ORIGEN DE LA DEUDA ADUANERA

In the following, I will be presenting main empirical findings related to talent management in the IFRC, and examining what I consider key factors underpinning the findings.

The term ‘talent management’ is used in the Secretariat and introduced as a component in the HR Strategic Framework (IFRC, 2016, Confidential). Talent management is considered one of the three key focus areas of HR, the other two being leadership and management development, and “enabling

environment conductive to Growth”83_{. Talent management is defined as}

processes designed to attract, develop, motivate, and retain employees who are both engaged and productive, which seems aligned with the definition among the majority of practitioners and researchers. However, some differences can be identified; firstly, succession planning is presented both separately (talent management and succession planning as one of the three key focus areas) and as an integral part of talent management. Another confusing aspect is the notion of seeing succession planning as ensuring ‘the right people in the right place at the right time’, which is usually considered the very core of talent management. This would imply that in the IFRC, talent management equals succession planning.

Furthermore, the target group of talent management practices is not clearly defined, albeit it is indicated that talent management involves identifying key positions and matching them with ‘potential talent’, and ensuring that relevant skills and competencies are developed. Definitions of who is considered a talent or ‘potential talent’ are not presented, and talent management is viewed as a process implemented by HR managers. There is no indication of how field staff, i.e. personnel working in delegations or emergency operations, benefits from the talent management processes even if each region has a dedicated HR Regional Manager. Based on the information gathered from interviews (June, 2016) and other research material at my disposal (Table 8 lists IFRC-related material), talent management is not recognized as a process at the Secretariat, let alone in field delegations. It is, at the most, regarded as a development initiative. Development initiatives, in turn, seem to, at least to most of the interviewees, equal to the e-learning courses available for all IFRC employees and some obligatory trainings, like WORC (The world of Red Cross Red Crescent) or Humanitarian Diplomacy (IFRC, HR Strategic Framework, 2016, Confidential).

The scoping study (BRC, 2011) refers to talent management or rather its lack at the IFRC, and argues that a long-term talent management strategy is necessary if a high-quality pool of HEOps and D-HEOps is to be maintained. Furthermore, and I fully agree, the BRC study (2011) proposes that talent management related to the HEOps pool, D-HEOps and respective rosters should be handled not by the HR department but by the DCPRR itself. This would denote a ‘talent scout’ dedicated to looking for candidates to fulfill leadership and management positions in emergency operations, and cooperating to this end with the National Societies. The ‘scouting’84 _would

have a wider scope than merely the HEOps pool and its rosters, albeit with a focus on developing and maintaining them. The eventual benefits of talent

83 Quotation from a document entitled IFRC; HRD and Talent Management. Received from the author in June 2016, Confidential. The publishing date is not indicated on the document.

84 E.g. OCHA has a talent scout who works in cooperation with some head hunting partners (BRC study, 2011).

management for HEOps and D-HEOps are further discussed in Section 7.4 and in Chapter 8.

The context of HEOps and D-HEOps involves a myriad of players and stakeholders; stakeholders and partners in an emergency operation in the field can include, in addition to the IFRC team and relevant Secretariat employees, the Operating National Society (ONS), e.g. the Philippines Red Cross during Typhoon Haiyan, the Participating National Societies (PNS) in the field, e.g. American Red Cross with several delegates in the typhoon operation, and donor societies, e.g. Finnish Red Cross. This requires a great deal of negotiation, communication and influencing skills from anyone working in the operations, particularly from HEOps, which should be emphasized in their identification and recruitment. Furthermore, as stated above, as the majority of leadership work takes place in emergencies, the position needs to grant sufficient authority to make timely decisions. In addition, in discussing the current shift of NGOs becoming more businesslike, Claeyé states (2014, p. 438) that managers and employees of NGOs cannot be passive recipients of orders, but are expected to be “capable of initiative, creativity and intelligence, and who are assumed to be self-motivated.” (Claeyé, 2014, p. 444). This authority inherent in the HEOps position together with competencies and skills important in the role are elaborated on in the following.

The growing complexity of disasters coupled with an interest among the public and institutional donors towards humanitarian aid and its impact and effectiveness have raised the standards of reporting and raised the level of scrutiny and accountability. This development requires internal support from the organization, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and well-prepared leaders who display the afore-mentioned characteristics of initiative and creativity, to mention just a few. The IFRC does not traditionally support these characteristics, and risk aversion is relatively high (BRC, 2011). Additionally, a lack of competent emergency leaders still prevails despite HEOps and D-HEOps improving the situation.

