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Multiple rationales, purposes, benefits and values, necessarily raise the prospect of instrumentalism once again, a term unavoidably linked to the search for legitimacy and thus the weak status of cultural policy. The emergence of cultural instrumentalism from 18th and 19th century discourses was explicitly articulated through the Victorians’

concern with public order and the skilful use of culture to support it (Nisbett, 2013, p 85). Instrumentalism, therefore, has been perceived as a particularly UK preoccupation (Sar, 2009) and like extrinsic and intrinsic discourses, understandings of it are complex and often divided - often within the same commentator/statement. The source of this

division essentially concerns whether instrumentalism is simply a description of how things are in policy, and/or whether it is a moral position describing how things should be, vis-à-vis the potential for putting culture to work.

By far the greater force of scholarship has been directed at the “well rehearsed”

(Nisbett, 2012, p. 2) critiques of instrumentalism that focus on its “harmful aspects”

(ibid.), viewing it as essentially driven by pernicious market forces with negative consequences for culture (McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Vestheim, 2007, etc.). Negative views of instrumentalism involve claims that expectations for and pressures on culture to deliver economically and socially, contribute to a number of harmful scenarios. These scenarios are claimed to be: the funding of mainstream, unchallenging and homogenous culture, which reduces cultural democracy as well as cultural or creative career opportunities (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p.

218); the promotion of “conservative values of prudence, anti-innovation and a nervousness of being disruptive” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 71); the dulling of the critical capacity of culture (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p. 218; Gray, 2008;

Hewitt, 2011, p. 10); the indifferentiation of the market to the “specific quality” of culture (O’Connor, cited in Flew, 2009, p. 4); the co-opting of artists into “already settled” cultural planning processes (O’Regan, 2001, p. 16); the presentation of the city as a space of uncontested, passive and manufactured consumption (Pasquinelli, 2007;

McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b); and the promotion of creative initiatives at the expense of projects directed at “poorer social groups” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 72).

Equally, the often “defensive” justification of culture (Belfiore, 2012, p. 103) associated with instrumentalism is primarily concerned with the outcome rather than process of cultural activity and specifically, quantifiable and managed outcomes (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 33). In this way, instrumentalism can be viewed as a form of instrumental reason, treating people and things (in this case culture) as a means to an end (usually social or economic), concerning the use of knowledge for particular ends (Habermas, 1984, p. 8).

There are other problems with instrumentalism, however. It has been claimed that the emphasis on quantitative measurement and evidence-based policy in instrumentalism not only undervalues culture, but is unable to deal with the “thorny” issue of the greater value of culture in society and political life (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105). Further and critically, it is also claimed that arguing for, or depending on, “non-cultural benefits that are meant to flow from [the] investment” makes it harder to justify specifically cultural spending (Mundy, 2000, p. 23). This is a key factor in the political positioning of culture and highlights the dangers of framing and judging it in terms of other “already crowded” (Gray, 2002, p. 87) ministerial agendas. This situation also raises the question of whether non-cultural outcomes are better addressed through other government portfolios and suggest that if cultural policy is “merely a reflection of other areas”, there are questions as to the “role and purpose” of the ministry or department in the first place (Nisbett, 2013, p. 97).

Over the past decade or so, however, in response to this overwhelmingly negative view of instrumentalism (and mirroring the utilitarian/romantic debate), counter discourses of positive instrumentalism have developed. These discourses invert “traditional” (ibid., p.

97) views of instrumentalism by combining a pragmatic acknowledgment of it, with supportive and positive rationales. This view has been acknowledged as “unorthodox”

(ibid., p 84) and is aligned with the view of instrumentalism as a “constructive and creative attempt[s] to elaborate a coherent theory of art and an intellectually sophisticated view of the effects of the arts on individuals and societies” consistent with the understanding that art/culture has always served a ruling class agenda (Belfiore, 2012, p. 103).

This discourse underlines the role of instrumentalism in fulfilling a function in society, and how it facilitates culture being “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). This view also works off the basis that the “attribution of cultural value” is to a certain extent dependant on instrumentalism (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105) and that “ideology-free policy-making”, or policy-making without values and purpose, is a myth (ibid., p. 107). This assessment is supported by claims that policy is endemically and intrinsically instrumental, given that it is clearly “designed to achieve something” (Gray, 2007, p.

205) and that instrumentalism is inevitable in a bureaucratic context (McGuigan, 2004, p. 53).

