The Theoretical Idea
Culture is a variable in political analysis (e.g. Harrison and Huntington eds. 2000), and to examine it in relation to politics is to study it as political culture. Political culture can be defined as a ‘particular pattern of orientations to political action’ (Almond 1956: 396). A more precise concept is to view it as set of norms, beliefs and sentiments that give meaning to a political process which drive and direct behaviour in a political system (Wiarda 2014; Welch 2013; Aronoff 2002; Almond & Diamond 1994; Kedou 1994; Chilton 1988). Political systems are relative embodiments of political cultures, democratic or otherwise. A group of prominent scholars (e.g. Putnam 1993; 1995; Huntington 1996) argued that cultural traditions shape the political behaviour of their societies, reaffirming the relationship between political systems and socio-political conditions. This is where the cultural modernizationists derive their core idea that a democratic political system is the embodiment of a democratic political culture. They want to get to the root of the factors that cause cultural change, so that by identifying such factors they could predict the result of the political form of cultural transformation. The idea that a certain form of political culture could lead to political democracy has its roots in the cultural aspects of modernization theory. The main argument is that modernization is a profound process that transforms primordial cultures into modern ones (see, Lerner 1958). 48
That shift in cultural values, caused by economic
48A similar understanding of modernisation in the context of the Middle East countries is developed by Daniel Lerner (1958). Who argued that modernization occurs when certain aspects of the cultural changes are stimulated by Western industrial urbanism, that is, exposure to, and presumed participation
transformation of modes of production and industrialisation, eventually brings about changes in political structures. With time, such a cultural transformation produces, or forms, new identities which tend towards liberal values, the cultural prerequisite to liberal democracy.
General Pattern: Previous Empirical Studies
Different empirical studies have examined the intricate interactions between the dominant cultural values in societies, relative to their political systems, particularly, to unravel how economic and political developments are associated. Two different patterns can be distinguished, the first being the attempt to identify what is the most important variable responsible in making democracy more likely. This includes an inquiry into the political culture to ascertain its primary traits and to show how the importance of political culture for democracy could be weighed. The second is the attempt to identify the most significant factor in the prevention of the establishment of democracy. This view treats culture as a consistent phenomenon that will not disappear. Empirical studies offer different and, at times, opposing findings.
A study drawing on a large body of evidence from approximately 85 percent of the world’s population, shows that the cultural values of people are changing, which in turn influences their political and religious perspectives. It takes modernization as a predictable process of human development that inexorably leads towards a predestined end result in which modernization is the vehicle and liberalism is the destination (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As a process in human development, economic advancement brings about the kind of cultural transformation that ensures those values of individualism and individual freedoms are progressively more likely.
In this study, the researchers designed a model of social change to predict the way in which value systems play the central role in emerging, democratic institutions. The core idea is that coherent cultural change, the product of modernization, is conducive to democratisation. It concludes that cultural changes are the most significant intervening variable between economic development and political end results based on a revised version of modernization theory. If the early theory of modernization held the
in, the mass media of communication and political awareness. In chapter 5, this thesis argues that Lerner is wrong, in the case of Iraq (see, section 5.2).
hypothesis that economic liberalisation could lead to political democratisation, the revised version suggests that cultural liberalisation could bring about the same result. The intervening culture variable suggests that societies are fundamentally determined by cultural conditions and the end result of this determinism in human progress is liberalism.
However, other scholars draw a distinction between what is western and what is modern (Huntington 1996). While non-western nations might strive to become wealthy, to develop, and to have access to modern technology and science, this does not necessarily indicate their willingness to accept western values as well. This view differentiates modernization from liberalisation and westernisation. The process of modernization is not an escalator ascending to the ultimate end point of liberalism but is rather one in which cultures modernise alongside their own inherent and intrinsic values. Another line of argument portrays culture as either an obstacle to, or a facilitator of, the emergence of a western type of liberal democracy. The main argument contends that the most important distinctions between peoples are no longer ideological, political, or economic; ‘they are cultural’ (Huntington 1996: 21).49
In relation to Islam, it has been argued that ‘governmental legitimacy’ flows from religious doctrine but that the ‘Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics’ (Huntington 1991: 28). As far as Islam is concerned, such views fail to differentiate between the doctrine as articulated in the Koran and peoples’ interpretation of it, or indeed their implementation in practical scenarios. It is certain that the Islamic doctrine involves principles that may be both supportive and antagonistic to democracy, but the interpretation of Muslims varies on a spectrum from liberal to anti-liberal. Based on Islamic doctrine, governmental authority comes from the people and not from religious doctrine. Islam outsources political authority to the people. Islamic doctrine with regards to politics (Quran 42: 38) does not prevent consultation or elections. If culture is taken as an intervening variable, it is a Muslim democracy, not an Islamic democracy, that has to be examined (Chapter 5).
