Paul’s quotation below suggests there are some instances that are beyond the realms of investigation. This view was not shared by others interviewed and may reflect recent changes regarding the charging of a defendant and whether a case goes to trial without consultation with the CPS25. Paul having worked in the area of child protection and historical cases of CSA for many years suggests that there are some experiences that he would probably not investigate unless there was corroborating evidence. This might be in the case of recovered memories that have been activated many years following the trauma.
‘And if it’s come back, if they had no knowledge of it, but they know that something’s wrong and then they say, “It’s come back to me in flashbacks,” or, “I’ve been having dreams about what happened to me,” then to be perfectly honest with you, if that was all we had and there was nothing to corroborate what they were saying, the likelihood is that it wouldn’t go anywhere’. (PAUL)
As discussed in the literature in chapter 4, people often experience intrusive traumatic memories that cause distress or experience nightmares relating to some aspects of abuse. Often these first recollections can be fragments of memories
25 Investigators and prosecutors work on a case together but decisions to prosecute is
that are decontextualised and lack a definitive time scale (Brewin and Andrews, 1998). This is not uncommon and can be understood by the existing literature on recovered memories as outlined in previous chapters (Dell and O’Neil, 2009; Lanius et al. 2015). More time allowed to examine these memories at this point in time may have been useful but taking into account any leading or suggestive questioning could have devastating results leading to wrongful conviction (Savage and Milne, 2007).
Understandably, a recovered memory that is vague and has only just appeared to be recognised by the witness on a conscious level may be a difficult case to investigate. Very often recovered memories are activated by an external cue in the individual’s current situation. Nightmares of the traumatic event can replicate the trauma experience or may constitute some representation of the event and will have significant salient factors relative to this (Davis and Dalgleish, 2001). As discussed in previous chapters there is a lot of controversy regarding the initiation of trauma memories and the concern that gaps will be confabulations of the truth (Barclay, 1993; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). From a legal perspective there are a number of contentious issues. Arguably, Dalenberg et al. (2012) completed a meta-analysis of thirty-eight studies and concluded that the relationship between dissociation and trauma could be seen across varying research paradigms, cross culturally and over time. Dalenberg et al. (2012) also concluded that recovered memories are as accurate as continuously recalled memories. Arguably, more recent studies have shown that individual differences measures do not correlate with false memory incidence but conclude that all memories are vulnerable to misinformation effects(Patihis et al. 2018).
As discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 4, there is evidence that suggestions can lead to an integration into an individual’s own memory and this is more apparent with susceptible clients. Much of the literature reports that the implanted memory is more likely to be integrated if it is plausible, ‘it feels right’ and is context related. Garoff-Eaten et al. (2006) suggest that the associative network is triggered from a single cue such as asking an individual to remember a person, we are likely to retrieve information from different memory localities and these may consist of factual information about the person, a visual representation and an emotional
reaction. Holmes and Mathews (2010) suggest it is mental imagery that mediates the emotional response that is particularly relevant to those with PTSD. Garoff- Eaton et al (2006) studied electro-cortical responses and the neuronal activity within the brain. They recorded similar responses with the same intensity for both true memories and related false memories. Slotnick and Schacter (2004) suggest that memory activation can be created by any related cue. We are also prone to recalling memory that has a similar theme or by a part formed memory trace but this may not be the complete accurate memory (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Persinger (1992) holds therapist suggestibility and false interpretations of client material as evidence of ‘false memories being implanted’. Persinger (1992) also purports that individuals may absorb false imaginations and mistake them for their own personal memories after reading about events of CSA in self help books. Harvey and Herman (1994, p. 296) emphasise ‘there is no evidence to suggest
that psychotherapists have the degree of power and influence that would be required to produce this fabricated memories effect’.
Meyersburg et al. (2009) set out to investigate the mechanisms involved in the inhibition of memories from childhood and equally, the underlying structures involved in forming false memories. Previous laboratory experiments have used the Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm of associated word lists in order to investigate which participants are more prone to naming an associated word not on the list. Findings have suggested that those who have recovered memories may be more prone to including the ‘false word’ on either the recall test or on a recognition test. Conclusions of these studies suggest that these participants have developed a false memory. There has been criticism of these experiments as not being relative to ‘real life’ and significantly different to the recovery of a traumatic memory (Gallo, 2006). It could also be argued that although some of the detail was incorrect, the general memory was in fact in place (Brewer, 1986). Arguably, if the participants had been victims of childhood abuse, then research suggests that this might impact on their cognitive functioning and memory. If an individual has a weakness in their autobiographical memory and also in their ‘working memory’ or executive functioning, it could be that memories
are stored more thematically rather than in detail and this could be the cause for the false recognitions of words (Holmes et al. (2005).
Clancy et al. (2000) found that there was a higher rate of false recognition with women who reported CSA and had forgotten the memory and later recovered it, compared to other adult women victims of CSA who had never forgotten their abuse. Gallo (2006) emphasises the idiosyncratic nature of individuals who have recovered memories and findings are not limited to the internalisation of false memories. Geraerts et al. (2007) make a distinction between processes by which memories are recovered. Memories that have been recovered spontaneously by an environmental cue or reminder are relatively verifiable whereas Geraerts et al. (2007) reported less validity and corroboration in the group that had recovered their memories during suggestive psychotherapy. Meyersburg et al. (2009) also claimed that the are some ‘individuals who are more prone to elevated absorption
and magical ideation and that individuals are less likely to be able to discriminate between imagined and real events’.
Paul drew attention to the fact that it might be difficult for others to understand why a witness can’t remember something and Fiona suggests that she may hear some colleagues talking in this way:
‘When she was asked to look at pictures, she couldn't remember. Because it's just such a blur when you actually deal with it and it's easy to sit there and say, “Oh, she can't remember what he looks like. It must not have happened.” (PAUL)
And I even hear some of them say, “Can she remember? Or is it that she doesn’t want to remember? What’s the truth here?” (FIONA) In some cases the police participants expressed some frustration in the knowledge that these difficulties in memory recall would impact on the outcome of the case. They found it particularly difficult when these problems were more complex and difficult to make sense of. Fiona, although empathic to her witness’s experience finds it hard to understand how the individual did remember and then a couple of hours later forgot.
she didn’t want anyone to get arrested wrongly. Now she knew in her mind, she knew that it was something that happened to her but because she couldn’t remember exactly, she says, “I’m not sure really what happened and I’m not sure if he would've known I didn’t consent.” And bang, there’s our problem. Because she couldn’t remember she was convincing herself it hasn’t happened.’ (FIONA). ‘She rang me and she said, “Look. I keep sort of, I’ll be somewhere or I’ll read something.” And she said she was in the library and she read a word and she doesn’t know what it was about that word but it caused the first flashbacks’ and I said, ‘How do I document that now?’ (FIONA)