Operaciones con partes vinculadas

Introduction

E

migrants from the Maghreb have been described as ‘colonial labourers’,‘colonial sol- diers’, ‘requisitioned war-labourers’, ‘French subjects’ or ‘protégés’, ‘French Muslims working in the metropolis’,1 _{and as ‘emigrant-immigrants’. More recently, they have}

been referred to as ‘immigrant-citizens’, while at the same time being simply ‘citizens’2

This range of chronologically ordered notions reflects the main periods of Maghreb migration, and spans a century of their social history.

The Algerians were the first.They produced the most massive and long-lasting waves of migration. They were soon followed by Moroccans, who often travelled via Algeria where they traditionally worked as seasonal agricultural labourers.3_{After World War II,}

there was a break in Moroccan emigration which lasted until 1960. During this period, the only immigrant workers permitted to enter France were those from Algeria.The last of the natives of the Maghreb to emigrate to France were the Tunisians. Each of these migration flows reproduced the classic process of the ‘three ages’, but they did so in their own way, each to a different rhythm. Algerian emigration-immigration was the first to develop this process to its full extent.4_{The more recent the emigration, the more rapid}

this evolution.

Because similar causes produce similar effects, this story is pretty much the same in all three Maghreb countries. In each case, the migration process is characterized by the same initial event, colonization. It is true to say that developments proceeded differently in each case. It is equally true that the twentieth century was characterized by all kinds of transformational processes, social, economic, political and cultural.Yet, in terms of migra- tion, the constellation of the Maghreb was unequivocally three emigration countries and a single immigration country. In the case of the Algerians, there was an exclusive migra- tion relationship. This applied to a lesser extent to Tunisians. In the case of the Moroc- cans, however, there was a very broad relationship, which meant that they became wide- ly distributed throughout various European countries. At the present time, the strong North African representation in Europe is reflected by statistics for the entire region and by figures at a national level in a number of European countries.5_{With the exception of}

the special situation in France, where there has also been large-scale immigration from

1 Ageron (1962). 2 Ray (1938). 3 Sayad (1977) 59-79.

4 See Dr de Haas’s article elsewhere in this book. 5 Noiriel (1988).

Algeria and Tunisia, this phenomenon is mainly due to the Moroccan presence, which increased almost threefold from 1975 to 1990.

The Moroccans are the most numerous of the North African communities in Europe. In the seventies, they represented 30 per cent of the North African population here. By the beginning of the nineties, this figure had risen to over 50 per cent. One characte- ristic of the Moroccan population is that it is widely distributed throughout all European countries. Already evident in the seventies, this aspect has been further accentuated in recent years.

As a former colonial power, France is an obvious receiving country. Its status as an immigration country dates back to the nineteenth century.6_{While France was host to}

68 per cent of the Moroccan population in Europe in 1975, by 1993 this figure had fal- len to 51 per cent. During the same period, the percentage of Tunisians present in Europe and established in France declined from 86 per cent to 73 per cent. In a num- ber of European countries, there is a strong Moroccan representation among resident foreigners from non European Union member states. Moroccans are the most numerous members of this group in Belgium, Italy and Spain.They occupy second place in France (after the Algerians) and the Netherlands (after the Turks).7

The First ‘Age’

When examined retrospectively, the first ‘age’ of the historical-cultural processes inau- gurated by Algeria, can be seen as a sort of ‘Golden Age’ for emigration-immigration. This mainly applied to the immigration country, of course. As the head of a colonial empire, France exercised absolute control over both ends of the migratory chain, i.e. the ebb and flow of the labour force and of soldiers. As long as the emigration country per- ceived this situation to be merely transient, involving only a ‘temporary’ absence of its emigrants, there was no threat to the cohesion and equilibrium of its overall internal social order. Finally it will not have been perceived as an adverse experience by those most directly concerned.This was especially true for those who clung to an illusion as a means of coping with the pressures of being emigrants/immigrants, and as a way of giving meaning to their situation. The illusion in question was that their ‘absence/pre- sence’ was no more than a temporary diversion, with no serious consequences for their long-term destiny.8

On the other hand however this first ‘age’ can be considered as the engineered dis- placement of population by the colonial power, as a means of satisfying its urgent need for soldiers and colonial labourers.This was in spite of the illusion that the ‘operation’ in question was limited in time and space. If you set out to find evidence of the arrival in France of the first Algerian immigrants – who at the time were not identified as such - you may find more than you bargained for. In a context that underlines its innovative

6 ILO, Migration from Maghreb, 1-4. 7 Boudoudou (1985), Sayad (1985). 8 Sayad (1985).

character, you will see that this was a deliberately well-planned and implemented enter- prise. During World War I, 240,000 Algerians – more than one third of the male popu- lation aged 20 to 40 – were either mobilized or required for labour. Given the magni- tude of the effects of induced enrolment in the French army, there is no doubt that the initial immigration of Algerians was engineered.9_{This view is further supported by the}

scale of the effects produced by the requisition of labourers for the war industry, or for trench-digging during World War I.10

During the same period, Moroccans were subject to the same process, with the same objectives.This is a fact of which French historians are very well aware.

‘The Great War broke out soon after we had established ourselves in Morocco. In the interest of national defence, many French emigrants were required to return to France. As financial flows ground to a halt, it was the turn of Moroccans to emigrate. Moroccan soldiers landed on our soil as early as August 1914. Before the close of 1916, thousands of Moroccan labourers has responded to the call from our factories and our metropolitan construction sites’.11

The French military was one of the most fundamental instruments of control in Algeria and Morocco. It depended primarily on indigenous soldiers who were coerced by French colonial policies while, at the same time, being instrumental in their implemen- tation. Conscription was the principal means of channelling ‘ex-fellahs’ into the French army. In the case of Morocco, four major military units had been established and were under the effective control of French officers even prior to the signing of the Protectorate treaty on March 1912. From 1908 to 1956, Moroccan colonial troops par- ticipated in various military campaigns both within Morocco and elsewhere.These inclu- ded Morocco (1908-1934), France (1914-1918), Tunisia (1942-1943), Corsica (1943), Italy (1944), France (1944), Germany (1944-1945), and Indochina (1948-1954).12

‘Voluntary’ enlistment in the army was clearly the only way of escaping from the life of unmitigated hardship led by these deprived peasants. It can be seen as a collective res- ponse to the colonial challenge and to the ensuing economic uncertainty. Its real signi- ficance has nothing whatsoever to do with the colonial ideology of ‘voluntary’ recruit- ment. One of the fundamental conceptions perpetuated by colonial discourse was the notion of voluntaryism.The attractiveness of a career in the Goums, or other regiments, can be explained by the existence of various forms of social benefit which acted as ‘swee- teners’ for a ‘voluntary’ recruitment. Unlike Algeria, there was no system of conscription in Morocco. In 1912, because it was considered to be a French département, Algeria was made subject to the same rules of recruitment that were instituted in a French law of 1872. In Morocco, however, this was not the case. The Tirailleurs were allowed to enlist for a period of four years only, after which they had the opportunity to re-enlist.13

9 Ray (1938) 45. 10 Maghraoui (1998). 11 Ibidem 73. 12 Boudoudou (1991).

Due to the colonial domination which generated it, the first ‘age’ of emigration from the Maghreb to France is historically seen as an ‘illegitimate’ presence.The phenomenon of Maghrebians in France and later on, throughout Europe, is viewed as what might be described as an ‘illegitimate birth’. Much more information is required concerning the economic, legal, social, and political conditions that mould this presence, and by which it in turn is defined. Only by this means can we arrive at a better understanding of the polemic notion of ‘community’. This in turn will enable us to understand how this group constitutes a ‘particular’ community.An unwarranted view of its history led to the ‘stigmatization’ of this community, thereby hampering its assimilation. The fact that the community was rooted in a dominated ‘civilization’ was another contributory factor.

