arguments presented by Elder-Vass (2012) who emphasises the pervasive influence of professional norm circles on practitioners’ reasoning processes. The potential for
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social workers to practice critical-reflexivity, and the causal influence a professional norm circle might have on their capacity and/or willingness to do so, is an important consideration in relation to my research questions. This is because, for example, even where a meta-reflexive mode might be present, how the cultural rules and practices of their professional norm circle might be influencing a social worker’s sense-making, action and agency needs to be understood empirically.
In my review, I have highlighted the range of reflexive modes Archer (2003) indicates may be potentially practised by social workers. In relation to the complexities of day- to-day practice, I discussed how communicative reflexive practitioners may find themselves with a fractured reflexivity. As noted, this is due to potential difficulties of personal agency arising where a practitioner’s need to seek the support and advice of managers and/or colleagues is impeded by a lack of relational-responsiveness. Archer (2003) theorising indicates there is a need for communicative reflexive practitioners to complete their inner conversation with trusted others to make sense and formulate judgement in child protection. However, unanswered within Archer’s theorising is the question of how some practitioners located within statutory settings might be encouraged to move between differing modalities where required to practice reflexivity.
Overlooked by Archer is how internal and/or external conversation as linguistic activity may act as the mediating mechanism between structure and agency regardless of an individual’s mode of reflexivity. Caetano (2014) highlights how several commentators have stressed the centrality of language as how people will: (1) express their concerns (2) negotiate goals and (3) challenge and/or adhere to
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what is expected of them. As Vandenberghe (1995: 259) points out, Archer (2003) neglects the ‘linguistic turn’ in social theory where language is considered constitutive of human meaning-making. Nevertheless, despite criticism of Archer’s theory of reflexivity, it remains a useful foundation for informing my study. This is because outside of any variation(s) arising inductively, Archer’s theory offers a deductive template by which social workers’ reflexive practices can be interpreted.
Throughout this thesis, I apply Archer’s (2003) theory to interpret practitioners’ reasoning processes. It is apparent from my review of Archer’s theory an awareness of the implications different modes of reflexivity might have on social workers’ sense- making, judgement and decision-making is important. However, while reflexivity remains undertheorised within the social work literature, what is understood about reasoning processes, judgement and decision-making in child protection is primarily based on theories developed within cognitive psychology. As noted in chapter 1, contemporary social constructionists (e.g. Weinberg, 2015: 150) argue for an appreciation of examining studied phenomena through a desegregation of theoretical perspectives and integration of differing epistemologies. Therefore, to fully explore what might inform social workers’ sense-making tendencies, in the final part of this chapter I examine human reasoning and models of judgement and decision-making formulated within cognitive psychology.
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