Otros componentes de la mezcla del marketing

It turns out that lexical causatives o f action verbs can never be equivalent in meaning to the analytical causative. Analytical causatives have two predicates, each retaining its event structure. Thus, there can be two agents, one o f the causative predicate, and one o f the original predicate:

(52)

'Laura made Nina work'.

I argued before that an analytical causative takes a whole I/TP, rather than just a predicate o f change of state. The upper v may either surface as a distinct lexical item (make, have) or as a causative morpheme (as in Japanese). Because there are two events (and two Ts, which license two agents), there may also be two agents. The originator of the basic verb is not internalized, but is generated as an external argument. It may therefore retain all the properties which are normally associated with agents, such as volition, control over the event, etc. Thus, there are no restrictions on the originator of the causative predicate - it can be either a person, or a force, or some desire or intention of the originator o f the main predicate. The incompatibility o f lexical causatives with a desire or intention as the originator (cf. 21-22) is explained: the participant which used to be the originator is now generated internally. However, it is asserted that it does act on purpose, or has volition (i.e., originates an event). This incoherence results in a deviant, or uninterpretable sentence. ' '

' ' The restriction on causative forms o f unergatives seems to be stronger in English. According to Cruse (1972) and Reinhart (1991), the causer has to be a "real" agent, i.e., animate, acting on purpose, etc., and not some natural force:

Given the difference in their event structure, we should expect that the meanings of lexical and analytical causatives formed from unergatives should differ in a systematic way: the analytic causative consists of two predicates, each retaining its event-structure properties. The lexical causative is a "fusion" of two independent events into one predicate - so one participant has to give up its former role. It is specifically the interpretation this role, the original agent, which distinguishes the two types o f causatives. I pointed out in section 4.3 that lexical causatives o f action verbs often have idiomatic, or "special" meanings, while the meaning o f analytic causatives is completely predictable, that is, cause to V. This, too, is expected: morphological causatives o f action verbs cannot mean cause to V; therefore, they either mean "put someone into action", as with make-laugh and make-run, or have some other meaning, related to the basic form, but not automatically derived. Some o f these cases are:

(53) CaCaC hiCCiC

kana (buy, acquire) hikna (provide with - only abstract objects) ‘avad (work) he'evid (employ, have one work for you) katav (write) hixtiv (dictate)

satal (plant) histil (transplant) saxar (rent from...) hiskir (rent to...)

ganav (steal) higniv (smuggle in, insert stealthily) zarak (throw) hizrik (inject)

Let us now compare the causativization of action verbs to that o f unaccusatives or states. With unaccusatives and states there is no problem to add an originator to the event. No argument loses its original role and therefore their meanings are, indeed, roughly equivalent to "cause to V" or "cause to be in a state" as in (12) and (14). The difference between the lexical and the analytical form amounts to the degree of involvement o f the causer in the action (cf. Comrie 1985, Miyagawa 1997). As noted above, the lexical causative implies a manipulative action on the causer's side and an

immediate connection between the action of the causer and the caused event. The analytical causative implies a "directive" interpretation, or a mere involvement of the causer: "John broke the stick implies an immediate connection between John's action and the breaking of the stick, for example he broke it by standing on it...whereas John caused the stick to break suggests a rather mediated chain o f events, for example, John pushed against the lever that released the weight that fell on the stick..." (Comrie 1985:333). The difference between lexical and analytical causatives, in their degrees of involvement on the causer's part, exists in Hebrew as well:

(54) a. Roz hipila et Nina

the make-fall OM Nina

b. Roz garma le Nina lipol

Roz caused to Nina to fall

(54a), but not (54b), implies that the causation is direct, and that Roz was personally and physically involved in Nina's falling. Only (54b) can be felicitously uttered in a situation in which Roz had left a heavy stone on the road the day before, which Nina failed to see as she was running. Similarly, (54b) would sound weird, if not unacceptable, in a situation in which Roz seized Nina and put her down to the floor.

Finally, note that idioms with causativized unaccusatives (as opposed to those formed from unergatives) may appear either in the direct, lexical causative, or in the analytic form. The difference between the two is, again, in the "directness" of the causation:

(55) a. ze hoci oti me ha kelim it make-exit me from the vessels Tt drove me mad' (direct causation)

Goldberg (1995) discusses similar data from Chichewa, where causatives can be formed either by a causative predicate and a main verb appearing independently, or by incorporation o f the main verb into the causative predicate. In the latter case, causation has to be direct.

b. ze garam li lacet me ha kelim it made to me exit from the vessels 'It drove me mad' (indirect causation)