Its distinct colonial past places Maghreb emigration-immigration in a class of its own. In this respect it differs from other migration movements to France, mostly involving southern-European immigrants. It also differs from Maghrebian immigration in coun- tries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and more recently, Spain and Italy. Its specific history results in an essential ‘alterité’, which today still defines the Maghrebian presence in France, and throughout Europe.

Indeed, this is not simply a matter of representation.The same ‘essentialist’ representa- tion is the defining principle of current immigration policy, aimed as it is at administe- ring the presence of foreign populations on home soil, as well as within the nation.14_As

a result, this ‘particular history’ had a profound effect on ‘immigration policy’ that was unprecedented in the history of immigration into France. People had to face the ‘dilem- ma’ of ‘choosing’ between ‘labour immigration’ and/or ‘settlement immigration’.

In the seventies, many people deplored the fact that France lacked a coherent immi- gration policy. However, this simply meant that France was unable to decide – although, in fact, it had no ‘choice’ in the matter – to opt for either a ‘settlement immigration’ or a ‘labour immigration’. Settlement immigration was thought to be associated with ‘dan- gers of inassimilable cores becoming encysted in the country’15_{, as a result of the immi-}

grants’ different geographical, social, and cultural origins. A ‘labour immigration’ invol- ves temporary settlement only. This ambivalence was maintained, especially during the period between the two wars. At that time, France needed to compensate for a mainly male demographic deficit of 2.5 million. This deficit was due to the effects of a long- term decline in birth rate, combined with military mortality and other human casualties incurred during the hostilities.16_{We should bear in mind, however, that even now it is}

not possible to formulate a policy other than a ‘lack of policy’, or a policy that is as contradictory as the issue itself. However many controls are imposed, labour immigra- tion will always include a component of settlement immigration. For France, this was especially true at a time when such matters were not subject to ‘contractual agreements’ (i.e. agreements between states), and during the colonial period. Aside from the matter of whether ‘settlement immigration’ is either desirable or useful, it is obvious that some

14 Bonnet (1980) 4. 15 Sayad (1985) 29. 16 Sayad (1975).

human settlements will not be totally French, and that they will not automatically turn people into French citizens.17

The Second ‘Age’

The second ‘age’ corresponds to the adoption of a new form by the foreign labour force. This was when the Maghreb countries drew up sovereign agreements called ‘Conventions of labour force and social security’.The idea that this would not result in a definitive transfer of population was, of course, an illusion.

What we witnessed during this second ‘age’ was therefore a form of ‘temporary pre- sence/absence’.The parties to this were those involved in any migration: the emigration country, the immigration country, and the migrant himself. Logically, any ‘temporary’ status ends when immigrants return to their homeland. Since 1977, this vision has cau- sed the immigration country to draw up all kinds of measures intended to encourage immigrant labourers to return to their native county, for the purpose of ‘réinsertion’.

Paradoxically, while both sides concerned in the phenomenon of migration were debating the topic of ‘réinsertion’, the implementation of measures to meet the massive increase in demand to reunite families was in full swing. In reality, no one pays much attention to this contradiction. Legislation is aimed at making the stay dependent on employment, which would be the sole source of legitimacy. As babies were born to Maghrebian emigrants-immigrants, whether to mixed parentage or solely immigrant parentage, a new form of ‘immigration presence’ arose. This involved ‘immigrants who emigrated from nowhere’18_{.This paradoxical situation compels us to re-define the immi-}

gration problem.Therefore,

‘those who were previously involved in the processes of institutionalizing the ‘aid to migrants’ are urged to ‘redirect’ their focus to the new generation. From this standpoint, it is the impending admi- nistrative division of labour that now makes it vitally important to devise a new definition of immi- gration’.19

An inevitable ‘human settlement immigration’ emerged from the great economic reces- sion of 1974. Every attempt to ‘promote’ the immigrants’ final return to their homeland had failed. Lone immigrants, having benefited from the provisions for family reunifica- tion during the ‘second age’, decided to stay.This was followed by the birth of a ‘second generation’, and a third….etc.

Accordingly, a new definition of immigration became imperative. Especially from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, this constituted the third ‘age’ of Maghreb-France emi- gration-immigration. This heralded the completion of a migratory cycle in France, and in other traditional immigration countries throughout Europe.

17 Lapeyronnie (1987) 287-318. 18 Zerroti (1984).

The Third ‘Age’

The emigration of entire households obviously meant that assimilation had to take place, regardless of how it was defined:‘adaptation to social reality’,‘insertion’,‘integration’, etc. These terms are all euphemisms relating to this inevitable social reality. No one harbou- red any illusions in this regard. Certainly not those concerned about family or house- hold emigration because they feared the dissolution of ties with the mother country and a more or less slow identification with the host society. Nor indeed those who were repelled by the immigration of such families, whom they considered (on the basis of pre- judice rather than experience) to be ‘inassimilable’.

This ‘sudden’ awareness of the evolution of this process led to the institutionalization of the debate about integration and ‘integrative’ actions on ‘cultural’ grounds, particular- ly in the educational field and mainly in schools.20_{This led to the emergence of new}

concepts, such as ‘pluricultural’,‘intercultural’,‘multicultural’,‘pluriethnic’ and ‘multieth- nic’ etc. These notions constitute a ‘social usage’ of the immigrant’s culture,21_especially

in the context of Maghreb immigration and its cultural characteristics, or its ‘intrinsic exogeneity’.

It was therefore no surprise when, at the end of the past decade, the problem of ‘inte- gration’ began evolving toward a ‘culturalist’ defining principle. This led to the ‘essenti- al’ characterization of Maghreb immigration as a ‘radical alterity’, Islam.22_{Of course, this}

totally contradicts that which – in the context ‘cela-va-de-soi’ – is seen as the basis of the French ‘national identity’. According to this view, laïcité and secularization form the cement of veritable ciment ‘national community cohesion’. At this point, it is legitima- te to wonder whether one can be more integrated, in cultural terms, than those who were born and socialized in the host society. Is this affected by whether the process of identification with that society takes place naturally or, as we usually say, ‘par la force des

choses’?

It is not by chance that, as this migratory cycle approaches completion, the processes of integration are becoming more efficient. After all, more and more Maghrebians are applying for the nationality of the host country, regardless of ‘resistance’ by the partners involved in the Maghreb immigration in France and elsewhere in Europe. Such resistan- ce is merely a negotiation ‘strategy’ in the wider issue, namely the social and political sta- tus of a permanent presence. Only now are people starting to appreciate the conse- quences of this situation. In other words, this presence is increasingly being defined on economic, social, cultural, and political grounds i.e. as an ‘established social fact’.

There are still ‘immigrants’ who, even though they have spent all of their active years (in some cases their entire lives) in the host country, do not have access to the legitima- cy of citizenship23_{(which is not only a matter of law and regulations). It has to be said}

that this will continue to cause ‘cultural’ conflicts and issues for the partners involved in

20 Sayad (1983).

21 Fondation Diderot (1988). 22 Boudoudou (1998) 55-70. 23 Fondation Diderot (1988).

the ‘Maghreb-Europe migration system’, whether in France or elsewhere in Europe. Conclusion

There is an unprecedentedly urgent need for a synthetic review of this kind, dealing with the Maghreb migratory process in France and throughout Europe, if we are to improve our understanding of the issues. Immigration has indeed become one of the most con- troversial public policy issues in immigration societies. Politicians, the media, and citizen advocacy groups are making a variety of claims about the forces driving international migration, and about the consequences of immigration for ‘national interests’. Our understanding should be conditioned less by speculative hazards (i.e. actuality, with its sometimes tragic aspects) and more by fundamental causes. What we need is objective research into the wider process and the structural determinants of emigration and immi- gration.24

Part IV

Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning

In document BOLETÍN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA (página 42-44)