The lack of competent leaders has led to the same individuals often close to retirement age being deployed to increasingly complex operations with a significantly higher amount of stakeholders than in the past, while requiring new ways of working and decision-making. An ability to react to a highly complex environment is often not among the strengths of extremely seasoned emergency leaders (BRC, 2011). This can first and foremost represent a reputational risk to the IFRC. It can also be argued to add to the reluctance to accept leaders coming to emergency operations from outside the more permanent field delegations; if no added value is accumulated, the leaders can be perceived as a threat to the leaders in the field and their decision-making, which in turn can nibble away some of the authority of the HEOps to make decisions and implement decisions (BRC, 2011, interviews December 2014, June 2016).

Challenges in accepting the HEOps’ role by more established leaders in the Regions are reflected in the following statements and notions. The

first quote is linked to the importance of the Regional Offices as they act as recipients of the HEOps’ services: “Since their recruitment in early April 2012, the three HEOps staff members have been deployed nine times into six different operations on behalf of three of the Federation’s Regional offices, representing approximately 40 per cent of their working time on contract.” (HEOps Progress Report, IFRC, 2014). However, the review points out that the three HEOps incumbents are not recognized and used by the Regions as ‘strategic leaders’, as the Regions seem to think ‘we can handle it’. “The HEOps are a global Federation-wide resource, not a Geneva tool to be resisted” (Mid-Term Review, HEOps, IFRC, 2014, p. 3. Confidential). Furthermore, one of the interviewees85 _{also expressed}

concerns over a lack of clarity in how leadership responsibilities are shared in emergency operations at the regional level.

The same challenges in accepting HEOps/D-HEOps by the Regional offices is still evident, despite the pool already existing for several years (D-HEOps induction workshop, presentation 3.3.2016. IFRC, 2016. Confidential). A lack of communication about D-HEOps (and HEOps) is considered one of the reasons, which has led to the low conspicuousness of the pool and rosters. The low awareness level was confirmed by the interviews and conversations conducted by the author of this research report at the Secretariat in June 2016. Including some of the interviewees, surprisingly many were unfamiliar with the HEOps pool and rosters. This issue can be serious and endanger the existence of the HEOps pool and related development and maintenance, especially if the lack of awareness hampers funding and support from the National Societies.

Regarding the competency frameworks in use in the IFRC for the HEOps and D-HEOps, a question arises whether the list of required competencies is too long and detailed. Detailed competency lists are discussed by Mirabile (1997), who claims that lists that are too detailed lead to restrictions in their effective usage, including ‘information that is less comparable across jobs and people’, and ‘creativity that is more inhibited in terms of allowing alternative ways to work and reach the same objectives’. (1997, p. 76). Creativity in finding alternative ways of working is particularly valid in the complex and unpredictable context of global disasters of today as discussed above. Additionally, the range of acceptable performance is more limited (Mirabile, 1997). I posit that the aforementioned points are valid for the HEOps and relate to the very detailed competency framework used in their identification, selection and development.

The combination of competencies required from HEOps seems extremely broad and all-encompassing. The IFRC also seems to use terms without actually defining them or looking at their general meaning in the corporate world or research. Examples of ill-defined or vague terms are ‘core competencies’, ‘skills’, and ‘strategic competencies’. The usage of the

terms ‘strategic’ and ‘strategy’ in the IFRC was discussed earlier in Section 7.1. The other terms and their unclear meanings were also referred to in Section 7.1.1.

A problem can eventually arise when competencies and skills are used as a basis for e.g. development plans and should be understood in terms of development activities contributing to their enhancement.86

To prevent the afore-mentioned problem and foster an understanding of the competencies, a framework was introduced as a tool, which displays specific behaviors valued by the IFRC and the beneficiaries of assistance. The framework is also supposed to provide a common language and basis for objective performance standards. According to the document, competencies relate to knowledge, attitudes, behaviors, and abilities that a person working for the IFRC should demonstrate. Competencies, then, are expressed through specific actions allowing them to be observed. Furthermore, when competencies are combined with skills, both professional and technical, they are expected to define the behaviors that drive the achievement of individual and team objectives.

The five domains of competencies within the IFRC Emergency Team Leader Competency Framework (2013) are as follows: