Opinión sobre el funcionamiento de la sanidad pública

conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand.

“In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order” (Art 190, CC)

“The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval…” (Art 191, CC)

FACTS:

Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married and had four children. On January 9, 1963, Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and went on to reside in Manila. She filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.

However, the spouses were able to reach an

WON the settlement/compromise agreement between the two spouses approved by the Court of First Instance is valid and conformable to law

HELD:

YES. The settlement/compromise agreement between the two spouses is valid with respect to the separation of property and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (See doctrine aforementioned) Judicial sanction was obtained upon the CFI’s approval of the separation of their property as well as the dissolution of the conjugal property. Moreover, the propriety of severing the spouses’ financial interests is manifest given that they have been separated in fact for at least five years already and at the same time the court had no power to compel the spouses to live together. However, the approval of separation of property and the dissolution of the CPG does not mean the court legalizes/recognizes the separation in fact of the spouses.

As to the custody of the children, the Court held that the CFI erred in depriving the mother of the custody of the two older children, citing Art 363 of the CC which commands that “no mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.” When the settlement was approved by the CFI, the two older children were then 6 and 5 years old respectively and the court did not have any compelling reasons to grant their custody to the father other than to rely on the mutual agreement of the spouses in their settlement.

The courts, in determining which parent custody of the child should be granted, should take into account where the child can best be assured of the rights granted to him by law.

Decision of the CA declaring null and void the settlement/compromise judgment in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two elder children is affirmed.

Maquilan v. Maquilan

TOPIC: Voluntary separation of property DOCTRINE:

Art. 134 - The separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

FACTS:

Spouses married with one son. However, their relationship soured when husband found out wife was cheating on him.

He filed a case of adultery against wife = both wife and her paramour found guilty.

Wife then filed for nullity of marriage, dissolution of CPG, and damages on the grounds that husband was psychologically incapacitated.

During this case, spouses entered into a Compromise Agreement to partially divide their CPG.

However, husband filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the agreement, stating that his lawyer did not inform him of the consequences of it. This was denied so he appealed to the CA >> also denied husband hence this case.

The husband argues that:

1. The Compromise Agreement should not have been deemed valid since it is against law and public policy (wife was guilty of adultery hence can’t get share of property)

2. That the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor

3. That the respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property. given the arguments of the husband

HELD:

Petition denied. Ruling of CA affirmed.

Compromise Agreement is valid.

1. Husband’s argument that wife can’t get a share and that her share should go to their common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the FC is wrong. The provisions he cited are inapplicable to this case and it is Article 134 of the FC that should be applied. Under Article 134 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.

2. Solicitor General’s participation is not required. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage.

3. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction, therefore wife’s right to manage property is not deprived.

4. Negligence of lawyer binds client. Only reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law.

Other notes:

The Compromise Agreement stipulated that:

Maquilan v. Maquilan

188 332 Poblador

Persons and Family Relations

a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the parties.

b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.

c. The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a building thereon;

The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be

owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;

d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;

e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.

Art. 34 of RPC -­­ Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.