OptSim

The Khmer Rouge’s assault on the country’s intellects and schools was disastrous for education. A 30 year old male interviewed by Panh (1999, p. 32) is cited as saying:

The Khmer Rouge didn’t just kill people, they turned our generation into ignoramuses, animals, idiots, who don’t know where they are going. We didn’t study. All we know is how to use our physical strength so we can only get jobs as peasants or labourers.

While many children in Cambodia are now afforded the opportunity to get an education, numerous others have no choice but to spend their days wandering the streets looking for food, moving goods on bicycles, hustling as street vendors, begging, or increasingly selling their bodies to satisfy an ever increasing sex industry (Stansell, 2005). Human trafficking has become rife in Cambodia and it is thought (Academy for Educational Development, n.d) that poverty, inequality, a socio-economic imbalance between urban and rural areas, unemployment, increasing tourism, and a lack of education are further contributing to the problem. Often trafficked for sexual exploitation and

forced labour, children under 18 years are particularly vulnerable. Many victims and their families are led to believe that they will be working as domestic servants only to later find that they have been tricked into something much more sinister (Academy for Educational Development, n.d; Kristof & WuDunn, 2010). Poverty makes life in Cambodia a constant struggle and corruption and impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2012b; Panh, 1999; Pearson, 2011) often go hand in hand in a society where bribes are paid for action as well as inaction.

It could be argued that corruption in Cambodia has almost become a cultural norm, with many accepting the practise as a normal part of everyday life. The beliefs that surround client patronage and gift giving likely contribute to the sense that corruption is normal or okay. The Corruption Perception Index 2011 (Transparency International, 2012) scored Cambodia 2.1 with 0 being highly corrupt and 10 being very clean. Of the 183 countries included in the index Cambodia ranks 164 (Transparency International). While the method used is not without its shortcomings (Seiha & Frommer, 2006), it does indicate the degree of corruption occurring in the country. It has been said that corruption has become routine in Cambodia (Seiha & Frommer, 2006) and that it is taking place locally, regionally, and nationally. The incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen came to power in 1993 after forming a coup when he came second in the country’s first national elections following the Khmer Rouge. Since then his government has been accused (Brinkley, 2009, p. 111) of “looting Cambodia’s natural resources, jailing political opponents, kicking thousands of the weakest out of their homes, and fostering an expansive system of corruption.”

The most dishonest institutions in Cambodia are thought to include the police, courts, tax, and customs departments (Seiha & Frommer, 2006). Although it is well known that corruption and impunity are not unusual in Cambodia international donations and foreign aid continue to flow into the country with limited accountability or transparency (Brinkley, 2009; Pearson, 2011; St John, 2005). Under these circumstances there has thus far been little political will to pass anti-corruption legislation (Soto as cited in Brinkley, 2009) or any real interest in democratisation (Blunt & Turner, 2005). One area where the Cambodian government has been repeatedly criticised (LICADHO, 2012; Stansell, 2005) is over the practise of “land grabbing”. The Khmer Rouge abolished private property rights and this has made it easier for the current government to seize large tracts of land for agricultural development under their Economic Land Concessions scheme (LICADHO, 2012; Seiff, 2012; Sochua & Wikstrom, 2012).

Large industrial companies are acquiring land through long term leases, often at the expense of local subsistence farmers who are forcibly evicted from their land with no form of compensation and few rights to protest (Amnesty International, 2012; LICADHO, 2011). Since 2003 it is estimated that as many as 420,000 people (Amnesty International, 2012) have been affected by forced evictions and

land disputes with LICADHO (2012) reporting that as many as 2.1 million hectares of land have been leased to private companies in the same timeframe. A SWOT analysis (UNDP, 2006) carried out in relation to the Cambodian economy reported on land ownership based on decile groups (page 17). They suggest that in 2003 those in the bottom 40 per cent of the decile groupings owned less than six per cent of the total land area and those in the top 20 per cent owned 70 per cent (UNDP, 2006). Since 2003 land concessions and forced evictions have continued to increase in number and magnitude (LICADHO, 2012; Amnesty International, 2012) making those in the lower 40 per cent group much more vulnerable to losing not only access to their land and homes but also the resources they rely on for their livelihoods (Stansell, 2005). In recent years restrictive legislation has been introduced in Cambodia aimed at limiting freedom of expression, assembly, and peaceful association (LICADHO, 2011; Amnesty International, 2012). At the same time, newspapers reports of land activists shot dead or detained (Pilorge, 2012; Radio Free Asia, 2012a; Sochua & Wikstrom, 2012) are accompanied with reports of human rights abuses (Alpert, 2012; Bartlett, 2012; Phnom Penh Post, 2012) and a culture of impunity (Grudgings & Thul, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012a; Radio Free Asia, 2012b). With the situation as it is, one begins to question how it is that the government has been able to get away with such behaviour.