In addition, some argue that instrumentalism is simply a useful discursive construct that gives “certain initiatives in cultural policy a name” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5), and that the

“diagnosis” of instrumentalism in cultural policies is a positive and resistant act, which calls to attention key issues and operates as a kind of “cleansing process” (ibid., p. 12).

It is also claimed that discourses of instrumentalism in cultural policy are exaggerated and distracting (ibid., p. 11), (as above) confined to English language countries (Sar, 2009, p. 54), lead to a “sterile dichotomy” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 7) and need to

be tested “against empirical evidence”, rather than debated “abstractly” in scholarly journals (Nisbett, 2012, p 17). Some also feel that the issue is not instrumentalism per se, but the particular function to which the arts (or culture) is put (Vuyk, 2010, p. 178).

This concept of positive instrumentalism, though clearly a legitimation of particular cultural practices (i.e. working with other government agendas), is closely linked to the concept of attachment policies (Gray, 2002), as introduced in Chapter One.³¹ Attachment policies are a “mechanism for achieving policy ends” (ibid., p. 81) by attaching “solutions to other sets of policy objectives which are seen as being more worthy or which have higher levels of political importance” and can shift to suit

“differing sets of priorities over time” (ibid.). Critically, these strategies are a

“conscious approach to the fulfilment of long-term plans which could not otherwise be achieved”, aim to secure the “necessary political support” for the sector (ibid.) and to provide “parameters for the assessment of the validity and utility” of cultural objectives (ibid., p. 80). The concept of attachment derives from a policy vacuum in UK local government cultural policies, whereby there were no “clear set of priorities for the [cultural] sector as a whole” so that in pursuing other local objectives, cultural priorities could be left to national cultural bodies (ibid., p. 79). Attachment, therefore, is presented as a conscious and it is suggested, voluntary strategy of a weak sector in need of legitimation.

While some view instrumentalism as inevitable but either largely or potentially negative (i.e. McGuigan, Belfiore respectively), therefore, others view it as a wholly positive mechanism that offers “highly beneficial” artistic opportunities for practitioners,

31 This concept follows Oliver Bennett’s concept of the “attachment of the arts to a governmental agenda in the XIX century” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 145).

allowing them to “forge partnerships, generate income” and expand artistic possibilities (Nisbett, 2012, p. 1), as suggested in the concept of attachment. Consequently, it can be argued, that there are two or perhaps three types of instrumentalisms, a pragmatic view of its inevitability, a negative instrumentalism and a positive instrumentalism. Whether instrumentalism is viewed as a pragmatic response to non-negotiable pressures from central governments, a genuine engagement with the possibilities of other agendas, or a negative and limiting force in cultural policy, however, it is a central process in legitimacy-creation, a factor acknowledged by linking it to “self-protection” and

“survival” (Nisbett, 2013, p. 97). Equally, a positive or negative approach to instrumentalism is determined by ideological factors, and, it is argued, the level of trust in and perceived independence (from outside pressures) of those making policy. The issue of trust (amongst the stakeholders), autonomy or voluntarism (in terms of attaching non-cultural agendas to cultural policy), is a key consideration in relation to instrumental and attached discourses like the creative city and will be discussed below.

Nevertheless, given the dominance and normative status of the economy in most policy discourses, as the following chapter will demonstrate, there are questions as to whether attachment or instrumentalism is always conscious (given the now normative status of instrumentalism) or voluntary (given the dependency of culture on wider political approval). As the concept of attachment implies, cultural practitioners are typically indentured to other government ministries and priorities, as well as the general precariousness of changes in political administrations. Equally, it has been acknowledged that attachment may “imply the absence of any clear long-term Strategy”

for cultural policy, that it involves an element of “band-wagon jumping” (Gray, 2002, p.

80) and that it may not represent a “workable solution” (ibid., p. 82). Similarly, since

attachment has migrated from local to national cultural policies, there is a vacuum in cultural policymaking.

The continued lack of autonomy of cultural policy has been underlined in recent comments from the UK’s culture secretary who spoke of the need to use economic arguments for culture in order to get “traction” (or legitimacy) from the Secretary’s other colleagues, as much as the “country at large” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.). This comment reflects other views of the need for culture ministries to make stronger arguments to more important “Finance and Prime Ministers” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). This deferral to other government colleagues introduces a second group from whom legitimacy must be secured, that of central government, as referred to in Chapter Two.

This lack of voluntary engagement with other government agendas is an important consideration in relation to the endemic nature of instrumentalism and the question of cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987).