49 There is a reoccurring theme in Huntington’s writings (1991; 1993; 1996); some cultures (i.e. Confucius and Islamic) show a great resistance to accepting western views of democracy.
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies
There are different views on whether the political culture in Iraq is a facilitator or a barrier to the emergence of democracy. Studies on either side tend not to be systematic analyses of the political culture in Iraq. Different authors point to structural factors that in their totality indicate the political culture in Iraq.
Those who highlight the obstacles note the lack of a vibrant civil society, the weakness of a national identity, the presence of a deeply divided society and structures that are extremely unfavourable for democracy. It is further argued (Diamond 2004; Diamond 2005a; Milton-Edwards 2006; Mokhtari 2008; Moon 2009; Parker 2012) that as a country with a society divided along ethnic and religious lines, Iraq is a long way from meeting most of the social and cultural conditions for democracy. One of the key factors holding back Iraq from becoming democratic is its legacy of an authoritarian culture and the absence of a historic democratic culture.
Of those who argue against the possibility of a democratic Iraq, Bruce E. Moon is the most pessimistic. His views stem from his assessment of the prospects for democracy based on the historical precedents of cases with similar contexts. He advances the argument that both theory and evidence indicate that a set of structural factors are necessary conditions for transition and Iraq lacks all of them. Those structural factors could be summed up in the phrase, ‘lack of a democratic culture’. He concludes that, even in a quarter century, the odds of Iraq achieving democracy are close to zero (Moon 2009).
In response to the argument that contents the obstacles to the emergence of democracy in Iraq are cultural, counter arguments have been put forward that democracy in Iraq is not solely subject to the legacies of authoritarianism and the absence of a history of democratic institutions (see, Dawisha 2005). With reference to historical experiences, the 1921-58 era, is called the period of democratic attitudes and practices, demonstrating that there were traditions of political pluralism and experiences of representative political institutions and believes that post 2003 Iraq does not suffer from a deficit in democratic culture. Moreover, along similar lines, with a focus on pluralism and culture, it has been argued that Iraq, between 1921-58, was more democratic and
pluralistic than is generally believed (see, Bashkin 2009).
The above arguments are presented in support of the feasibility of democracy in Iraq and regard the country as the best candidate in the region for democratisation. Supporting structural factors include the cultural variable. Daniel Byman (2003), for instance, points out that before the Gulf War, Iraq had probably the ‘best educated, most secular, and the most progressive population of all of the Arab states’ (Byman 2003b: 72). Bearing that in mind, other scholars (e.g. Alterman 2003: 158; Byman 2003b: 72; Baracati 2004: 158; Ryan 2010: 65) have advanced the idea that if established correctly, Iraq’s democracy could become ‘a successful model’ of democracy for the Middle East.
Conclusion
It has been argued that modernization as the liberalisation of cultures is an inevitable process (Inghlhart and Welzel 2005). The change of value systems has been regarded as a cultural shift with culture being the prime intervening variable responsible for the emergence of political democracy. That view is opposed by those who, like Huntington (1996), view culture to be a persistent phenomenon, and argue cultures revive along value systems peculiar to themselves. In arguing for the possibility of democracy based on culture, the existing literature offers mixed views and propositions. Some argue Iraq lacks the sort of political culture that any type of political democracy requires, while others argue that Iraq’s political culture is a relative facilitator for political democracy, in comparison to other countries in the region.
The fundamental question that remains is, ‘In the context of Iraq, what constitutes the political culture?’ What is clear is that Iraq does not have a single political culture. It has not been successful in creating a unified single national identity, or a coherent social structure. Both ethnicity and religion are component parts of the political culture. Each group has developed its distinctive political culture; among the Shia, religious elements prevail, among the Kurds, ethno-nationalism, and among the Sunni, Arab solidarity is dominant. In this context, it is not a matter of whether the political culture is resistant or receptive to democracy, but rather that the political culture of each group demands a specific type of democracy consistent with its values.