Otros estudios

We are trying to argue that risk of harm is itself harmful. If risk is itself harmful, we can easily accommodate why we have rights against risk of harm. Since it might be bad for us when our desires are frustrated, and we have desires not to be at risk of harm, risk might be harmful when our desires not to be at risk are frustrated.

Recall again that the Desire Theory says that what is good for an individual is the fulfil-ment of their desires. There are several choice-points for the Desire Theorist. We just considered whether the desires that are relevant for the Desire Theory are individuals’

actual or informed desires. The choice-point that is important for our purposes in this sub-section is whether the desires that are relevant are both individuals’ derivative and

non-140

derivative desires or only their non-derivative desires.¹⁶⁷ Let us say a person’s desire for some-thing is non-derivative if she desires it for its own sake, and her desire for somesome-thing is derivative if she desires it, but not for its own sake. On what we can call the Non-Deriva-tive Desire Theory, what is good for an individual is only the fulfilment of their non-derivative desires. On the Unrestricted Desire Theory, what is good for an individual is both the fulfilment of their derivative and non-derivative desires.

Suppose that Dan wants it to snow in the mountains so that he can get some good skiing in. It does snow but, as it turns out, Dan does not end up going skiing (Heathwood 2016, 139). Does the satisfaction of Dan’s desire that it snow in the mountains make his life go better for him, even though he does not end up going skiing? Dan’s desire that it snow was only a derivative desire. The satisfaction of Dan’s desire that it snows seems only to derive its value from his desire to get some good skiing in. Dan’s desire that he get some good skiing in is a non-derivative desire (or, at the least, closer to a non-derivative desire).

The Non-Derivative Desire Theory says Dan’s life does not go better for him. The Unre-stricted Desire Theory says his life does go better for him.

We have good reason to endorse the Non-Derivative Desire Theory. First, the Unre-stricted Desire Theory is intuitively implausible. As Chris Heathwood suggests, ‘intui-tively, the fulfillment of [Dan’s] desire that it snow was not in the end of any benefit to [Dan]’ (2016, 139).

Second, compare the following two worlds.¹⁶⁸ In both worlds, I want to eat an apple. In both worlds, one apple remains on a tree. In world 1, I need only to reach out to get the apple. In world 2, I need a ladder to reach the apple. To satisfy my desire to get the apple, I will also desire a ladder, though this desire will be only derivative. Luckily, there will be a ladder nearby. If the Unrestricted Desire Theory is correct, my life goes better for me in world 2 than it does in world 1. This is because, in both worlds, I get to satisfy my desire to eat an apple. But in world 2, I get to satisfy an additional desire—my desire for a ladder.

167 (Sidgwick 1981, 109; Heathwood 2005; 2016, 139). See (Parfit 1984, 117; 2011a, 58–59) for relevant discussion concerning the Desire Theory of reasons.

168 The case is inspired by (Parfit 2011a, 59).

141

But it is implausible that my life goes better for me in world 2 than world 1 in virtue of the satisfaction of the additional derivative desire.

So, we have good reason to prefer the Non-Derivative Desire Theory. Returning to risk, the Desire Solution works in the following way: if the Desire Theory (of wellbeing) is cor-rect, and if Target has a desire that Shooter not subject her to risk, Shooter harms Target.

She does so by frustrating Target’s desire not to be at risk. And, relating this to the broader problem under consideration in the thesis, the Problem of Pure Risk, if Shooter harms Target in Roulette, we can easily accommodate why Target has a right against Shooter subjecting her to risk of harm. However, Target’s desire that she not be at risk is a deriv-ative desire—it is derivderiv-ative upon, at the least, her non-derivderiv-ative desire that she not be harmed. And, if we ought to endorse the Non-Derivative Desire Theory, Target is not made worse off by the frustration of her desire not to be at risk. But this means that Target is not harmed by the frustration of that desire. So, the Desire Solution fails.

The preceding argument rests upon the claim that Target’s desire that Shooter not subject her to risk is merely a derivative desire. This seems fairly obvious to me—why would one desire not to be at risk of harm for its own sake? But perhaps it is not as obvious to everyone.

One way to support this claim is to consider a case in which one holds the desire not to be at risk of harm, though not the desire not to be harmed. Suppose that Bloggs is indif-ferent between being harmed to some degree and not being harmed. Suppose also that Bloggs’s indifference is rational—suppose, were she to be harmed, she would be compen-sated to the level that would leave her indifferent between not being harmed, and being harmed and compensated. Finally suppose that despite this indifference, Bloggs desires that she not be subject to risk of harm. Once we factor away any non-derivative reasons for which she might hold this desire not to be at risk, the desire looks very peculiar. (It is not that Bloggs desires not to be at risk because being so will make her anxious or on edge.

The desire also cannot be explained away with recourse to Bloggs’s being risk-adverse for her risk aversion will already be accommodated when determining the compensation owed.) The explanation for why this desire looks peculiar, I submit, is that it is a derivative desire without a non-derivative desire to latch onto.

142

One might object that showing how peculiar the desire not to be at risk would have to be in order for it to be derivative, as I have done, does not show that having a non-derivative desire not to be at risk is not possible. Rather, it shows only that it is peculiar.

And, because of this, risk can sometimes be itself harmful given the Desire Solution—

namely, when someone has a non-derivative desire not to be at risk of harm.

Perhaps this objection is onto something. However, I am inclined to think that these rare cases may be captured by other restrictions not discussed here on which desires get to count for the Desire Theory (for example, perhaps desires need to be sufficiently rational for their satisfaction or frustration to count towards one’s wellbeing, and perhaps non-derivative desires not to be subject to risk are not sufficiently rational). But I do not de-velop this here. Instead, note that this objection shows only that the Desire Solution would work in these extremely peculiar, rare cases in which someone has the desire not to be at risk for a non-derivative reason. And so, even if this objection is correct, the solution to the Problem of Pure Risk cannot lie in it being harmful given the Desire Solution—this would mean we have rights against risk only in these rare cases.

I have argued that the Desire Solution fails because the desire that we not be at risk of harm is a derivative desire (derivative upon our non-derivative desire not to be harmed);

and, the frustration of derivative desires does not itself constitute a diminishment to one’s wellbeing and, thereby, a harm. In section 4, we consider an argument against any view on which risk itself is harmful; this objection tells against the Desire Solution.

3. The Autonomy Solution